Epistemological Explorations in the Context of Religious Diversity
Keywords:
Epistemology, Evidence, Justification, Naturalism, Religious Experience, William AlstonAbstract
Ever since modern epistemology, with its scientistic orientation and foundationalist structure, took centre stage, religion has been on the defensive. Although both these features of modern epistemology have been challenged in the more recent times, it has not yet restored the credibility of religious knowledge. Briefly looking at William Alston’s attempt at doing epistemology of religious experience in the changed circumstances, it is seen that diversity (religious and otherwise) poses a serious challenge to his efforts. This paper explores how epistemology of religious experience may be further fine-tuned by naturalizing it. Since public evidence plays a crucial role in the emerging theory of epistemic justification, it is dubbed evidential naturalism. An initial exposition of evidential naturalism is provided.
References
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