KANT ON INCLINATIONS
‘ALIEN’ OR ‘HUMAN’?
Keywords:
KANT, ReasonAbstract
The central thrust of Kant’s ethics is practical as well as transcendental with its emphasis on the synthetic a priori nature of the moral law in the form of the categorical imperative. Kant defends the necessity and universality that are characteristic features of the moral law with a view to safeguard its transcendental justification and employment in the sensible world. In this process, however, he assigns an “alien” status to human inclinations, which technically includes human interests, desires, emotions, etc. The assumption that Kant’s moral perspective, by necessity, revolves around an integral human person calls for a reconsideration and appraisal of the role of human inclinations in realizing human destiny.
References
Kant, Groundwork, Ak. IV, 389 (Paton 57).
Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, Ak. VI, 215 (Gregor 12).
Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, Ak. VI, 217 (Gregor 15),
Kant, CPrR Ak. V, 61 (Beck 63);
Kant, Education, Ak. IX, 442, 447 (Churton 2, 13).
Kant’s Reflections: “Man is an animal who is in need of, and capable of, discipline by reason.” Kant, Reflection 1499, Ak. XV, page 782;
Kant, Reflection 1500, page 785, both quoted in Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason, 155
Kant, CPrR Ak. V, 93 (Beck 96). See also Kant, On the Old Saw, Ak. VIII, 278 (Ashton 45).
Kant, Groundwork, Ak. IV, 459n (Paton 128); see also Kant, CPrR Ak. V, 74-75 (Beck 77-78).
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 6.2.1139a36, quoted in Sullivan, Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory, 26; see also CPR B166; Groundwork, Ak. IV, 459n (Paton 128); CPrR Ak. V, 79 (Beck 82).
Kant, Religion, Ak. VI, 26-27 (Greene & Hudson 22-23);
Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 148-49;
Sullivan, Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory, 237.
Kant, Anthropology (Dowdell), 270; Kant, Religion, Ak. VI, 26 (Greene & Hudson 21).
Kant, CPrR Ak. V, 87 (Beck 89-90); see also Kant, Groundwork, Ak. IV, 428-29 (Paton 95-96).
