THE IS AND MORAL OUGHT OF INTER SUBJECTIVITY

Authors

  • Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr. DVK

Keywords:

Human Dialogue, Human Interaction, Interpersonal Relationship, Intersubjectivity

Abstract

The paper analyzes the possibility and moral normativity of intersubjectivity — here understood as referring to the kind of human interaction that respects the personhood of human beings. The analysis of the possibility of intersubjectivity inquires into the conditions of its occurrence; while the analysis of its moral normativity examines the basis of its status as a moral obligation. The paper advances two points. The first is the distinction between theoretical intersubjectivity, where persons are perceived or conceived as subjects and not as objects, and practical intersubjectivity, where persons are treated as ends and not merely as means. The second is the clarification that the imperativity of theoretical intersubjectivity (for involving perceptions and beliefs about persons) is epistemic while that of practical intersubjectivity (for involving intentions and actions towards persons) is moral. Given these points and the questionable status of the possibility of theoretical intersubjectivity (for requiring a nonconceptual knowledge of persons), confusing the latter with practical intersubjectivity would render the morality of intersubjectivity problematic.

Author Biography

Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr., DVK

Dr Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr. is a full professor of philosophy and a former chair of the Department of Philosophy of De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines. He specializes in the areas of ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.

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Published

2017-09-29

How to Cite

Mabaquiao, Jr., N. M. . (2017). THE IS AND MORAL OUGHT OF INTER SUBJECTIVITY . Journal of Dharma, 42(3), 271–288. Retrieved from https://dvkjournals.in/index.php/jd/article/view/257