TERRORISM
AND GLOBAL RESPONSE-ABILITY

Brad Bannon♦

1. Introduction

It was a Tuesday morning much like any other. I was printing and collating the annual budgetary report to distribute to my church congregation which I was to carry to the church staff meeting on the Upper West Side of Manhattan. The television was turned on, but the sound was muted. I gazed at the screen to see an astonishing image: the World Trade Center was ablaze. My first response was fear. Just a year earlier, I was a financial executive working on the 73rd floor of Tower Two and many of my former colleagues and friends were still working there. I noticed the radio tower through the smoke and flames and relaxed slightly – the fire was in Tower One. My friends must be OK. I turned the sound on and watched as the day unfolded in tragedy. Just an hour later, Tower Two collapsed. There could be no word to describe my emotion other than *terror*. The emotion did not subside for weeks. Somehow, all of my friends escaped from the 73rd floor. Others were not so fortunate. My best friend lost his cousin; a parishioner lost 40 friends and employees; our local fire station lost 90% of its staff.

Much of the emotion, in my opinion, is lost in the word *terror-ism*, which seems to objectify the emotion in a way that is all too academic. The theme for this issue of the Journal of Dharma is *Terrorism and Global Responsibility*. Well before 11 September 2001, but particularly after the events of that day, the global community has been somewhat entrenched in an atmosphere attuned by terrorism. I have chosen to begin this article, therefore, with this more personal recollection of that dark day in an attempt to overcome this objectification and make the word *terror*-ism somewhat more real. If we are to discuss global response and global responsibility, then we must not lose sight of the fact that the object of our response is an emotion: terror.

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But what of that other aspect of this journal's theme: Global responsibility? We run the risk, here, of linking these terms too closely by turning three words into two. What is the *ability* of the *globe* to *respond* at all? Do we have the kind of global community and global connection necessary to *respond* in a way that could be labelled *Global Response-ability*? It seems to me that this question is fundamentally necessary prior to any specific elucidation of a possible global response to terror-ism. Further, what about the linking together of terror and response? Formulated in this way (as a response to an emotional response), what possibilities are there? Can terror be responded *to* in any way that is not *terrified* or *terrorizing* or *terr(or)ific*? Can emotion somehow be removed from the equation? If this were possible, then would the re-action still be considered a 'response'? From this perspective, the theme of this journal is an effort to dis-cover our ability to respond as a global 'community' to the emotion of terror propagated by actions specifically intended to cause terror. This article seeks to examine these possible responses and, in doing so, cannot escape some comparison to the re-action (I do not think we can call it a 'response') to the events of 11/9/01 and those that have followed in Spain, London, Paris, Mumbai, Israel, Lebanon, Sudan, Iraq, and, most recently, in Hyderabad.

Let us consider the first question. What is the *ability* of the *globe* to respond at all? For the last 30 years, at least, we have often thrown around words like *global village*, *global community*, inter-national, and multi-lateral. But the pervasive use of such terminology does not mean that they actually exist. Of course, we have the United Nations, but this organization functions with great difficulty, if we can say that it functions much at all (humanitarian efforts aside). There was some measure of a global response to the tsunami in 2004 and somewhat less of one to the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005, but these responses were not so much unified as they were simultaneous.

So, if we are to discuss a global response, what might we imagine that would look like? I find myself unable to answer this question. The most obvious retort would seem to be the United Nations, but even this name indicates a unified entity of extant and separate nations. It is still a far cry from any kind of cosmopolitanism that would seem to be necessary to fit the term *global response-ability* and, even less, *global responsibility*.

2. The Collapse of the ἰδέα of 'Nation'

The inherent problem here is one of conception. The Platonic *idea* (ἰδέα or εἶδος) is one that seems to have run its course and is in need of abandonment. Our struggle to identify (or even imagine) a *global response* fails because the very concept of *idea* has failed us. Does not the *idea* of 'nation' objectify the citizens *of* that nation? Have we not imagined an entity with an existence all its own, of which we, as citizens, barely register as members? We say things like 'The USA has done this' or 'England has done that' or 'India's response was…'. The *idea* of 'nation' has become a monolithic entity which quashes the individuality of the very persons of which that 'idea' consists. For example, how might 'I' place myself with regard to the *national response* by the US to the terrorizing effects and affects of 11/9/01? Certainly, I shared in the emotional response of terror, but what of the 'national' re-action to invade Afghanistan and Iraq?

As a US Citizen, I neither agreed nor supported either re-action. I was not alone. My church, reeling from the loss of parishioners and friends who died on that day actively and loudly protested against the military action in both nations. One of my friends, a mother of two and daughter of a former US ambassador to Afghanistan, returned to the country where she grew up to serve as a human shield and a journalist to recount the atrocities en-acted in that re-action. The state of Vermont, which has the highest number of soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan per-capita, also has the most active secessionist movement of any state. Thomas N. Naylor, a leader in the association, explains that one reason for this movement is that, "The U.S. Government has lost its moral authority."[1]

These are but a few examples of how the term 'national response' fails when we examine the lives of real individuals within those 'nations'. The problem, once again, is the Platonic *ideal*. The idea (ἰδέα) of 'nation' does not exist. People (citizens) do. People respond and re-act quite differently from one another. Their *ability* to respond (personal response-ability) is fundamentally different because people are fundamentally different from one another. Because persons have different abilities to respond, they have different responsibilities. A person is not simply 'one

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[1]Naylor, Thomas H., "Secession: A Radical Act of Rebellion against the Empire," *http://www.vermontrepublic.org* (21 May 2007), Article 3.

of a people' because 'people' is a collection of persons. To define a 'citizen of the US' as one who is a member of the US 'nation' is specious reasoning. The US 'nation' consists of US citizens. Citizen must be defined first. The converse cannot be true. Once again, the Platonic 'idea' and the Kantian 'subject' collapse because they either objectify or subjectify what is most unique, most essential, and most Real: the person. The responsibilities of a people eclipse the responsibilities of persons because the commitment to the ἰδέα of 'nation' has eclipsed the commitment to persons. By attributing 'reality' to 'nation', we have lost the reality of 'citizen'. At the very least, we have made 'nation' *more real* than 'citizen' with generalizations like 'most USAmericans', 'most Indians' or, worse still, 'most Westerners'.[2] So long as ἰδέα reigns supreme, depersonalized persons are its subjects.

With this de-construction of the concept of 'nation' in mind, how might we then conceive of 'nation' more inceptually in order to come to some understanding of 'united nations' or 'global community', which is one third of our theme here? A nation, it would seem, is not simply a collection of persons in a geographical region. Neither is it a group of persons unified by some history or ethnography which inevitably starts at some rather arbitrary point in time. If we are to remain thematically connected to that which is most real (the person), then we must define 'nation' inceptually as 'persons in dialogue'. It is in dialogue that these individual persons find their unity – even in their stark disagreement. What makes a nation truly unified is not that they all agree, but that they continue to remain committed to dialogue with and against one another in their agreement and disagreement.

Above, I offered the example of Thomas Naylor and the Vermont Republic movement. In many ways, this is an exception that proves my point. The Vermont secessionists desire to secede from the United States precisely because they feel a lack of desire, or perhaps a lack of effectiveness, in the commitment to dialogue with the federal government. They feel that their voice is not heard in the dialogue. What holds the ἰδέα of 'nation' together, if such an ἰδέα exists at all, is a

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[2]Consider, for example, the common use of the word 'American' which tends to refer only to the United States and forgets that Brazilians, Venezuelans, Mexicans, and many others who are also 'American'. This is why I prefer the term 'USAmerican' which merely objectifies the citizens of the US without obviating all other 'Americans'.

commitment to dialogue. Given this, Plato's ἰδέα of 'Republic' does not exist. What does exist is human persons committed to dialogue with one another both in agreement and disagreement. Only within this inceptual understanding of 'nation' can we conceive of anything like a 'Global Response'.

3. The Cosmopolitan Quest

We now return to our quest to imagine a 'global community' or 'cosmopolitanism'. If we understand 'nation' as 'persons committed to dialogue', then we can quite easily extend this definition and apply it to 'global community' because 'nation', thus defined, is devoid of geographical boundary. In fact, the two are not at all different. Citizens of a 'nation' often disagree and *never* fully agree, but they are still citizens *of a nation* because they remain committed to dialogue with and against other citizens. A cosmopolitan would then be a person who is committed to dialogue with other cosmopolitans. Patriotism, thus, would not be defined as loyalty to a 'nation' (understood as an extant Platonic ἰδέα), but instead would be defined as loyalty to dialogue with other citizens. In no way does this mean that cosmopolitans agree with one another; nor does it mean that we agree to disagree. Agreeing to disagree is tantamount to agreeing not to dialogue. It is an end to dialogue. Quite to the contrary, we agree to dialogue and agree to continue to dialogue, despite whether we disagree *or* agree. Our 'unity', then, is not tied to our agreement, but to our commitment to dialogue. Therefore, we might identify 'global community' simply as that collection of cosmopolitan persons who are committed to dialogue.

How do we understand the word 'response'? The word itself indicates dialogue. It is a dialogue which is *about* something which has been said or done. It is an answer or a reply. The word derives from the Latin *respondeo*, which means "to answer to; to meet, agree, accord, or correspond with."[3] More originarily, though, we find it as the reflexive form of *spondeo*, which means "promise solemnly, to bind or pledge one's self."[4] A re-sponse, therefore, is a covenant to dialogue. It is a

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[3]*A Latin Dictionary Founded on Andrews' Edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary: Revised, Enlarged, and in Great Part Rewritten* (1879 Clarendon Edition), s.v. "*respondeo*."

[4]*A Latin Dictionary Founded on Andrews' Edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary*, s.v. "*spondeo*."

reciprocal 'pledging oneself' to the Other in dialogue. 'Other', therefore, ceases to be 'Other' and becomes 'you' and 'Thou'.

There can be no way to justify the use of violence (bullets, bombs, and missiles) under the term 're-sponse'. These are re-actions, not re-sponses. Re-acting is diametrically opposed to responding. It is in no way a *speaking* or *dialoguing*, but an *acting*, and, in fact, a re-acting (which is far less original than acting-as-such). 'Global response', therefore, indicates a pledge or commitment to dialogue. It presumes a 'global dialogue' in which to respond and such a global dialogue requires a global commitment to dialogue and, therefore, cosmopolitanism. By adding the word 'global' to 'response', we signify not just a pledge to dialogue, but a *correspondence* (co-re-spondeo), a reciprocal-pledging-together: a covenant to dialogue.

Subsequent to the inceptual understanding of 'nation', there is also a need for an inceptual understanding of 'person' and identity. A 'person' can no longer be thought of in concepts or ideas in the manner of Plato. If we attempt to 'identify' a person in terms of categories, such as 'USAmerican', 'Christian', 'Indian', 'Hindu', or 'Muslim', then we prioritize these ideas (ἰδέαι) over and against the person who is said to 'conform' to these ideas, more or less. "Identification is not identity."[5] We need to move away from the conceptualization of 'person' and 'identification' in order to think more inceptually. For this, we find valuable insight in a speech made by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, at the World Council of Churches in February 2006. In this speech, the Archbishop suggested that we should move away from conceptualization of 'identification' in favour of inceptually thinking about identity as a "map of relationships."[6] That is, 'identity' is not a list of static categories to which we *belong*, rather it is a series of relationships in which we are involved. The more thoroughly structured is our 'map of relationships', the more firmly established is our personal identity. Here, again, we have arrived at a commitment to dialogue. Our personal identity is tantamount to our commitment to dialogue with

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[5]Raimon Panikkar, *Christophany: The Fullness of Man*, trans. Alfred DiLascia, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004, 57.

[6]Rowan Williams, "Plenary on Christian Identity and Religious Plurality," *World Council of Churches* (February 2006), http://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/assembly/porto-alegre-2006/2-plenary-presentations/christian-identity-religious-plurality/rowan-williams-presentation.html (21 May 2007), Document No. PLEN 02.1.

others on our map of relationships. A cosmopolitan, therefore, can be understood as a person with a cosmopolitan map of relationships.

Having shed some light on what we might mean by 'global response', what, then, do we mean by the term 'global responsibility'? To whatever extent we have an *ability* to respond globally, we must have a global commitment to dialogue, which is to say a more global map of relationships. This, I hope, has already been shown. But the word 'responsibility' means something more than simply our *ability to respond*, does it not? Responsibility at least implies, though, that we have some sort of duty or moral obligation to live up to our abilities. One cannot have a *responsibility* that is somehow *beyond* his or her ability to respond, so the two are inseparably connected. This means that we have a moral obligation and duty to dis-cover our abilities to respond; otherwise we cannot be assured that we have met our responsibility and fulfilled our moral obligation. Therefore, we must ask, *do we* have the ability to commit to dialogue? Here, I do not mean on a 'national' scale, since we have already shown this *idea* to be at least troublesome, if not altogether fallacious. More directly, the question becomes, "Do *I* have an ability to commit to dialogue?" Fifteen years ago, our answer to this question would, indeed, be different from today. Along with the power of the internet and global communication on an unforeseen scale, we have also received a new *ability* to respond and new *responsibilities* commensurate with that ability. In a way never before possible, cosmopolitans around the globe have ability to dialogue and, hence, a newfound *responsibility* to commit to dialogue, which, I have shown, is the essence of global community and global response.

4. Terr(or)ific Response
With this understanding of *global response*, we can now return to the question of *terror-ism*. As I tried to emphasize with my introduction, terror-ism is that which names terror as an emotional response and is, as such, entirely personal. In order to respond to terror (and this means to respond to the enactor of terror), we must ask *why?* Most often, and particularly in the US immediately following 11/9/01, this question is asked from the most personal perspective: *Why me? Why cause terror in me?* In order to come to some answer, though, the question must shift

focus and become: *Why you? Why do you seek to cause terror?*[7] Unfortunately, most people seem to leap over this question completely in order to come to the next question: *Why do you seek to cause terror in me?* Already, the dialogue has become one-sided. In order to be truly cosmopolitan (and, thus, to be able to initiate a global response to terrorism), we must remain committed to the second question as well as the other two.

In our attempt to answer this second question, there is a real danger of presenting terror-ists in a monolithic manner, as if all enactors of terror act for the same reasons or to the same end. Nineteen terrorists enacted terror in the US on 11/9/01 and we may never truly know what their intentions were. Whatever their aim, though, those intentions seem quite different from the intentions of Israel when it showered cluster bombs over villages in southern Lebanon in 2006 or those of the Sudanese military for genocidal attacks in Darfur even today. But, at the risk of monolithic essentialization, we can find at least two common elements regarding the intentions of those who enact terror. These two elements represent a partial attempt to venture a response to the question, *why do you (terrorists) seek to cause terror?*

The first common element is an intention by terrorists simply to be heard and to be noticed. Despite the term 'global village', the world continues to feel quite enormous, which makes 'me' (each of us) feel quite small, quite insignificant, and quite unable to be heard. Terror, then, becomes a desperate attempt to be heard. Terror by murder/suicide is seen as the most desperate, but also the means through which one is most heard. For example, one would not likely know the name Seung-Hui Cho without the desperate act of terror in his murder/suicide at Virginia Tech University on 16 April 2007. Some would say (and have said), that to give such people a voice – to publicize, discuss, and even to hear – is to validate their terror and to make it successful. There is some truth in that. However, one might respond that their effort to create terror has *already* been successful. By hearing those voices, in an attempt to understand the question *why you?*, we are committing ourselves to dialogue. We are committing ourselves in an effort to understand why such terror was enacted so that we might avoid it in the future. By committing ourselves

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[7]If our commitment to dialogue and response is authentic, then we must use the pronoun 'you' and not the impersonal third person 'they'. A 'they' cannot respond. Only a 'you' can respond.

to dialogue, we do so not *just* for our own safety and wellbeing, but also in the hopes of rescuing people like Seung-Hui Cho from the depths of despair and out from under the weight of hegemonic objectification.

5. The Force of Dialogical Ideas

During his farewell visit to the White House, British Prime Minister Tony Blair gave an interview to Steve Inskeep of National Public Radio. During this interview, he said: "If I have a criticism of our policy, if you like, the only way you're going to knock out this terrorism eventually is not just through the force of arms, but through the force of ideas: Freedom, yes, and democracy, yes, but also about justice and about opportunity for people."[8] Here again, to grasp Blair's meaning, we must not understand 'ideas' as εἶδος, as if there was an extra-terrestrial 'war' amongst Platonic ἰδέαι. Instead, ideas indicate some form of dialogue among persons. We must ask, though, whether or not it is appropriate or responsible to associate 'force' and 'dialogue' in this manner. Isn't 'force of arms' somewhat dichotomous and inconsistent with dialogue ('force of ideas')? If the 'force of *our* ideas' is powerful enough to overcome the 'force of *their* ideas', then why pursue the 'force of arms'? While the expression, 'force of arms', is a tacit acquiescence, the 'force of ideas' is insufficient. What, then, should be done?

The answer seems clear. If our 'force of arms' is insufficient, we strengthen our arms. If our 'force of ideas' is insufficient, should we not seek to strengthen our ideas? It seems to me that the former represents a failure of the latter such that the two cannot progress beside one another. If military war indicates a failure to dialogue, then how can dialogue proceed in the midst of military war? Is not the beginning of one consubstantial with the end of the other? If so, then we must decide which is more important and which is more valuable; that is to say, which is more effective.

Recall the words of Cicero in 44CE to Cassius: "What is there that can be done against force without force?"[9] Is this not the very question

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[8]Steve Inskeep, "Complete NPR Interview with Tony Blair," http://www.npr. org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10244816 (17 May 2007). The transcript here varies slightly from the actual interview. My quotation is derived from a recording of the interview. This recording is available on the website listed here.

[9]Raimon Panikkar, *Cultural Disarmament: The Way to Peace*, trans. Robert R. Barr, Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995, 39.

which this journal seeks to answer, nearly two millennia later? Raimon Panikkar suggests that "the appropriate answer [to Cicero] would be to introduce the subtle, delicate distinction between 'force' and 'violence'."[10] Contra-Blair, however, we must recognize that this 'delicate distinction' cannot survive synthesis. We cannot 'balance' the force of violence and the force of ideas. The introduction of the force of violence is a tacit (or, perhaps, cacophonous) acquiescence that our 'ideas' lack force. Consider, if our ideas were adequately forceful, then why pursue violence?

There is another common element to terror-ist intention: manipulation. This follows from the first element. The desire 'to be heard' indicates a desire to 'manipulate' or change the behaviour of others. The rebel forces in Iraq use terrorism not so much because they want to instil terror, but because they want freedom and independence. Israel showered southern Lebanon with cluster bombs because they wanted to stop kidnappings and border snipers. The terrorists on 11/9/01 intended to weaken the US commitment to Israel. Seung-Hui Cho wanted to manipulate people into being less judgmental and less materialistic (but not, apparently, less violent).[11] By refusing to yield to such overt manipulation, we are, it would seem, denying the terrorists this goal. The solution is certainly not to yield to such overt manipulation in order to simply avoid future terrorism. Freedom and justice are too important for such yielding.

On the other hand, isn't refusing to yield also to manipulation? Suppose, for example, I was planning to give you a gift of money, but then you threaten to hit me if I don't give the money. If I give you the money because of the threat, then I am allowing you to manipulate me. If, though, I decide not to give you the money because of the threat, am I not also allowing your actions to manipulate my own? What if I had not yet decided to give the money to you? Would the situation change? My point here is that it is important to hear the voices of terrorists in order to respond. If we re-act, then we are giving them great power because we are allowing them to manipulate us. If we *respond*, though, then we are giving power not to the terrorists, but to dialogue itself. Those ideas which are the most *responsible* should be revealed in our commitment to

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[10]Panikkar, *Cultural Disarmament*, 39.

[11]This is according to the videos Cho submitted to NBC News indicating his desire to be heard.

dialogue in and through the dialogue itself and never as a re-action, which is always manipulation, even when it is unyielding.

However, we must recognize that a dialogue among unequals is not a dialogue but a lecture. Open and honest, which is to say effective, dialogue must occur among equals. For those with political, military, and economic power, this requires what Panikkar refers to as 'cultural disarmament'.[12] Much like military disarmament, cultural disarmament is difficult, risky, and leaves us vulnerable.[13] The same, we might note, is true of military engagement. Few would dispute that the US, for example, has entered a difficult and risky engagement in Iraq that has left it vulnerable. There is a danger in misinterpreting Panikkar's notion of 'cultural disarmament'. It is not a riddance of cultural or a de-culturalization. Our culture, after all, is part and parcel of our identity and cannot be disposed of or abdicated. Instead, Panikkar compels us towards a *disarmament* of our culture such that we can enter into dialogue with those of different cultures on equal (which does not mean 'same') footing. Only in this way can the 'Other' become a 'Thou'. Culture (which, of course, includes both politics and religion) then becomes 'my culture' and 'your culture'. Culture persists, but is dis-armed, enabling fruitful and peaceful dialogue.

The global response to terror-ism, then, should be a commitment to dialogue. This should not be misunderstood as some idealist ideology that suggests we should sit and dialogue with terror-ists. The language of terror-ism is terror, which is the opposite of dialogue and response. A global response, as I emphasized earlier, can only be enacted by cosmopolitans, and this means those who are committed neither to self nor to 'nation', but to dialogue itself. As such, a global dialogue can only occur between cosmopolitans and never between a cosmopolitan and a terrorist. Will this philosophy bring an end to terrorism? No. That is not likely. But this is not a discussion of what will bring an end to terror-ism. Such a discussion would be outside of the question of respons-ibility because it is outside of our ability to respond, or even to react.

6. Reaction and Response
To illustrate this last point, we must turn to the ensuing re-action to terrorism on the global stage. We have seen, since 11/9/01, the US and

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[12]Panikkar, *Cultural Disarmament*.
[13]Panikkar, *Cultural Disarmament*, 20.

England invade Afghanistan and Iraq. These invasions have been repeatedly classified as a re-action to the terrorist events in the US and in London. With these re-actions, it has been made clear that the governments of these countries are committed to action and re-action and not to dialogue and response. The incontrovertible message is that violence, as such, is not only acceptable and justifiable, it is also preferable to or more effective than dialogue. The underlying message is that of hegemony: *we are stronger than thou, so you best not act against us or we will act against you with greater force of arms.*

But once we identify 'voice' as a fundamental cause of terror-ism, then we must appreciate that we are forcing those under our hegemony to realize that their only options are life-*without*-voice or death-*with*-voice. No doubt, the instinct to survive will compel most people to choose the former. But how many will choose the latter? Seung-Hui Cho and Timothy McVeigh demonstrated that one is enough. The terror-ists on 11/9/01 demonstrated that nineteen is enough. If we acquiesce that violence is justifiable and is ever superior to dialogue, then we, consequently, acquiesce that terror-ism is justifiable in at least some cases. How many cases? Under which circumstances? For whom? By whom? Towards whom? Towards what end? What about those who are starving to death and watching their families and children starve? What about those suffering under neo-colonialism and economic imperialism? As soon as we prioritize violence over dialogue, we fall into this line of questioning and into a moral obscurity from which we can never recover.

Finally, consider our options from the most pragmatic view. We cannot watch everybody. We cannot stop everybody. We can never eliminate all threats. Violence will not accomplish these any more than will dialogue. In fact, I do not even mean to suggest that violence is *never* an option. There are certainly situations (Hitler and World War II come to mind) in which dialogue is powerless and action becomes necessary.[14] As I stated earlier, global dialogue can only occur among cosmopolitans. Our goal should not be to stop terrorists, for I do not think this is a goal that

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[14]On the other hand, we might argue that there was some point, well prior to World War II, where a more effective dialogue could have prevented or, at least, mitigated the necessity of violence. Our task is not revisionist history, but to learn from our mistakes. Panikkar writes: "victory never leads to peace. Victory leads to victory." Panikkar, *Cultural Disarmament*, 94.

lies within our response-ability;[15] instead our goal can be, nay should be, to dramatically quell the *production* of terrorists. Once we identify 'voice' (the lack thereof) as a fundamental motivation of terrorism, then the prioritizing of dialogue is dis-covered as a means to provide an alternative venue to terrorism. Our goal, then, is not to dialogue with terrorists, but to prevent would-be terrorists from becoming terrorists by providing an alternative venue in which they would be heard. This is by no means a panacea … but what is?

7. Conclusion

There is much that is said in the saying of 'terrorism and global responsibility'. Terror is emotional and, as such, is personal. It cannot be resolved through impersonal means and, certainly, not through the concept of 'nation' or 'global' or any such Platonism which prioritizes *idea* over person. Further, 'terrorists' do not exist. Persons who cause and seek to cause terror do exist. 'Nations' and 'global community' do not exist (that is, if we take 'global community' as an extension of the modernist notion of 'nation' as something extant). Persons committed to dialogue are nations and cosmopolitan persons committed to dialogue constitute the global community. Only by becoming increasingly cosmopolitan and increasing our commitment to dialogue do we have any hope of formulating (or even imagining) something we can call a 'global response'. From a theoretical (i.e., ethical) perspective, only in the prioritization of a dialogical response over a violent re-action can we undermine the ideology which undergirds terror-ism. From a pragmatic perspective, only by allowing a venue (and establishing a priority or value) for others to be heard can we quell the production of terror-ists in their desperation to be heard. In the end, the global response to terror-ism must be just that: a global listening and responding of cosmopolitan persons in committed dialogue.

Dialogue is commensurate with openness to the wisdom of others. In keeping with this, it is fitting that I should end with the wisdom of another, a great cosmopolitan sage whom I have quoted often, Raimon Panikkar. On the final page of his book, *Cultural Disarmament: The Way*

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[15]There is an acceptance in modern society that murder and crime can be subdued but never eradicated. For some reason, though, it has become politically incorrect to suggest, as I am here, that terrorism can never be eradicated.

to Peace, Panikkar modifies the Roman adage "*Si vis pacem, para bellum*,"[16] i.e., "If you want peace, prepare yourself for war." He writes:

> The desire for peace is equivalent to a desire for dialogue, and the desire for dialogue arises when we think that we can learn something from others, along with converting them to our point of view where possible. Fanaticisms and absolutisms prevent persons from travelling together, because they make us believe ourselves self-sufficient or in full possession of the truth. '*Si vis pacem, para teipsum*' ('Would you have peace? Prepare yourself.').[17]

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[16]Flavius Vegetius Renatus from *Epitome Rei Militaris*, book 3, Prologue: "*Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum*," cited in Panikkar, *Cultural Disarmament*, 120, footnote 74.

[17]Panikkar, *Cultural Disarmament*, 103.