

# RECONCILING THE MADRASSAH WITH THE SCHOOL

## Freedom of Religion, Education, and the Dilemma of Contemporary Muslims

Ghazala Irfan<sup>♦</sup>

### 1. Introduction

When we look at education today, we see that there are no inflexible dogmas and no infallible masters. Everything is to be understood in rational and human terms. There is no finished body of knowledge; the search for truth is perennial and the quest unending. The model discipline here is, of course, philosophy. Yet, this model seems to be at odds when it comes to education concerning religion. In Islam, the pivot and fulcrum of all life is Allah. Allah is ‘everywhere’ (Omni-present), ‘every when’ (eternal), ‘every what’ (Omni-competent), ‘every why’ (Omniscient), and ‘every who’ (Omni-potent). There is authoritative knowledge in religion: eternal, infinite, perfect, and complete.

Freedom of religion is generally held to involve a freedom to express, to disseminate, to question, and to teach. But in light of the contemporary understanding of education and of religious knowledge and truth, many contemporary Muslims are confronted with a dilemma. For, since religion and philosophy have different approaches to truth, the predicament is whether to reject one and accept the other, or to bifurcate oneself to accommodate both.

There is, then, a dilemma for Muslims today, particularly for Muslims in South Asia. Religion and philosophy have different approaches to truth, and institutions in Islam that provide education reflect these different approaches as well. In this essay, I wish to draw attention to this dilemma by, first, providing a short sketch of the nature of religion in Islam. Next, I will look at the different ways in which knowledge and truth are understood in religion and in philosophy, and also the implications of this for education. Finally, I want to look briefly at the contemporary influence of theologians (*ulema*), how this contributes to the dilemma and,

---

<sup>♦</sup>**Ghazala Irfan** is Associate Professor of Philosophy in the School of Arts and Sciences at the Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan.

by extension, to how the claim to freedom of religion – in the sense of a freedom to express, to disseminate, to question, and to teach – itself might be at stake.<sup>1</sup>

## 2. Nature of Religion in Islam

Contrary to popular belief neither Islam nor Islamic society is a monolith. Despite the die-hard unicity of Islam, within the Abrahamic tradition of Monotheism, the Muslims have never agreed on a singular homogeneous belief system. Disagreements and variations emerged soon after the death of the Prophet. The *Shian-e-Ali* (the Party of Ali) parted ways never really to work within the same framework. The Divine Book, the Qur'an, has had up to seven versions according to Ibn-e-Khaldun. "For the Men around Muhammad transmitted it on the authority of The Messenger in different ways."<sup>2</sup> "Eventually," he maintains "seven specific ways of reading the Qur'an became established."<sup>3</sup> It was compiled during the time of the third *Khalifa* (Caliph or successor to the Prophet Muhammad) but it is not in any chronological order, for example, the Meccan Ayats (verses) do not necessarily precede the Medanite. There is, therefore, much room for interpretations as there have been several versions, more so because there is no prescribed ecclesiastical order in Islam.

There are supposed to be no intermediaries or intercessors between Allah and the individual human being. No priests are required to lead the prayers; anyone can. No exclusive readers of the Qur'an are necessary; everyone can. It is permissible to say that there are as many Islams as there are Muslims; everyone is entitled to individual, unique interpretations. The oneness of Allah did not limit these manifold interpretations. In fact,

---

<sup>1</sup>In this discussion, I draw on Annemari Schimmel, *Islam and the Indian Sub Continent*, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2003; Rasheed (Jullundhri) Ahmad, *Dar-ul-Loom Deoband: Bartanwi Hind Mein Musalmano Ka Nizam-e-Taleem*, Lahore: Idara-Saqafat-e-Islamia, 2004; Huston Smith, *Religion: Significance and Meaning in an Age of Disbelief*, Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2002; Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983; and H. A. R. Gibb, *Islam*, 2<sup>nd</sup> impression, London-Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.

<sup>2</sup>Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqadimmah: An Introduction to History*, trans. Franz Rosenthal, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958, 440.

<sup>3</sup>Khaldun, *The Muqadimmah*.

Allah's Ninety Nine Names reflect the diversity of Qualities that Allah possesses.

Let us also remind ourselves that Islam spread very rapidly outside the Arabian Peninsula to countries that had no exposure to Arabic language or Arab ways. Even today the largest number of Muslims live in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh where Arabic is neither spoken nor understood. Islam of the Indian sub-continent has been eclectic in nature, borrowing from and being influenced by the Zoroastrians of Iran, and the Buddhists and Hindus of India. The religion of the Muslims of South Asia has been mystical in character and heterodox by Arabian criteria.

### 3. The *Madrassahs*

Orthodox religious education is imparted in *madrassahs* (traditional Islamic schools). This education is free. Board and lodging is also provided. It is normally attached to a mosque and serves the poor. Very little research had been conducted on *madrassahs* prior to 2001. According to research conducted in 2002 by the Institute of Policy Studies (entitled "Pakistan: Religious Education Institutes – An overview"), only four domestic studies – two government and two private – had been conducted. The sudden and unprecedented interest in *madrassahs* does not have to do with their propriety as alternative academic institutions. The interest is due, more, to political reasons. It hails from the western perception in general, and American perception in particular, that:

1. *Madrassahs* are the dens of extremism, fanaticism, fundamentalism, and terrorism;
2. They are churning out the *Jihadi* zealots who fought alongside and supported the Afghan war against Russia;
3. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was linked to the graduates of these Pakistani *madrassahs*; and
4. Finally and most importantly, they have a major role in supporting Al-Qaeda and Osama-bin-Laden's group of former American allies, now their major foe.

Perceptions – even if they are based on facts – can be manoeuvred and manipulated like the story below indicates:

Seeing a big dog about to pounce on a little child in New York's Central Park, a man took out his gun and killed the dog before the child was hurt. A reporter on the spot ran up to the man and said:

“You have made news. I am going to report this, and tomorrow there will be a headline: ‘New Yorker Saves Child’.” The man said “But I am not a New Yorker.” “OK,” came the reporter’s reply, “the headline will read ‘Alert American Saves Child’.” “But I am not an American,” said the man. “Where are you from then?” asked the reporter. “From Pakistan” was the response. Next day the headline read: “Pakistani Muslim Fanatic Kills Dog.”

I am not suggesting that *deeni* (religious) *madrassahs* have not contributed to some or all of the above. Pakistanis themselves also perceive *madrassah* education as fanning a sectarian divide which has become increasingly violent in attacking mosques, especially between the Shia and the Sunni sects. This, however, is also due primarily to political rather than religious reasons.

In America’s war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Pakistan became the front-line state for its geo-strategic position. Pakistan received massive funding from several sources, each having its own sphere of influence: the USA (obviously), Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran. This funding ultimately created what Pakistanis call a heroin and Kalashnikov (Russian gun) culture.

The sub-continent and Afghanistan have always had opium. In its raw form, it is mild and harmless; it enables people to resist the intense heat and helps them to sleep. With potent heroin being made and smuggled through Pakistan, heroin addiction has become a common tragedy. Also, in the North West Frontier Province there has long been an influx of guns. The challenge for these people was to acquire Russian guns, not with money but by killing a Russian and taking his gun. So there was a piling of Kalashnikovs. Where could the people be trained? The only institutions worth its name in their mountainous terrain were the *madrassahs*, as they were the hub of activity. Thus, was born the significance of the *madrassah*.

Traditionally, there have been five different kinds of *madrassahs* that exist among the Muslims of South Asia according to *mazhab* (sect): (1). *Deobanidi* (Sunni-Hanafi): This accounts for 65% of all *madrassahs*. They are reformists, yet respect tradition; they include *Taliban* and *Talighi Jamaat*. (2). *Barelwi* (Sunni-Hanafi): These are traditionalists, yet they defend cultural / spiritual rituals of the Sufis that the *Deobandis* condemn. (3). *Ahl-i-Hadith* (Sunni): These return to *salaf* (earliest Muslims) and reject the prevalent *Shari’a* discourse. (4). *Jama`at-i-Islami* (Sunni): It

represents political Islam. (5). *Al-Shia* (Shia). All these have been 100% male domains.

According to Khalid and Saleem Mansoor of the Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, in 1988 there were 2,800 *madrassahs* with 0.5 million students enrolled. In the year 2000 there were 6,700 *madrassahs* with an enrolment of over 1 million students.

At this juncture, let us not forget that *madrassahs* have not been the only institutions of learning in the Islamic world. The *Jama' Masjid* (the main mosque used for Friday prayers) always served as a pivot of religious teaching. *Maktabs* were substitute institutions used for primary education and basic teachings of the Qur'an. These were generally attached to the mosque also. The *Zawiya/Khanqah* provided the Sufi alternative where gnostic (illuminationist) practices took precedence over scriptural texts. Most of these *madrassahs*, *maktabs*, *majlis*, and *khanqahs* were informal. According to John Esposito, it was Nizam-ul-Mulk (d. 1092), Vizier of the Seljuk Sultans, who first institutionalized the *madrassah* (though it existed before his time), and created a network of schools that spread in Damascus, Cairo, and India.<sup>4</sup>

By the end of the 12<sup>th</sup> century there were at least 30 *madrassahs* in Damascus and an equal number in Cairo. What is important to realize is that at the time of the colonial incursion and consolidation in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, the major institutions of learning in Muslim lands (including India and Pakistan) were the *madrassahs*.

Let us now turn to the curricular of traditional Islamic education. It was divided into two broad fields: *Manqulat* (the transmitted subjects) and *Ma`aqlat* (the rational or secular subjects). The *Manqulat* included: *Tafsir* (exegesis of the Qur'an), *Hadith* (the tradition of the Prophet), *Sarf* (Arabic grammar), *Nahw* (syntax), *Adab* (language and literature), *Fiqh* (jurisprudence), *Usul-ul-fiqh* (principles of jurisprudence), and *Balaghat* (rhetoric). The *Ma`aqlat* consisted of: *Mantiq* (logic), *Falsafa/Hikma* (philosophy), *Kalam* (theology), *Riyaziyyat* (mathematics, arithmetic, geometry), and *Tibb* (medicine).

Each *madrassah* had different foci or emphases. When we look at the Indian subcontinent we find the following. The *madrassah* in South Asia served the religious scholar as well as the civil bureaucracy in India before

---

<sup>4</sup>John L. Esposito, *Oxford History of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

the British rule. The emphasis on *ma`qulat* served the Muslim courts. However, with the advent of British courts and the English language as the court language, the *madrassah* lost its importance and Islamic scholarship became obsolete, for it no longer provided useful knowledge. These were replaced by new, western style institutions, such as schools, colleges, and universities.

Three noteworthy responses were made to the setting up of these educational institutions of British character. First, in 1867, we find the ‘*Dar-ul-ulum*’ at Deoband aimed at preservation of traditional religious learning. It was institutionally radical. Next, in 1875, we have the ‘Muhammadan-Anglo Oriental College’ at Aligarh by Sayyid Ahmed Khan. This was set up along European lines. It was modern and progressive. Then, in 1891, “*Nadwat-al-ulama*,” at Luknow, U.P., was set up by Shibli Nomani. Its avowed mission was to balance the excessive traditionalism of Deoband and the excessive modernism of Aligarh. This institution was unable to sustain itself.

This was the beginning of the divide between the *Ulema* (theologians) of Deoband and the progressives of Aligarh University (as it came to be known). This divide epitomized in the diversity of attitude between religion in the *madrassah* and philosophy in the university.

#### **4. Religion, Philosophy, and Education**

“Truth is manifest” in religion and, therefore, it is deduced, in the *madrassah*. It is obvious and clear, for it is both apprehensible and comprehensible. We are aware of it, appreciate it, and react to it. It is knowable and, moreover, applicable in society. This truth, thus, fulfils adequately the need for a psycho-therapeutic support framework if not for a metaphysical-epistemological doctrine. But the claim of religion is that it is eternal (i.e., for all times) and universal (i.e., for all peoples). It is fixed and final. It is complete knowledge providing “a code, a cult, and a creed.” These three elements, according to D. J. O’Connor, refer to a set of moral and ethical rules, a set of observances or rituals and a set of beliefs about God and humanity’s relation to it.<sup>5</sup>

In religion, knowledge is held to be infallible and certain. There is no risk of error or doubt, for truth is indubitable. There is no provision,

---

<sup>5</sup>D. J. O’Connor, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957; Indian Reprint 1986.

therefore, for tentativeness or guess-work. Since God is Omniscient and He has revealed himself to His Prophets, there cannot be any challenge or question.

In philosophy and, by extension, in the university “Truth is conjectural.” There are no ready or easy solutions to questions. If one cannot prove God, one cannot disprove it either. It is a solution to philosophical problems to assert that they have no solutions. The exercise is, thus, only speculative and discursive. Socrates was only a lover of wisdom, not a possessor of it. His wisdom consisted in knowing that he knew nothing. He was no sage, no authority, and no arbiter of truth. He was a seeker, an inquirer, an explorer, not knowing whether there is light at the end of the tunnel. A philosopher has no alternative but to continually reflect upon and be ready to alter his or her methodology.

The acceptance of fallibility, therefore, is the prerequisite of any philosophical enterprise. The realization that hope may reside in probability – and that too in a very small measure – may result in pessimism. But there is no reason to despair, for tentative, provisional guess work is philosophy’s greatest asset. It is only when arguments are inconclusive that amendments occur which herald growth, evolution and change. It is only when a free, open, critical examination of assumptions is sustained that creativity emerges. Thus, what distinguishes religion in the *madrassah* from philosophy in the university is its approach and attitude.

The dogmatic approach of religion is to look for regularity, uniformity, and harmony, to anticipate order, and to attempt to find it even when there seems to be none. This dogmatism may be a pre-condition for dogged pursuit of beliefs. It may be necessary when we need to convince ourselves and others to accept what seems all too evident. The problem is that religion is so easily justified by an appeal to omniscience, the claim that Divine Knowledge is *a priori* true and valid and above the need for justification.

What characterizes philosophy is its susceptibility to modification. Judgment is never final, and so cherished beliefs remain open to correction and rejection. Truth is not luminously clear but elusive; it is not obvious but concealed. Philosophy has its misgivings and doubts, and is open to be tested and re-tested. It is the method of trial and error, of conjecture and refutation.

A philosophical approach may also consider appropriating truth by degrees or approximations. This is gradual, uncertain, and hard to come

by. This can paralyze any quest; if all efforts are futile and all knowledge unascertainable, one might well not try. Yet, this is what the philosophic attitude inculcates – to live without hope, yet without fear, and not to find solace in fairy tales or to delude oneself into believing that one knows.

The attitude in the *madrassah* is to appeal to tradition – that tradition is the only competent authority or criterion of truth. The religious approach encourages the authority of religion alone and asserts that no man's authority can establish truth; all we need to do is submit to and accept the truth which is super-human and, therefore, super-natural.

The philosophical approach enjoins us not to conform to the command of authority however exalted it may be. It also requires us to have the humility to confess that one does not know but one shall continue to learn and participate in the unending quest. The pre-Socratic philosopher Xenophanes describes it thus in his poetry:

But as for certain truth, no man has known it  
Nor will he know it; neither of the gods,  
Nor yet of all the things of which I speak.  
And even if by chance he were to utter  
The final truth he would himself not know it  
For all is but a woven web of guesses.<sup>6</sup>

The philosophical approach must necessarily retreat from traditionalism and authoritarianism and allow indeterminacy. This would assert that truth cannot be established. If truth is not discernable and definitive knowledge is not acquirable, we have to be content with probability and a perennial quest, with a constant willingness to analyze and be corrected. This entails a constant need of interpreting and affirming, and re-interpreting and re-affirming all the hypotheses.

In the religious framework, essential precepts are never challenged for they are based on the faith that, if it were not for our sinful, evil refusal to see the truth, we would be enlightened. This may also be the basis of the self-righteousness of the religious and the fanaticism of the believers. If the sources of knowledge are divine and truth is above and beyond humanity, there is no possibility of error. Since God is the Truth and God is Truthful, all we need to do is purge our mind of false idols.

This may also promote absolutism for one is no longer limited by

---

<sup>6</sup>Karl R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, 26.



restrictions or awkward questions. Everything is positive, certain and unconditional. All cherished assumptions are reinforced for they need no reconstruction or reinterpretation. Not only do questions not require reformulation but the answers are conclusive. All that is sought, therefore, is an all-embracing allegiance, since there is no need of explicit explanation or what one holds to be implicitly true. The clergy helps to reiterate this absolutism.

In contrast to the religious approach, the philosopher is constrained to admit that no knowledge is final, for there are no guarantees. Even if a theory that is held is true, there is no way of knowing so with certainty, for there are no eternal criteria of truth. So one can never know for sure whether what one believes to be true is, in fact, so.

One cannot but refer here to Kierkegaard. He bade us look to the Abraham story and ask on what ground or criteria was Abraham sure that the voice that commanded him to sacrifice his son was that of God. It might have been that of Satan. Thus, in Popper's words, "Knowledge can be only finite, while our ignorance must necessarily be infinite."<sup>7</sup>

This is at variance with the psychological process of thinking in religion where it is so obviously easy to find arguments to justify what one holds to be true on other grounds, e.g., on faith or belief, tradition, or authority. Philosophers pursue a disinterested search for truth, not censoring their investigations and not pretending "that deep-seated prejudices are heaven-sent intuitions."<sup>8</sup> Notwithstanding Russell's own bias (which is evident from the previous statement), it is only fair that the difference between the irrational and the non-rational be clarified here. The religionists maintain that their beliefs do not require to be justified by such methods, that the real ground of religious belief is not rational at all. However, philosophy has traditionally been used to justify the religious point of view. But, as O'Connor points out, "this would be a confidence trickster's policy of heads I win, tails you lose."<sup>9</sup> The argument, in fact, reads: "if these arguments are valid, they establish my case, but if they are invalid, the rational grounds for my beliefs are invalid."<sup>10</sup> Despite this use

---

<sup>7</sup>Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 29.

<sup>8</sup>Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1946, 789.

<sup>9</sup>O'Connor, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, 124-5.

<sup>10</sup>O'Connor, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, 124-5.

of philosophy by the religionists, there are other risks they do not wish to take and, therefore, they do not agree with the basic philosophical assumption that all knowledge is fallible.

One could summarize this difference of attitude by agreeing with Russell when he describes an educated person of being one who has learnt that information always turns out to be, at best, incomplete and invariably false, misleading, fictitious, or just dead wrong.

The religious person, in general – and the Muslim person, in particular – considers that the pivot and fulcrum of all life is Allah. Allah is ‘Every-where’ (omnipresent), ‘Every-when’ (eternal), ‘Every-what’ (omni-competent), ‘Every-why’ (omniscient), and ‘Every-who’ (omnipotent). Allah is Proactive, Active and Interactive. Authoritative knowledge is eternal, infinite, perfect and complete, and is readily available in the word of Allah, i.e., in the Qur`an.

This is in sharp contrast with European-type schools where everything is understood in rational and human terms. Thought-provoking questions epitomize that paradigm. Critical reflection consists of wisdom without answers and with a continuing, gnawing doubt. There is no finished body of knowledge; the search is perennial and the quest unquenched.

This clear cut demarcation of domains should make neat compartments and clear division of categories. But there is no dichotomy of *Deen* (religion) and *Dunya* (world) in the Spirit of Islam. There is no dichotomy between the ‘Private and the Public’, ‘Individual and Social’, ‘Abstract and Concrete’, ‘Mind and Matter’, ‘Spirit and Body’, ‘Knowing and Doing’, ‘Noumena and Phenomena’, and ‘Transcendent and Immanent’. Thus, knowledge, truth, beauty, and goodness are inseparable.

Moreover, Islam is not a monastic religion that promotes a withdrawal from the pleasures of life. The Prophet himself was a trader and businessman. He brought forth the concept of state (the state of Medina) where the *Khalifa* (Caliph) was the head of the state and of religion. Thus, the celestial (other worldly) and the terrestrial (this worldly) were supposed to converge to bring forth a moral social order. Islam also does not distinguish between instrumental values and non-instrumental values: for what is good and useful for the world is good and useful for the hereafter. There is no duality (and that is the point of reference of the Oneness of Allah): no duality between body and mind, mind and spirit, or spirit and divinity. The world is the arena of activities

with the proviso that the human mind remains subservient to Allah. This is the realization that human beings are finite and limited and must recognize that they are ignorant.

### **5. The Influence of Theologians (*Ulema*)**

In the name of Islam, *Ulema* (theologians) have compelled Muslims to choose between two worlds which they made mutually exclusive, thereby compromising the holism that is the essence of Islam. They usurped authority, monopolized religious *Ilm* (knowledge) and, thus, created a community of fragmented individuals unable to resolve the divide.

The domain of *Ulema*, like that of the *Faqeeds* (jurists), was cent percent male. Women remained only marginal in religion, and were excluded as exponents. In fact, they were considered both *Naqis-ul-Aql* (deficient in reason) and *Naqis-ud-Din* (deficient in religion). Thus, a handful of male religionists usurped the privilege of most of the male population and all of the female population of Muslims of the right to seek.

The *Ulema* also usurped the right to disagree by declaring, in the Sunni world, that the doors of *Ijtehad* (re-interpretation) were closed, that they were the *Maqeen* (owners) of *Dar-ul-Ilm* (abode of knowledge). Moreover, the *Madrassah* proclaimed that dissent was equivalent to heterodoxy.

The *Ulema* also maintained that the *Aalim* (teacher) was all knowledgeable (for only he knows Arabic and the sacred texts). He also became the intermediary between Allah and the seeker to the extent that (in South Asia) *Be-Pira* (without a *Pir/Murshid/teacher*) remained *Be-Dina* (without religion), even *Be-hidayata* (without guidance/direction). The *Pir* was impeccable to say the least. Because Allah's is the Best Word and the *Aalim* is above the rest, this paradigm was used by President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan who proclaimed in a nation-wide referendum that "if you want Islam, you want me." My personal experience as the presiding officer in the referendum was that some women replied: "*Assi Kali Kamli Valey Nu vote pana ey* (We want to vote for the Prophet)."

Thus, in the name of spreading Islam, the *Ulema* have limited the area of activity of the Muslim and hijacked the prerogative of every Muslim to read the text on his or her own. In the name of extending the knowledge of Islam, the *Ulema* usurped it, fixed it, closed it, and made it incompatible with the *Dunya* (world). No wonder Muslims today find themselves in the present predicament: either to reject one and accept the other, or to bifurcate

oneself to accommodate both. If this be the unresolved dilemma of contemporary Muslims, they can only be described as fragmented, divided selves unable to cope. They become victims of the *Ulema* who, in the name of perpetuating the Islamic way of life, succeed in quashing the Islamic spirit. Thus, Muslims become victims of the successes and the failures of their educational institutions.

These *Madrassahs* and the *Ulema* have, however, remained disempowered within the larger context. They relied on donations/gifts from the believers and a small government subsidy from *Zakat* funds.<sup>11</sup> The total enrolment of students in schools in Pakistan going to *Madrassahs*, according to the research conducted by Andrabi, Das, and Zajonc, is 1%.<sup>12</sup>

Nevertheless, these *Madrassahs* have recently and suddenly become politically empowered – but that is another story and a different discourse. But it is obvious why these *Dar-ul-ilms* (abode of knowledge) and bastions of *Ulema* power became abode of the Holy Warriors (*Dar-ul-Jihadis*).

## 6. Conclusion

Knowledge and truth in religion, particularly, in Islam, is very different from the search for knowledge and truth in philosophy. In Islam, this “certain” knowledge is to be found in what is taught in the *madrassah*; outside of this, i.e., in the schools and the universities, however, knowledge is much more tentative. One result, then, is that there is a dilemma for Muslims today: how are Muslims to respond to the different understandings of knowledge and truth, and the correspondingly different models of education? But there is another concern. If there is a claim to freedom of religion, in the sense of a freedom to express, to disseminate, to question, and to teach, what are the institutions in which such a freedom is to be exercised, and who should control them? This latter question should surely be a central one in contemporary debate.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup>*Zakat* figures for 2004-2005 (according to the Secretary of Zakat and Usher, Government of Punjab), Zakat funds for Deeni Madaras (Religious Institutions) are as follows: allocated Rs. 163,382,000; used Rs. 17,210,781; unused Rs. 146,171,219.

<sup>12</sup>Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Tristan Zajonc, *Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data* (Kennedy School of Government Working Paper No. RWP05-024. World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 3521, 2005); available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=667843> (19 March 2005).

<sup>13</sup>An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Ninth East West Philosophers' Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, May 29 – June 10, 2005.