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IDEOLOGICAL NARRATIVES OF POVERTY AND PROSPERITY: MARXISM, INJUSTICE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESIST

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Abstract: This article examines Karl Marx's critique of poverty and prosperity through the ideological narratives by which economic inequality is produced, justified and normalized. Marx's analysis reveals that the accumulation of wealth cannot be separated from the social relations through which poverty and vulnerability are reproduced. Moving beyond a purely economic interpretation of Marxism, the article examines narratives that portray poverty as individual failure, prosperity as deserved achievement and inequality as inevitable. Such narratives become particularly significant in polarized societies, where competing representations of social groups can obscure structural injustice and weaken solidarity. Literary narratives are considered as forms of ethical imagination that reveal the human consequences of class, gender and institutional injustice. Drawing on Marxist scholarship and selected ancient Chinese perspectives on communal responsibility, the article argues that critical consciousness becomes ethically significant when recognition of injustice generates responsibility to resist its reproduction. Resistance entails solidarity, dissent and meaningful engagement with those whose suffering has been normalized. Marx remains significant for exposing structures and narratives that make inequality socially intelligible, normalized and politically acceptable.

Keywords: *Capitalism, Commodity Gender, Ideology, Inequality, Karl Marx, Literary Representation, Marxism, Poverty, Prosperity, Resistance, Zhuangzi*.

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1. Introduction

The contemporary approach towards equality and prosperity is well-reflected in international commitments to social justice, human dignity and the reduction of inequality. The United Nations' 2030 Agenda, for example, places the reduction of poverty and inequality among the central goals of a more sustainable and inclusive social order (United Nations 2015). Yet prosperity remains an ambiguous concept. Economic growth, technological development and the accumulation of wealth may coexist with unemployment, precarious labour, environmental degradation and persistent social exclusion. Prosperity, therefore, cannot be evaluated simply by the quantity of wealth generated. The more fundamental question is whose prosperity is being produced, under what conditions, and at whose cost.

This question provides an important point of entry into Karl Marx's critique of capitalism. Marx's significance does not lie merely in arguing that some possess more wealth than others. His deeper intervention was to investigate the social relations through which wealth is produced, accumulated and represented as legitimate. The contradiction between prosperity and poverty, in his analysis, is not accidental. It can emerge from the very organization of capitalist production. As Marx observes in *Capital*, "The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as 'an immense accumulation of commodities'; the individual commodity appears as its elementary form" (Marx 2001, 53). The commodity, therefore, provides an entry point into a social order in which human labour and relationships can become subordinated to processes of accumulation.

The ideological dimension of this process is very significant. Poverty is never experienced only materially; it is also interpreted. A society may explain poverty as individual failure, inadequate education, lack of discipline, insufficient productivity or poor personal choices. Prosperity, correspondingly, may be narrated as the natural reward for talent, effort, entrepreneurship or merit. Such narratives can obscure the institutional and historical conditions under which wealth and poverty are produced. Ideology, understood in this broader sense, concerns

not simply political doctrines but the narratives, categories and representations through which historically contingent relations of power can appear natural, legitimate or inevitable. As Eagleton and other Marxist theorists have shown, ideology operates at the level of social meaning as well as formal political belief.

This notion becomes particularly important in polarized societies, which frequently organize public debate through sharp oppositions such as deserving and undeserving, successful and failed, productive and unproductive, insiders and outsiders, elites and masses, etc. Such oppositions can transform complex structural problems into moral judgements about individuals or groups, obscuring the historical, political and economic conditions that shape social inequality. The poor may be blamed for their poverty, while the wealthy may be treated as the sole authors of their prosperity, as though social position were determined exclusively by individual merit. Conversely, political resistance may itself become ideologically rigid when complex social realities are reduced to a simple opposition between oppressor and oppressed. A critical engagement with Marx helps us to analyze the narratives through which class structures are interpreted, legitimized and contested.

Marxian analysis remains particularly significant because it places the accumulation of wealth and the production of misery within the same analytical frame (Marx, 709). The point is not that every instance of prosperity necessarily causes poverty, but that the capitalist organization of production can generate a structural relationship between the accumulation of wealth and the vulnerability of labour. Poverty thus cannot be adequately understood as an isolated condition detached from the social processes that produce prosperity. If inequality is not simply the result of individual failure but is sustained by institutions, economic relations and ideological narratives, recognition itself becomes ethically significant. The responsibility to resist then begins with the responsibility to see differently—to question narratives that make injustice appear natural, inevitable or deserved. The ethical force of Marxist critique lies not simply in exposing inequality but in transforming the recognition of structural injustice into responsibility to resist its reproduction.

2. The Structural Relation Between Poverty and Prosperity

Marxian analysis of capitalism begins with the organization of production and the social relations established through it. The contradiction between poverty and prosperity cannot therefore be reduced to differences in income or possessions. It must be examined through the relationship between those who own or control the means of production and those who depend upon the sale of their labour. Marx and Engels' analysis of the *bourgeoisie* and *proletariat* established a framework in which economic inequality was understood as a relationship rather than merely a distributional difference. This structural approach is evident in Marx's analysis of primitive accumulation. Capital does not arise simply because individuals save money or accumulate goods. It depends upon a historical process through which producers become separated from the means of production, creating a class of workers who must sell their labour-power in order to live. Siddiqui notes the significance of this separation for Marx's account of capitalist production and the accumulation of capital (526). The resulting relationship between capital and labour makes poverty and prosperity analytically interdependent.

The distinction between labour and labour-power is central here. Workers sell their labour-power as a commodity, while capital seeks to extract surplus value from the production process. The resulting relation is formally contractual but materially unequal. The worker enters the market as a formally free individual, yet the absence of independent access to the means of production places the worker in a structurally dependent position. Marx's critique therefore concerns not merely unfair exchange but the social conditions that make the accumulation of capital possible. This perspective challenges narratives that treat poverty as an individual deficiency. If workers' economic vulnerability arises partly from the organization of production itself, poverty cannot be explained adequately through individual choices alone. Lönnroth's discussion of Marx and Engels similarly emphasizes the relationship between *proletarian* labour and *bourgeois* wealth (122). The accumulation of prosperity at one social pole can therefore be connected to the concentration of vulnerability at another. The

contradiction becomes particularly striking in Marx's description of capitalist accumulation - "it establishes an accumulation of misery, corresponding with accumulation of capital." The importance of this formulation lies in its relational character. Marx is not simply describing two social facts—wealth and poverty—but identifying a process in which the accumulation of capital can simultaneously reproduce conditions of insecurity, exploitation and dependence. Wealth and poverty therefore have to be examined together.

This argument also has implications for the concept of prosperity. If prosperity is measured exclusively through accumulation, production or consumption, the conditions of those whose labour sustains that prosperity may disappear from view. Economic growth can then become a substitute for social well-being. Marx's critique asks whether a society can reasonably describe itself as prosperous when significant sections of its population remain structurally vulnerable. The problem extends beyond the workplace. Contemporary forms of accumulation can involve environmental exploitation, precarious employment and unequal access to resources. Chen connects monopolistic accumulation with environmental destruction, while also noting the possibility that industrial production can generate substantial wealth alongside unemployment and inequality (Chen 2017, 154, 217). Such developments suggest that the Marxian question remains relevant even where the specific institutional forms of nineteenth-century capitalism have changed.

The relationship between poverty and prosperity also raises questions about political institutions. Marx was skeptical about treating the state as a neutral actor standing outside the conflicts produced by economic relations. Wright notes Marx's argument that a capitalist state cannot simply be expected to abolish inequalities generated by the economic system itself (87). This does not mean that all political institutions are identical or that the state is incapable of social reform. Rather, it means that political responsibility must be examined in relation to the structures of power within which institutions operate. Marx's own political experience illustrates the relationship between critique and resistance. His confrontation with governmental

authorities, including his criticism of the Prussian political order and his subsequent expulsions from Prussia, France and Belgium, contributed to a life of political displacement and eventually exile in London (Burlaud, 15–16). His criticism of social and political arrangements was not merely theoretical. It involved public disagreement with institutions whose practices he regarded as unjust.

This movement from analysis to intervention is important. Marxism became influential partly because it did not regard social theory as an exercise detached from political life. As Gouarné observes, Marxist thought became an important component of modern social scientific reflection (149), while Hong notes its influence beyond Europe, including in China (120). Yet the continuing value of Marxian analysis should not be reduced to the historical success or failure of particular political regimes claiming Marxist legitimacy. Its enduring significance lies in its critical method: examine the structures beneath appearances and ask whose interests are served when those structures are treated as natural. The responsibility to resist, therefore, begins with refusing to separate prosperity from the conditions through which it is produced. Prosperity cannot be considered ethically sufficient when it depends upon systematic exploitation, exclusion or the invisibility of vulnerable persons. Marxian critique consequently moves from economic analysis to ideological critique and from ideological critique to responsibility.

3. Ideological Narratives: How Inequality Becomes Normal

The concept of ideology is essential to understanding why unjust arrangements can persist even when their consequences are visible. Social systems are not maintained only through coercion. They are also sustained through meanings, assumptions and narratives that make particular arrangements appear reasonable. Ideology can therefore operate by transforming historically produced relations into apparently natural facts. This insight is particularly important in relation to poverty and prosperity. A society may acknowledge that poverty exists while interpreting its causes in ways that conceal structural responsibility. If poverty is explained primarily through laziness, lack of ambition,

irresponsible behaviour or personal failure, the social structures that distribute opportunities unequally remain outside the field of moral concern. The poor become objects of judgement rather than subjects of justice.

Prosperity can be narrated in a similarly selective manner. The successful individual is presented as self-made, entrepreneurial and deserving, while the social infrastructure that makes success possible remains invisible. Education, inherited wealth, social networks, access to capital, political stability and the labour of others may disappear from the narrative. The result is a moral vocabulary in which economic success becomes evidence of personal virtue and economic failure becomes evidence of personal inadequacy. Marx's critique disrupts precisely this separation between individual appearance and structural reality. His analysis asks what relations of production lie beneath apparently free exchange. The ideological problem is therefore not simply that people hold false opinions. It is that social relations themselves can appear in forms that conceal their historical and material foundations.

This is why the concept of ideology should not be restricted to explicit political doctrines. According to Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, ideology is to be understood in relation to the patterns through which people inhabit a meaningful and structured world (153). Torrance similarly argues that Marxian conception of ideology possesses significance beyond a narrowly defined economic or political context (1995, 2). Ideology operates where particular ways of interpreting social reality become sufficiently familiar that alternatives appear unrealistic or even unintelligible. The narrative of meritocracy provides a contemporary example. Merit matters, and effort can indeed contribute to individual achievement. Yet when merit is treated as a complete explanation of social outcomes, structural inequalities disappear from view. The narrative can then legitimize extreme differences in wealth while presenting them as the simple outcome of unequal talent or effort.

The ideological construction of poverty also becomes particularly powerful in polarized societies. Political discourse may divide citizens into competing moral categories, with one

group portrayed as responsible for social decline and another as its victim or saviour. Such narratives simplify complex economic relations and intensify antagonism. The result is a politics in which structural analysis gives way to blame. Marxian critique offers an alternative method. Rather than beginning with moral judgements about individuals, it asks how social relations are organized. Rather than asking only why some people are poor, it asks how poverty is reproduced. Rather than asking only why some individuals are wealthy, it asks how wealth is accumulated and institutionalized. This approach does not eliminate personal responsibility. Rather, it places personal responsibility within a wider social context. Human beings make choices, but choices are made within structures of opportunity and constraint. An adequate account of justice must therefore consider both individual agency and structural conditions. Jessop's discussion of Marx's political analysis is useful here because it shows that Marx's conceptual vocabulary extends beyond a simple binary between *bourgeoisie* and *proletariat*. Political parties, supporting classes, political representatives and the relationship between political discourse and class relations all form part of the wider analysis (279–280). Economic structures and political narratives therefore interact.

The ideological dimension of poverty and prosperity becomes even more visible when economic narratives are connected to gender, race, sexuality and ethnicity. Kellner notes that ideological conflicts operate across multicultural, feminist, anti-feminist and other contested identities (57–58). Inequality cannot therefore be understood through class alone, even though class remains an indispensable category in Marxian analysis. The critical task is consequently to identify the narratives through which different forms of domination become legitimate. Who is represented as deserving? Who is treated as disposable? Whose suffering is visible? Whose suffering is normalized? Who is permitted to speak? Who is expected to remain silent? These questions shift the analysis from ideology as abstract doctrine to ideology as social practice. At this point, the ethical significance of critique becomes clear. If ideological narratives can normalize injustice, then resistance requires more than redistribution. It

requires a struggle over meaning. To resist injustice is also to resist the narratives that explain injustice away.

4. Literary Narratives of Poverty, Privilege and Marginalization

Economic structures become socially meaningful through human experience, and literature can make that experience visible in ways that abstract analysis cannot. Marxist literary criticism has long recognised the capacity of literary forms to reveal relations of class, power and ideology. Marx and Engels transformed political economy into a critique of social relations, while later Marxist thinkers explored how cultural forms reproduce or contest dominant social meanings (Pradella, 261). Literature is especially significant for the present argument because it can disclose the human consequences of structures that otherwise remain abstract. Statistics can demonstrate inequality; political economy can explain its mechanisms; literature can make readers encounter its moral and emotional consequences. For instance, Katherine Mansfield (1888-1923) was one of the most famous figures in writing short stories, who challenged class struggles, inequality, and injustice. She published almost twelve stories characterized by the working class and their challenges amidst the class system and struggles (Ferrall, 108). In one of her well-known short stories, *The Garden Party* (1988) attracts the attention of the readers towards the socio-economic consciousness. The whole story focuses on the social and economic realities of the world (Sorkin, 441-442). The literary narrative unsettles the apparent normality of privilege by placing it alongside death, poverty and social distance. What appears ordinary within one social world becomes ethically disturbing when viewed from another.

This is one of the distinctive powers of literature. It interrupts ideological distance. The poor cease to be an abstract category and become particular human beings. Privilege likewise ceases to appear as an isolated achievement and becomes part of a social world structured by unequal access, expectations and possibilities. Claire Keegan's *Small Things Like These* extends this ethical function to institutional and gendered injustice. The novel's representation of women and children affected by the Magdalene Laundries reveals how institutional power can

operate through silence, social respectability and collective complicity (Kiely, 4). Basler notes the significance of Keegan's literary representation of victims whose suffering was obscured by institutional power and social silence (7). The narrative is especially important because it locates responsibility in an individual who confronts a system larger than himself. Bill Furlong is not presented as a revolutionary theorist. His ethical significance emerges from a decision to refuse the silence that surrounds suffering. By acting on behalf of a vulnerable person, he risks social standing, economic security and familial stability (Sarıkaya-Şen, 77–79).

This is precisely where literature contributes to the present argument about responsibility. Structural injustice can become so deeply embedded in ordinary life that resistance appears disruptive, unreasonable or dangerous. The morally responsible person must therefore sometimes dissent from what a community has accepted as normal. The literary representation of women and children also demonstrates the limits of a narrowly economic interpretation of exploitation. Social domination may involve economic dependence, but it can also involve sexuality, family structures, religious institutions, cultural expectations and bodily vulnerability. A contemporary Marxist analysis must therefore be capable of engaging forms of domination that cannot be reduced mechanically to class. This is where feminist Marxist scholarship becomes important. Contemporary approaches to social reproduction, particularly those associated with scholars such as Nancy Fraser, Silvia Federici and Tithi Bhattacharya, have demonstrated that capitalist societies depend upon forms of reproductive and caring labour that are often undervalued or rendered invisible. Such approaches expand the analysis of exploitation by asking not only how commodities are produced but also how human beings are sustained, educated, cared for and reproduced socially.

Gender injustice therefore cannot simply be added as another category to an otherwise complete class analysis. It requires examination of how economic production and social reproduction interact. Women's unpaid and underpaid labour, domestic responsibilities and unequal access to resources can

become part of the hidden infrastructure of prosperity. The literary narratives considered here help to make such hidden relations visible. They do not provide economic theories of exploitation, but they disclose the lived consequences of institutional arrangements and social silence. Literature thus becomes an ethical form of resistance because it creates the imaginative conditions under which distant suffering can become morally significant. This movement structural analysis to moral recognition and responsibility is essential in a polarized society. Polarization often depends upon abstraction: "the poor," "the rich," "the elite," "the workers," "the outsiders." Literary imagination can interrupt such abstractions by returning complexity and individuality to persons who have been reduced to categories.

5. From Critical Consciousness to Responsibility

If Marxist analysis exposes the structures through which inequality is reproduced, and literature makes their human consequences visible, the ethical question remains: What should one do with such knowledge? This is the point at which critical consciousness becomes responsibility. Marx's famous insistence that philosophers have interpreted the world while the point is to change it is relevant here, not as a rejection of theory but as a reminder that knowledge has practical implications. Critical consciousness becomes ethically significant when it changes the way persons perceive their social obligations. Faustino argues that confronting difficult realities involves more than truth-telling; it requires an engagement capable of transforming life and circumstances (2024, 48). This insight helps illuminate the ethical dimension of Marxian project. To know that an institution produces suffering is not equivalent to accepting responsibility for changing it. The distance between knowledge and action is precisely where responsibility emerges.

Onega similarly argues that consciousness must become effective attention and that historical experiences need to be recontextualized in the present rather than treated merely as distant events (2024, 21). The past therefore becomes ethically significant when it changes present perception. Marxist theory

provides one way of developing such critical consciousness. Allman observes that Marxian theory of consciousness resists rigid binary distinctions and opens a perspective oriented toward human emancipation (32). Consciousness is not merely a private possession. It is shaped through social relations and can become a resource for collective transformation. This has particular importance in times of polarization. Polarization often fragments moral responsibility. Individuals may identify strongly with one group and consequently regard the suffering of another group as irrelevant, deserved or politically inconvenient. Responsibility becomes conditional upon identity: one feels responsible for "our people" but not for others. A critical ethics of resistance must challenge this narrowing of responsibility. Structural injustice cannot be overcome if solidarity remains confined to one's own ideological community. Responsibility must cross the boundaries that polarization establishes. This does not mean eliminating disagreement. Responsible resistance is not the same as political conformity. Indeed, dissent can be an expression of responsibility when prevailing practices have become unjust. The ethical question is not whether one disagrees but what one is resisting, why one is resisting it, and whether one's resistance contributes to the dignity and flourishing of others.

Here selected perspectives from ancient Chinese philosophy can provide a useful comparative horizon. Mohist thought emphasized the responsibility of political authorities to seek benefit for the wider human community rather than privilege a narrow elite (Brindley, 18). Its concern with social benefit provides an alternative framework for thinking about prosperity: a political order is justified not by the wealth of a ruling group but by its contribution to the well-being of the wider community. Zhuangzi, from a very different philosophical standpoint, offers a caution against power when it becomes "universalized, absolutized, and institutionalized" without room for deviation or accommodation (Oviedo, 74). This perspective is valuable in the context of polarization because ideological certainty can become oppressive even when it begins with a legitimate concern for justice. Resistance itself requires self-critical responsibility. The comparison with Marx should therefore not be understood as

suggesting that these traditions are historically or philosophically identical. Their differences are important. Mohism, Zhuangzi and Marx emerge from different historical contexts and employ different conceptions of human flourishing, social order and political authority. Yet each, in its own way, raises questions about the relationship between power, communal life and human well-being.

The ethical significance of resistance consequently depends upon the quality of the consciousness from which it emerges. Resistance can reproduce domination if it merely reverses the positions of oppressor and oppressed. A responsible resistance must instead seek to dismantle structures that deny dignity without creating new structures of exclusion. This point is particularly important for Marxism itself. The historical experience of regimes that claimed Marxist legitimacy cannot simply be ignored, but neither should the failures of particular political implementations be allowed to eliminate the critical questions Marx raised about exploitation, inequality and power. A responsible engagement with Marx must distinguish between Marxian critique and every subsequent political appropriation of Marxism. Such distinction is itself an act of intellectual responsibility. The responsibility to resist, therefore, has at least four dimensions. First, there is an epistemic responsibility: the obligation to see injustice accurately rather than accept ideological simplifications. Second, there is a moral responsibility: the obligation to recognize the dignity of those who suffer. Third, there is a political responsibility: the obligation to question institutions and practices that reproduce injustice. Finally, there is also a relational responsibility: the obligation to resist dehumanization without reproducing hatred or exclusion. Together these dimensions transform resistance from mere opposition into ethical action.

6. Responsibility and Resistance in Times of Polarization

The relevance of Marxist critique becomes especially evident when poverty and prosperity are transformed into polarizing political narratives. Contemporary societies often experience economic inequality not merely as a material problem but as a

conflict over identity, blame and recognition. The language of inequality can divide populations into antagonistic camps: workers against elites, taxpayers against welfare recipients, the successful against the unsuccessful, migrants against citizens, or one ideological group against another. Such narratives can conceal the structural character of economic problems. When poverty becomes a moral accusation against the poor, structural responsibility disappears. When wealth becomes an object of indiscriminate resentment, the complexity of economic relations disappears as well. Polarization therefore thrives on simplified narratives.

The responsibility to resist polarization does not require abandoning conflict or disagreement. Some conflicts are morally necessary. Resistance to exploitation, discrimination and institutional injustice may require profound disagreement with existing structures. The challenge is to distinguish responsible dissent from destructive polarization. Responsible dissent seeks truth while recognizing the dignity of opponents. Destructive polarization transforms disagreement into enmity and makes the suffering of the other morally invisible. Marxian critique can contribute to this distinction by shifting attention from personalized blame toward structures and relations. Instead of asking only who is guilty, structural analysis asks how particular outcomes are produced. Instead of treating the poor as a political enemy, it asks what social arrangements reproduce poverty. Instead of regarding prosperity simply as evidence of individual merit, it asks what forms of labour, infrastructure and social cooperation make prosperity possible.

This does not eliminate moral agency. It deepens it. A society capable of responsible disagreement must be able to hold two truths together: persons are responsible for their actions, and persons live within structures that shape the possibilities available to them. Ethical responsibility therefore requires both personal accountability and structural critique. The same principle applies to resistance. Resistance is justified when it confronts injustice, but it must remain attentive to the possibility that new forms of domination can emerge from the struggle itself. A politics of responsibility therefore resists both passive acceptance and

ideological absolutism. The goal is neither the preservation of an unjust status quo nor the creation of a new order maintained through dehumanization. The goal is a form of common life in which prosperity is increasingly understood through shared flourishing rather than accumulation alone. This broader understanding of prosperity has significant implications for the contemporary world. Economic development cannot be evaluated solely through aggregate growth. It must also consider labour dignity, social inclusion, ecological sustainability, access to education and health, the status of women and children, and the ability of vulnerable communities to participate meaningfully in social life. Such an approach does not simply reproduce Marx's nineteenth-century categories. It extends his central question: What social relations are hidden behind the appearance of prosperity? The question remains ethically urgent.

7. Conclusion

Karl Marx's enduring significance lies less in the repetition of a fixed ideological programme than in his insistence that social appearances must be subjected to critical examination. His analysis of capitalism reveals that poverty and prosperity cannot always be treated as independent realities. The accumulation of wealth can be connected structurally to the vulnerability of labour, while institutions and narratives can render such relations normal, legitimate or inevitable. The concept of ideology deepens this analysis. Poverty can be narrated as personal failure; prosperity can be represented as purely individual achievement; inequality can be presented as natural; and accumulation can be equated with social progress. Such narratives are not politically neutral. They shape how societies understand responsibility and determine whose suffering is considered worthy of attention. Marxist critique challenges these narratives by directing attention toward the structures beneath them. Yet structural analysis alone is insufficient. The recognition of injustice must become ethically meaningful. Literary narratives contribute to this process by making visible the human consequences of class, gender and institutional domination. Mansfield's representation of class difference and Keegan's portrayal of institutional suffering

demonstrate how literature can transform abstract inequality into moral encounter.

No doubt, responsibility cannot be reduced to political allegiance. In a polarized context, resistance itself requires ethical discipline. Responsible resistance must distinguish between challenging injustice and dehumanizing opponents. It must be capable of dissent without absolutism, solidarity without exclusion and political engagement without the reduction of persons to ideological categories. Marxian critique does not require the uncritical preservation of every historical form of Marxism. Rather, it invites renewed attention to the ways economic structures, political institutions and ideological narratives shape human possibilities. Again, prosperity cannot be separated entirely from the conditions under which it is produced; freedom cannot be detached from the freedom of others; and responsibility cannot stop at the boundaries of ideological affiliation. The ethical question is, therefore, not simply whether Marxism is right or wrong as a comprehensive political programme. A more enduring question is whether Marxian critique can help contemporary societies recognize forms of inequality that have become normalized and recover the moral capacity to resist them. Critical consciousness becomes responsibility when it refuses to accept injustice as inevitable; responsibility becomes resistance when it refuses to allow another's suffering to become invisible; and resistance becomes ethically meaningful when it seeks not the domination of one group by another but conditions in which prosperity can be shared as human flourishing.

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