

## HEURISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY TO LIMIT DIVISIVENESS

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### 1. Introduction

When contrary truths collide, adherence can *potentially* lead to divisiveness and sometimes violence. If truth is the goal of enquiry, how is truth to be pursued or adhered to without causing conflict or, worse, violence? To address these concerns, a distinct *approach* to epistemology is being proffered in the hope that the process of enquiry, deliberation, assent/dissent, and adherence are practised with *authenticity*. The name given to this new understanding of the role of epistemology is Heuristic Epistemology (HE). This approach comprises of three symbiotic and heuristic modalities, namely, the Triad of Apperception, Appraisal, and Appropriation, undergirded by the understanding that the notion of truth is a type of virtue.

### 2. Heuristic Epistemology

Traditionally, the concentrated effort of epistemology has been to examine the so-called nature of truth or lack thereof (Deflationism). Heuristic Epistemology contends that this is necessary but insufficient. A balanced approach to the subject of truth is required that equally emphasizes the human and cognitional dimension of the knowing process as opposed to viewing truth (exclusively) as something only acquired methodically or formulaically. It was once asked: "What does it profit thee to know the definition of compunction if thou dost not feel it?" Likewise, what profit does it serve to know the definition of truth or develop an elaborate epistemology if the will is lacking a *desire* to diligently pursue and know it authentically?

Heuristic Epistemology is a radical shift in understanding the role of epistemology by forming an integral relation between epistemology and

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moral philosophy (the intellect and will, respectively). It is argued that epistemology cannot be effective in achieving its intended purposes without considering moral philosophy. In addition, HE seeks to bring to light the contributing causes of divergence and divisiveness over opposing truth claims which, in turn, hinder the knowing process of moving from error or ignorance to truth appropriated. The goal is to create an appetite for the pursuit of truth as a type of virtue. More specifically, the intent is to change the dynamics of dialogue and enquiry by instilling a desire for appropriation and thereby limit divisiveness. This is accomplished through a process of sublimations and a dispositive paradigm shift in how the subject of truth is *approached* (i.e., via the proposed Triad and appropriating the virtue of truth).

Given the yearning to make life intelligible and full of meaning, it is not surprising that divergence and divisiveness exist with respect to related truth claims (particularly existential truths). Given the need to find a *will to live*, such beliefs are cosseted when found. People will even criticize those who do not share their *raison d'être* or whatever s/he defines to be the *summum bonum*. Also, given the existential discord that exists in each person (granted in various degrees), the exigencies of HE are best expressed by Seneca who maintains that the “Eyes will not see when the heart wished them to be blind – *desire* conceals truth as darkness does the earth.”<sup>1</sup>

It is argued that the two heuristic devices of HE (viz., the virtue of truth and the Triad) can be efficacious in reducing conflict and assist the epistemic process of moving from error/ignorance to the appropriation of particular truths. The Triad is an epistemic shift in *emphasis* from *ratiocination* to Apperception, from objective *criteria* to Appraisal, and from *certainty* to Appropriation. Various heuristic modalities that comprise HE are expounded below:

1. Apperception seeks to sublimate those factors that contribute to divergence and divisiveness, which consequently frustrate the purposes of epistemology and cause conflict. It is the linchpin in the attempt to integrate moral philosophy and epistemology. Apperception seeks to complement the ratiocinative approach of examining truth claims, although it also recognizes the limitations of ratiocination. Apperception cultivates a certain disposition throughout the knowing

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<sup>1</sup>Cited in Lynette Evans, *Wisdom for Life*, New York: Book Blocks, 2003, 34; emphasis added.

process which serves to complement the other members of the Triad. In short, apperception serves to calibrate the will and intellect towards authenticity.

2. Appraisal's function is to divert the object of enquiry *to* the subject. Truth is not something that can always be 'computed' by applying various types of criteria. By being attentive to the cognitional process, deliberation will operate more authentically and thereby encourage appropriation. Appraisal approaches truth in a Gestalt and holistic manner and thereby changes the process of deliberation from being mechanical to being dynamic. Another role of appraisal is assessing one's level of apperception and appropriation in order to ensure that the other two modalities do not become static.
3. Appropriation is an authentic process of moving from knowledge to knowing and creates a type of awareness that separates one's beliefs from his or her identity. HE contends that the quest for truth does not end once certainty is attained. Just because someone possesses certitude does not mean, necessarily, that s/he is in a position to say "I possess the truth" about something or say, for example, "My religion is true."<sup>2</sup> Rather, it is the person who *appropriates* a particular truth with authenticity who can say "I *know*." Appropriation is also a response to the *limitations* (as opposed to the repudiation) of the Correspondence Theory (CT). CT and the idea of epistemic criteria or the notion of warrant do not constitute sufficient benchmarks in being able to say "I know."<sup>3</sup> Just as neither the accumulation of knowledge does constitute wisdom, truth can also not be a mere product of adding up, as it were, correspondence criteria. Beliefs are in need of appropriation.
4. The premise of HE is that the subject of truth is far more nuanced than what is commonly cited in the literature of epistemology. To know truly is first and foremost a moral quest. Sometimes truth requires more of the knower than discursive reasoning. The idea of integrating moral philosophy and epistemology begins with the following working assumption of Aristotle's principle: "As are a man's dispositions, so are

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<sup>2</sup>Nor can truth claims be so easily disregarded without appropriation or via the other two members of the Triad.

<sup>3</sup>Heuristic Epistemology is more of a challenge to the *limitations* of CT, as a succinct and holistic understanding of truth, than an outright dismissal of the spirit of CT (viz., objectivity).

his judgments.”<sup>4</sup> Not only moral judgments but also those judgments that pertain to issues of truth.

### 3. The Desire for Truth

The desire to know truly often manifests itself as a desire for *certainty* with an entrenched *need to be right*. Despite the fact that truth is valued, it is often pursued as a means to an end. That is to say, enquiry or adherence is not always *authentic* but rather a means to substantiate other beliefs or, as Nietzsche argues, for example, the desire for truth is often a cloaked manifestation of the “will to power.”<sup>5</sup> Consequently, inauthenticity leads to divergence, which can cause divisiveness and, thus, error or ignorance prevails.

Why does divergence exist in all subject matters, whether in ethics, politics, religion, science, history, philosophy, or any other area of enquiry? In seeking to answer this question, it is being put forth for consideration that one means to reduce divisiveness, resolve conflict, and judge correctly by appropriating the proposed heuristic devices of HE (viz., virtue of truth and the Triad). Not only does HE function as a means to limit divisiveness but to abet the process of enquiry with a desire to know veraciously, thus, paving the way to move from error/ignorance to truth.<sup>6</sup>

Unless truth is considered a type of *virtue*, the proposed Triad will be futile. What is being offered here is not properly an epistemology or a method *per se* but rather an *approach* to epistemology. It is believed that in the order of enquiry, *developing an approach takes precedence*. Traditionally, epistemology does not provide the navigational tools, as it

<sup>4</sup>Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. W. D. Ross, in Robert Maynard Hutchins, ed., *Great Books of the Western World*, vol. 9, Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952, 1114<sup>a</sup>32.

<sup>5</sup>Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York: Vintage Books, 1974, §4.

<sup>6</sup>The use of the word ‘veracious’ conveys what the English word ‘truth’ is not able to, but which the Sanskrit word for truth (*satya*) does: the idea of being genuine, virtuous, and real. *Satya* is from *sat*, which is the present participle (“being, existing, occurring”) of the Sanskrit *as-*, “to be, to happen.” In short, being true, genuine, virtuous, and real is denotative of the word *satya*. Although the English word ‘truth’ does not share the connotations of *satya*, its etymology does convey a similar idea. In Old Frisian, for instance, *tr,uwe*, connotes “trust and allegiance.” It is interesting to note that the Hebrew word for truth (*emeth*) denotes being faithful (i.e., faithful to what is).

were, to ensure *authenticity* or instil a desire for appropriation. Epistemology has rather caged the subject of truth within the narrow walls of ratiocination. Given the reality of divisiveness and violence, what we need is a more robust understanding *and* approach to truth than *merely* arid theories of truth, like the CT, which may contribute to the problem of divergence by fostering a superficial view of truth.

Since HE is an *approach* to epistemology, it is independent of any worldview, *a priori* category, or concept. It acts, rather, as a handmaiden *for* epistemology or for any type of enquiry. By attempting to cultivate an epistemic 'ethos' (via the virtue of truth and the Triad), HE functions as an aid in the quest to know by instilling a desire for authentic appropriation, which, in turn, can allay divisiveness and conflict.

If philosophy still means "love of wisdom," perhaps philosophy should not limit itself to Postmodern concerns or exclusively concentrate on the so-called theories of truth and justification; instead it must return to its first love of honouring philosophy's commitment to seek wisdom. If, as the Spanish philosopher Miguel Unamuno states, the "appetite of knowledge is exhibited to us as bound up with the necessity of living and of procuring the wherewithal to maintain life,"<sup>7</sup> and people "believe themselves to be seeking truth for its own sake, [but instead are] ... seeking *life in truth*," then perhaps we need to remember that the "personal and affective starting point of all philosophy and all religion is the tragic sense of life."<sup>8</sup> Is this not why philosophy was born?

For Unamuno, a philosopher is one who "philosophizes not with the reason only, but with the will."<sup>9</sup> This is one account as to why it is being proposed that a more *integral* relation needs to be considered between moral philosophy and epistemology. It is being suggested that the classic or common understanding of the role of epistemology will not bring us any closer in 'attaining' wisdom because too much emphasis is placed on the intellect's ability without due consideration of the role of the will. It is the will that has the 'final word' or as Aquinas puts it, the "will wills the

<sup>7</sup>Miguel de Unamuno, *The Tragic Sense of Life*, trans. J. E. Crawford Fritch, New York: Dover Publications, 1954, 22.

<sup>8</sup>Unamuno, *The Tragic Sense of Life*, 37; emphasis added.

<sup>9</sup>Unamuno, *The Tragic Sense of Life*, 28.

intellect to understand."<sup>10</sup> The will also plays a significant part at the moment of assent or dissent. It is for this reason that epistemology cannot disregard moral philosophy in its quest to know. HE seeks to understand the relationship between the will and the intellect and how this relationship affects epistemology. Consider these additional words from Unamuno:

In the starting-point of all philosophy, in the real starting-point, the practical, not the theoretical, there is a wherefore. The philosopher philosophizes for something more than for the sake of philosophizing... [A]nd as the philosopher is a man before he is a philosopher, he must need live [*sic*] before he can philosophize, and, in fact, he philosophizes in order to live. And usually he philosophizes either in order to resign himself to life, or to seek some finality in it, or to distract himself and forget his griefs, or for pastime and amusement.<sup>11</sup>

A thinking person is a human being before s/he is a philosopher. We seem to forget this during disputations. We are all born within the confines of a labyrinth. Everyone is attempting to navigate around its walls. Is this not what unites humanity, a desire to unravel mystery and find equanimity? Yet, our interpretation out of the labyrinth creates divergent views in the effort to make sense of our condition and to find a *will to live*. What unites us is sadly what divides us ... the wherefore.

To merely theorize about epistemology without considering the existential dimensions of philosophy is like an architect designing a building without knowing the purpose of the building. Or, consider how everyone could agree as to what the 'correct epistemology' is (if there is such a thing); and yet having the 'correct epistemology' is no guarantee that it will be implemented.

HE works with the assumption that epistemology must not be something which simply appeases the intellect. Appropriation cannot be 'attained' solely by the intellect. In short, it is argued that any particular truth, even though justified, is of no consequence if it is not appropriated.

#### 4. Postulates of Heuristic Epistemology

One function of HE is to find a more robust *approach* to truth by placing greater emphasis on the knower and not just the object of truth (of

<sup>10</sup>Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, in Robert Maynard Hutchins, ed., *Great Books of the Western World*, vol. 19, Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952, I-II, 3, 5.

<sup>11</sup>Unamuno, *The Tragic Sense of Life*, 29.

enquiry). This is because, given the four modes of knowing (enquiry, deliberation, assent/dissent, adherence), the will plays an equally important role as the intellect. Below are the basic postulates of HE:

01. The CT (in its *modern* articulation) is too narrow and limiting. There are different types of truths (viz., existential, aesthetic, ideological, ethical, etc.), which CT cannot account for since these truths do not pertain to 'facts' and, therefore, do not directly entail a one-to-one correspondence.<sup>12</sup> HE's challenge of CT is not a complete repudiation of CT nor is there a hidden Postmodern agenda or credence to various forms of Deflationism. Instead, CT requires semantic fine-tuning, especially because it leads to confusion (hence the modern movement of Deflationism).
02. The word correspondence has been inappropriately extracted from its original Aristotelian context causing equivocation.
03. The meaning of the word 'relation' in the CT formula<sup>13</sup> is not clearly explicated. Further clarification is required since the traditional meaning of the word was reversed by Immanuel Kant. For this reason, CT is not a homogeneous theory as most of the literature in epistemology implies.
04. *If* CT is independent of metaphysics, the word 'reality' in the CT formulation is ambiguous.<sup>14</sup>
05. The distinction forced by CT between the nature of truth and criteria is not characteristic of Aristotle who is the so-called originator of CT.<sup>15</sup>
06. The same criticisms that befall logical positivism *may* also apply to the basic formula of CT (i.e., it is self-referentially incoherent).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup>In other words, there are truth claims which do not entail any type of correspondent relation. For example, in what sense does a political *theory* or an economic *theory* correspond with *reality*? If this is a correct analysis, then CT (in its *modern formulation*) cannot account for all truth claims.

<sup>13</sup>"Truth is a correspondent *relation* between the thought and reality."

<sup>14</sup>See Devitt, "The Metaphysics of Truth." He argues, rightly or wrongly, that, "Any semantic doctrine needs to be disentangled from Realism. In particular, the correspondence theory of truth needs to be disentangled: it is in no way constitutive of Realism nor of any similarly metaphysical doctrine." Michael Devitt, "The Metaphysics of Truth," in Steven Hales, ed., *Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999, 94.

<sup>15</sup>The fact that Aristotle is claimed to be the originator of CT is also being challenged.

07. The CT is not clear as to what actually *constitutes* a truth claim.<sup>17</sup>
08. The CT may entail a vicious circle. How, for example, is correspondence or the relation between thought and reality accurately *recognized*, i.e., as true? The obvious question is, 'What is meant by truth?' CT states: "Truth is what corresponds with reality." But, how does one know whether this statement itself 'corresponds'? The answer, given by CT, appears to be: correspondence.<sup>18</sup> Is this not circular?<sup>19</sup>
09. The *quest for truth* is not to be conflated with the *quest for certainty*.
10. Truth is not a noun.
11. Heuristic Epistemology seeks to give an account of the reasons why truth is not always pursued authentically. It is argued that this examination can itself be efficacious as a means of limiting divisiveness or assist the epistemic process of enquiry.
12. Truth is a type of virtue.
13. Enquiry cannot begin until *apperception* is sought.
14. For enquiry to be authentic, for the purpose of 'attaining' truth, it must not merely be pursued as a means to an end. Pursuit of truth is an ongoing dynamic process requiring appropriation.
15. Given the existential dynamics of epistemology, *moral philosophy* and *epistemology* need to be integrated.

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<sup>16</sup>The refutation of logical positivism's "verifiability principle" was that it was either tautological or not empirically verifiable. In like manner, does CT (which itself is a truth claim) correspond with reality? This potential problem may only be applicable to the *basic formula* given by some correspond theorists. That is, it may be avoided upon further explication.

<sup>17</sup>Consider that a theist could state that an ethical claim is either true or false depending on whether it 'corresponds' with God's moral law, whereas a pantheist or an atheist would not be able to say that a moral pronouncement is true in the same way as a theist could.

<sup>18</sup>In response, a correspondent theorist may contend that this accusation fails to make a distinction between the "nature of truth" and "criteria for truth." However, this does not avoid the problem since any criterion must itself, according to CT, correspond with reality. Pulling oneself up by your epistemic bootstraps is not a solution.

<sup>19</sup>Of course, *if* CT is a first principle (i.e., a necessary truth), then it requires no justification. However, it must be established as a first principle like the "law of contradiction." Aristotle certainly made no such claim.



16. The pursuit of a particular truth does not end with assent or certainty. What is further required is appropriation guided by apperception and appraisal.
17. Enquiry and deliberation constitute a continual process of *appraisal* that requires apperception.
18. The CT (along with most other theories) creates an illegitimate mien towards truth. It limits the knowing process by implying that all that is required of the knower is verification or warrant. This view of truth not only *intellectualizes* truth but hinders *appropriation*.
19. *Appropriation* supersedes the demand for certainty.
20. *Apperception* and *appropriation*, undergirded by the *virtue of truth*, are keys to finding a balance between the intellect and the will.
21. In retaining the spirit of Aristotelian epistemology and given the fact that truth is a property of judgement (via the intellect and the will), HE subjugates assent/dissent to the heuristics properties of the Triad. In doing so, HE claims that truth is in need of appropriation. This does not mean that HE precludes the need for verification and justification but rather to say traditional approaches to epistemology are simply insufficient.
22. By changing how we think about truth and how we dialogue, HE serves three primary purposes: (i) it allays divisiveness, (ii) causes the knower to be hyper cognizant of his/her epistemic processes, and (iii) creates space to move from error/ignorance to the appropriation of truth.

### 5. Heuristic Epistemology as an Approach

The *process* leading up to assent/dissent is demanding, and without *authenticity* divisiveness seems inevitable. This, in turn, hinders the possibility of a fruitful dialogue between opposing positions and moving from error/ignorance to truth appropriated. As mentioned, applying criteria for truth and having the 'correct' theory of truth or being able to justify one's belief *is* epistemically necessary but insufficient for *knowing* truth. This is one of the main contentions of HE, that is, historically epistemology offers a narrow approach to truth. In fact, this was a similar concern of Nietzsche when he uttered the following:

SUPPOSING that Truth is a woman – what then? Is there not ground for suspecting that all philosophers, insofar as they have been dogmatists, have failed to understand women – that the terrible

seriousness and clumsy importunity with which they have usually paid their addresses to Truth, have been unskilled and unseemly methods for winning a woman?

Certainly she has never allowed herself to be won; and at present every kind of dogma stands with sad and discouraged mien.<sup>20</sup>

No matter what type of truth question is raised, traditionally the answer has been found within the confines of one of two methods (empiricism and/or rationalism). This is problematic for several reasons. Pedantry may offer insight, but does it always yield results! Consider the following from Descartes:

It were far better never to think of investigating truth at all, than to do so without a method... Moreover, by a method I mean *certain* and simple rules, such that, if a man observe them *accurate*, he shall never assume what is false as true, and will never spend his mental efforts to no purpose, but will *always* gradually increase his knowledge and so arrive at a true understanding of all that does not surpass his powers.<sup>21</sup>

Like Kant, Descartes was in search of certainty and that certainty was the benchmark of truth. Notice how for Descartes the only requirement in attaining “true understanding” is to find a proper *method* and follow it. This approach to truth is flawed because Descartes views truth as something obtained in the same manner one solves a mathematical problem (i.e., using a formula). Some truths cannot be *assented* solely via ratiocination like the statement, “I love you.” This truth claim is not on the same level as saying “Your shirt is yellow.” The statement, “Your shirt is yellow,” is either true or false as is the statement, “I love you.” However, the process of coming to the realization of whether these two statements are true or false requires different means. There is no single formula to know all truth claims and even if there were, this would not preclude the necessity of appropriation which is not a product of discursive gyrations.

## 6. Efficacies of Heuristic Epistemology

Despite recognizing the value of Postmodernism, it nevertheless entails some type of relativism similar to the Sophists. Is it possible to retain a

<sup>20</sup>Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Helen Zimmern, Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2004, 2 (Preface); emphasis in the original.

<sup>21</sup>“Descartes, Rules for Direction of the Mind,” cited in Haldaine, ed., *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, I: 8; emphasis added.

spirit of objectivity and avoid potential power struggles? Heuristic Epistemology argues that relativism is not the only avenue to take in order to avoid divisiveness, power struggles, and violence.

What is the bridge between truth as cognition (i.e., intellectualism, dogmatisms, ideologies, etc.) and (where applicable) its efficaciousness? This is the difference between knowledge and knowing, respectively. A 'spiritual' person, for example, adheres to a set of doctrines, however, s/he also expects some of these doctrines to be affectively efficacious. Some truths require only *intellectual* assent and are not meant to be efficacious in the same way as other truths. The desire to know truly does not end once 'valid' knowledge is acquired or warrant obtained. Nor does it end with assent or dissent. HE contends that given the need for *appropriation*, enquiry does *not* end with assent/dissent or even with certainty.

Certainty does not add closure to truth. Truth, according to HE, is an ongoing process of appropriation – a furtherance of authenticity. The *quest for truth* and the *quest for certainty* are not the same quest despite the fact they are often conflated. This may further explain why many Postmodernists either dismiss the importance of truth entirely or embrace some form of relativism.

Instead of intellectual assent *or* dissent being the end of enquiry, HE states that this is only one facet of the process of knowing. It is being suggested that in order for the knowing process to operate authentically the proposed Triad and, in particular appropriation, must be an essential component in being able to say, for example, "I believe." With an intuitive impetus for appropriation, perhaps, polemic dialogue can be productive or avoided, and even the desire to be right overcome. This change in perspective can eliminate eristic discussions by emphasizing that truth cannot be bantered about simply on the level of the intellect. What is often lacking in dialogue is a healthy exchange of ideas *for the purpose* of furthering one's own appropriation and even appropriating someone else's beliefs (as a means to generate empathy). It is argued that this potential is only actualized once apperception and the virtue of truth is acknowledged and appropriated.

If veracity was measured by one's level of appropriation, instead of empirical or rational criteria being the *sole* proprietor of truth, then one might be less assertive and confrontational. The desire for appropriation, undergirded by the virtue of truth, creates respite and frees one to be attentive. Instead of perceiving those with conflicting views as adversaries,

dialogue is freed from the 'need to be right'. This shift in *emphasis* from persuasion to docility<sup>22</sup> signals a radical shift in the process of personal enquiry and dialogue. With HE, the will and the intellect are conjoined in an attempt to consummate the theoretical understanding of truth (i.e., epistemology) with its praxis (i.e., moral philosophy and appropriation).

### 7. Conclusion

Consider the following as to why HE is being proffered:

What we think is true is what we *will* value.

What we value is what we *will* live for.

What we live for is what we *will* die for.

What we'd die for is what we will *fight* for.

Herein lies the proverbial door to Pandora's Box, which represents conflict in the name of truth or, to be precise, in the name of "my truth" (that which provides one's *raison d'être*).

Something more is required of the seeker and the knower than simply appeasing the intellect and will or attaining certainty.<sup>23</sup> Something is needed to move from knowledge to knowing. It is being proposed that there are certain exigencies (*viz.*, the Triad) that are necessary if epistemology is to be constructive rather than being merely analytical or theoretical. To ensure authenticity the heuristic devices of Apperception, Appraisal, and Appropriation act as concomitant conditions *before, during,* and *after* assent/dissent. Cultivating a proper epistemic attitude and appetite towards truth is, according to HE, as equally important as developing a theory of truth.

HE seeks to supplement traditional avenues of speaking about matters of truth, as well as the demand for certainty, toward a more intuitive grasp of truth while retaining the necessity of logic. Consider appropriation. It is analogous to the process of translation. Sometimes

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<sup>22</sup>To be docile does not mean feeble but rather a willingness to be taught and, when applied to HE, a desire for appropriation. If appropriation becomes the intention of dialogue, then people will *a fortiori* be willing to be docile. Consequently, this proclivity would circumvent the propensity to be defensive or reactionary. The etymology of 'docile' derives from the Latin word *docere*, which means to teach.

<sup>23</sup>HE does not seek to dismiss the possibility of certainty. Rather, it emphasizes that appropriation needs to *supersede* the desire for certainty. This will allow dialogue to be less polemical and thereby allows truth to be more freely explored instead of the need "to be right" dominating the conversation which only hinders the *knowing* process.

analyzing truth claims is like translating an inflected language and, thus, demands more of the knower. It is of little help to use a lexicon to translate a sentence from *Koiné* Greek (an inflected language) to English without a grasp of Greek grammar. Likewise, acquiring knowledge via the intellect does not (necessarily) enable one to say, "I have the truth." Truth is far more nuanced than finding correspondence as is translating *Koiné* Greek to English.

What HE seeks to encourage is belief with integrity.<sup>24</sup> Consider the following words of the American political leader Robert Green Ingersoll:

It is the duty of each and every one to maintain his individuality. "This above all, to thine own-self be true, and it must follow as the night the day, thou canst not then be false to any man." It is a magnificent thing to be the sole proprietor of yourself. It is a terrible thing to wake up at night and say, "There is nobody in this bed." It is humiliating to know that *your ideas are all borrowed*; that you are *indebted to your memory* for your principles; that *your religion is simply one of your habits*, and that you would have convictions if they were only contagious. It is mortifying to feel that you belong to a mental mob and cry "crucify him," because the others do; that you reap what the great and brave have sown...<sup>25</sup>

Without apperception there can be no integrity; without integrity neither appropriation nor appraisal will be sought. Unfortunately, all too often our *amour-propre* creates conflict and hinders the epistemic process of judging correctly or being able to listen attentively.

To move from opinion to truth is to move from belief to appropriation. Yet, *appropriation* requires *apperception*, which, in turn, requires *appraisal*. Likewise, appraisal needs to be appropriated as does apperception. For appraisal to operate authentically, it requires apperception; hence, the symbiotic nature of the Triad. But the Triad will not be pursued unless truth is *valued* and appreciated as a virtue, a type of duty that enables one to *transcend* differences during conflict(s). In short,

<sup>24</sup>It is interesting to note that the etymology of integrity, from the Latin *integritās*, means wholeness. We may claim to be a person of integrity but do we *believe* with integrity? This means moving beyond intellectual or emotional assent towards appropriation through apperception and appraisal.

<sup>25</sup>Robert G. Ingersoll, *The Works of Robert G. Ingersoll*, vol. 1, ed. C. P. Farrell, vol. 1, *Lectures* (New York: Dresden Publishing, 1901), lecture titled "Individuality"; emphasis added.

the degree to which the virtue of truth is imbibed and the degree to which the Triad is appropriated will equal the degree differences can be understood with empathy and thereby avoid divisiveness or worse violence and egregious evil. Instead, dialogue will empathically evolve (with compassion) in such a manner that truth (as a virtue) will act as a precedence, sought passionately yet dispassionately, believed confidently yet humbly, adhered with integrity yet with docility. It is being proffered that through the practice of HE truth is known heuristically. This is the value of appropriation. This is the value of ensuring, in the words of Ingersoll, our "ideas are [not] all borrowed."

Truth is not about being right. Credence to the proposed Triad creates space for authenticity, consequently, divergence is reduced, the causes of divisiveness sublimated, and the road paved for truth to be more readily *known*. It is being suggested that HE could create a radical shift in how we think about truth, how we dialogue, and how conflict is resolved.