GLOBAL POP, NATIONAL CONSERVATISM AND GENDER IDEOLOGY AMONG GEN Z IN CHINA

MENGTIAN WU♦

Abstract: The study reveals the functions of global popular culture as an ideological interface in which national conservatism and gender ideology are reinvented among Generation Z in China. It challenges assumptions that cultural globalization equals cultural liberalization, and/or youth culture equals resistance, by arguing that global popular culture in China is deeply domestic and shaped by digital platforms, nationalist discourses, and state-oriented regulations. Drawing on the theoretical frameworks, such as globalization, nationalism and gender theory, the paper examines the process of localization, state-oriented regulations and interpretation of transnational pop forms in China. Through a qualitative approach, cultural studies, discourse analysis and textual interpretation, the study shows how global aesthetics frequently reinforce heteronormative gender norms and banal nationalism. Finally, by theorizing global pop culture as an interface, rather than an import, the paper contributes to a broader discourse on globalization, politics, and ideological reproduction in digitally mediated societies.

Keywords: *Adaptation, Consumption, Culture, Gen Z, Identity, Laws, Media, Norms, Online, Popular, Power, Society, Values, Youth.*

1. Introduction

Over the past two decades, China has undergone intensified globalization and digital platformization. Gen Z, which has grown up with smartphones, algorithm-driven media and deep integration into digital capitalism, represents one of the most

---

♦Mengtian Wu is from College of Intelligent Transportation and Smart Construction Engineering, Huanghe Jiaotong University, Jiaozuo, 454950, China; College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Silla University, Busan 46958, Republic of Korea. Email: mwu3@live.esu.edu.

revealing groups for observing these transformations (Qian, 2025). Peter Baehr (2010) describes this generation as culturally anomalous: globally exposed yet increasingly static, shaped by national conservatism, conventional gender ideology and state-centered social narratives. This contradiction raises a central question: to what extent does global culture in China move beyond imported aesthetics to function as an ideological mechanism that negotiates nationalism and gender among Gen Z?

Earlier studies on cultural globalization in East Asia often framed global popular culture as a force for liberalization, modernization or Westernization (Iwabuchi, 21–30; Tomlinson, 1999, 84–86). These linear assumptions have been challenged. Arjun Appadurai (1996) argues that cultural flows are fragmented and reconstituted within local power structures rather than simply transmitted across borders (32–35). In China, global pop culture — ranging from K-pop and anime to gaming and streetwear — circulates through state regulation, platform governance, nationalist discourse and localized fan practices (Sun, 20–25). As a result, global pop rarely serves as a straightforward carrier of progressive ideology.

This study proposes a conceptual shift from viewing global popular culture as an "import" to understanding it as an interface — a space where global trends, state policies, platform algorithms and youth practices intersect. Platforms such as Weibo, BiliBili, Douyin and Xiaohongshu do not merely distribute content; they actively shape perception, moral judgment and meaning-making. In Foucauldian terms, these platforms function as productive regimes of power that form subjectivity through normalization, participation and pleasure rather than overt coercion (Foucault, 1977, 191–198).

Within this interface, China's Generation Z occupies a distinctive position. Unlike earlier generations shaped by scarcity, revolutionary politics, and social rupture, Gen Z is characterized by cultural remixing, upward mobility, and digital fluency. While youth culture is sometimes portrayed as politically apathetic, research suggests that young people exhibit strong emotional investment in nationalism, online moral regulation, and symbolic

boundary-making (Yang, 2009, 61–68). Zhao (2004) further observes that nationalist sentiment often emerges in debates about foreign cultural influence, celebrity scandals, and gender norms (218–221). Among Gen Z, nationalism operates less as explicit doctrine and more as an affective, performative practice embedded in fandom, memes, and digital media.

Gender ideology is another key arena in which these dynamics unfold. In recent years, Chinese state discourse has increasingly emphasized masculinity, femininity, family values, and demographic concerns (Chong, 299–313). Media narratives criticizing the "feminization" of men frame gender nonconformity as a threat to social stability and national strength (Connell, 41–50). These narratives coexist uneasily with global pop culture's visibility of androgynous idols, cosplay, and emotionally expressive fandoms. Although such cultural forms appear to challenge traditional gender norms, their local reinterpretation often ends up reinforcing conventional gender roles and nationalist identity.

Judith Butler's theory of gender performativity (1999) provides a useful framework for understanding this process. Butler conceptualizes gender not as a fixed identity but as a repeated performance shaped by social norms and institutional power (84–90). Xu (2025) argues that global pop culture introduces alternative scripts for gender expression, yet these scripts are selectively embraced or condemned through nationalist ideology (12–25). For instance, androgynous male idols may be celebrated within niche communities but criticized in mainstream discourse for undermining normative masculinity. This illustrates how global pop culture can destabilize gender categories symbolically while leaving dominant ideologies intact.

Importantly, global popular culture in China does not operate solely through resistance or conformity but through ambivalence. As Sun Wanning (2002) notes, negotiation rather than opposition defines Chinese popular culture, allowing nationalism, pleasure, and self-expression to coexist (175–180). Billig's (1995) concept of "banal nationalism" further explains how national ideology becomes embedded in everyday cultural practices in subtle and routine ways (5–9).

This paper argues that global popular culture among China's Gen Z does not primarily function as a vehicle of liberalization or ideological opposition. Instead, it serves as a mediated middle ground where nationalist and gender meanings are continuously reshaped within China's digital and political environment. Through state regulation, platform governance, nationalist discourse and youth participation, global pop aesthetics are localized to reinforce traditional gender norms and everyday nationalism while simultaneously projecting an image of openness and diversity. Accordingly, this study addresses two main questions:

1. How does global popular culture function as a mediated interface through which national conservatism is reproduced and normalized among China's Ge Z on digital platforms?
2. How are gender norms—masculinity, femininity and sexuality—negotiated and rearticulated through Gen Z's engagement with global pop culture under nationalist and regulatory conditions?

To answer these questions, the paper first develops a theoretical framework that conceptualizes popular culture as a site of ideological production shaped by globalization, nationalism, and digital mediation. It then situates China's Gen Z within specific political and technological conditions, emphasizing algorithmic governance and participatory media practices. Finally, it examines how global pop aesthetics are localized in ways that reconcile nationalist discourse with evolving gender performances, contributing to a nuanced understanding of global popular culture as an ideological interface in contemporary China.

2. Global Popular Culture, Mediation & Ideological Power

Understanding global popular culture as an ideological interface requires moving beyond models that treat culture either as a passive reflection of political structures or as an autonomous sphere of resistance. Rather, global culture operates through uneven interactions between transnational flows and local conditions. As John Tomlinson (1999) argues, globalization does

not dissolve national boundaries; instead, it produces hybrid meanings shaped by specific political, economic and technological contexts. Similarly, Arjun Appadurai's (1990) concept of disjunctive global "scapes" highlights how cultural forms travel in fragmented ways, becoming reassembled and reinterpreted as they move across environments. In China, these dynamics unfold within a distinctly structured field of state-led cultural governance, platform-based moderation and official discourses of "cultural confidence." Global popular culture enters not as a neutral marketplace of ideas, but as a regulated ideological environment in which meanings are continuously negotiated. As Meng notes, global cultural contact in China presents both opportunity and ideological risk, managed through layered mechanisms of supervision and guidance. O'Brien and Szeman further emphasize that culture circulates within structured systems of power rather than in open, equal spaces.

Within this setting, nationalism often functions subtly. Michael Billig's (1995) concept of "banal nationalism" is especially useful here: national ideology is reproduced not primarily through overt propaganda but through everyday practices, symbols and habitual ways of feeling. On Chinese digital platforms, nationalism is frequently enacted through participatory belonging—users engage in boundary-making, moral judgment and collective policing of perceived foreign influences. Global aesthetics are not simply consumed; they are evaluated for compatibility with national identity and social order. Popular culture thus becomes a key site where national belonging is continuously negotiated.

Power in this mediated environment is not merely repressive but productive. Drawing on Michel Foucault, Raffnsøe et al. (2019) describe modern power as organizing subjectivity through normalization and discipline rather than direct coercion. Digital platforms exemplify this productive dimension. As Li and Sun (2025) argue, algorithmic recommendation systems, visibility hierarchies and moderation regimes actively shape how users perceive, evaluate and emotionally respond to cultural texts. Platforms cultivate specific evaluative habits—encouraging users to feel pride, shame, enjoyment, or suspicion toward particular

cultural forms. Consequently, global pop culture becomes ideologically significant not only through what is allowed or censored, but through the affective and moral frameworks within which it is experienced. Cultural openness does not automatically translate into ideological pluralism. Instead, the Chinese platform ecosystem fosters selective appropriation, moral regulation and assessments of ideological compatibility. Rather than signaling simple Westernization or resistance, the interactions of Gen Z occur within a system that combines globalization, nationalism and mediated power. The result is an interface where global forms are creatively reworked, yet often associated with conservative and gendered norms embedded in the broader socio-political order.

3. Gen Z and the Platformized Cultural Economy in China

Gen Z in China has come of age in a media environment dominated not by traditional broadcasting but by digital platforms. Unlike earlier generations, their exposure to global popular culture is mediated primarily through domestic platforms such as Weibo, Bilibili, Douyin and Xiaohongshu. These platforms do more than host content; they actively structure what users see and how culture is experienced, shaping participation through algorithms, interface design and moderation practices (Lin and de Kloet, 1525–1533). As June Wang and Xinyue Yu (2021) observe, China's user-generated content (UGC) ecosystem has developed along three interconnected strands: everyday improvisational creativity, algorithm-driven prosumer labour and visibility hierarchies, and coordinated state–platform governance. Together, these strands sustain a creator economy that reorganizes cultural production, consumption and power relations (1–12). Understanding Gen Z's engagement with global pop culture, therefore, requires situating youth culture within China's platformized political economy rather than treating it as a purely expressive or oppositional domain.

Chinese digital platforms operate with hybrid objectives. While they promote entertaining and emotionally engaging content to drive user participation, regulatory frameworks ensure alignment with national identity and state-sanctioned values

(Chen and Yang, 1–8). For Gen Z, access to global culture is thus filtered—curated through algorithmic preferences that amplify "acceptable" expressions and marginalize others (9–16). In such an environment, nationalism does not appear primarily as overt political indoctrination but as a normalized element of everyday digital life. Jing Wang (2008) argues that contemporary Chinese nationalism has become increasingly affective and consumer-oriented, particularly among youth. National belonging is expressed less through explicit political rhetoric than through cultural taste, moral evaluation and symbolic boundary-making (4–5).

Gen Z's engagement with global pop culture vividly illustrates this dynamic of negotiation between openness and identity. The consumption of foreign music, fashion and celebrity culture is often accompanied by discourses affirming cultural confidence and national distinctiveness rather than passive imitation. Online debates surrounding celebrity behavior, cultural appropriation and political controversies frequently transform global pop into a space where the boundaries of acceptable cultural openness are actively negotiated. In this process, cultural literacy becomes closely intertwined with expressions of patriotic sentiment and collective belonging. Participatory digital affordances further intensify these dynamics. Chinese online platforms increasingly blur the distinction between expression and regulation, as users simultaneously produce content and police ideological limits through commentary, reporting, and collective sanctioning (China Spektrum, 2025). For many young users, engagement in fandoms and comment cultures involves public moral evaluation and performative demonstrations of political and ethical alignment within national narratives.

At the same time, broader socio-economic pressures shape Gen Z's orientations. Vanessa L. Fong (2011) notes that heightened educational competition and economic precarity have fostered a desire for stability, belonging and moral order alongside aspirations for self-expression (97–99). While global pop culture offers aesthetic novelty and cosmopolitan appeal, nationalist narratives and conservative norms provide emotional reassurance.

4. Globalized Popular Culture as an Interface: Localization, Regulation & Youth Practices

Global popular culture occupies an ambivalent position in China's platformized cultural economy: it is simultaneously pervasive and contested, celebrated and scrutinized. For China's Gen Z, engagement with K-pop, Japanese anime and transnational gaming unfolds within a tightly regulated and ideologically sensitive environment where market vitality operates alongside political securitization. These cultural forms are not merely foreign imports; they function as interfaces through which national values, moral norms and political boundaries are negotiated in everyday digital practice. Research on East Asian popular culture suggests that transnational flows are shaped less by cultural domination than by selective localization. Nissim Otmazgin (2013) argues that regional pop circulates through adaptive processes aligned with domestic priorities rather than simple imitation (41–43). Similarly, John Lie (2015) notes that in China localization is mediated by regulatory systems that distinguish desirable elements from problematic ones (77–78). Thus, while K-pop aesthetics and performance styles are widely imitated, aspects such as celebrity activism, fan mobilization or certain gender expressions often face criticism or restriction. Global pop is not rejected wholesale; it is reorganized into ideologically legible and politically acceptable forms.

Digital platforms are central to this reorganization. Platforms such as Bilibili and Douyin host vast quantities of globally inspired content, yet algorithmic recommendation systems and moderation frameworks privilege interpretations that emphasize cultural confidence, moral propriety and national alignment (Su and Kaye, 1–16). Fan-generated media—reaction videos, remixes, commentary—frequently reframes global texts within nationalist or moralizing narratives. In this sense, platforms do not simply transmit global culture; they actively structure its meanings. Fandom practices further reveal global pop as an interface rather than a site of resistance. While Henry Jenkins (2012) conceptualizes participatory culture as creative and identity-forming (22–24), the Chinese context adds layers of ideological discipline. Fans often monitor one another, avoid

politically sensitive expressions and distance idols from controversial associations (Hu and Zhang, 1–17). Participation thus involves balancing affective attachment with normative compliance. Enjoyment and regulation coexist rather than cancel each other out.

This dynamic becomes particularly visible during moments of controversy. Backlash against foreign celebrities' political statements, debates over "cultural infiltration" or campaigns targeting perceived moral transgressions demonstrate how global pop becomes a stage for articulating national boundaries (Tabib, 18). In such episodes, Gen Z users engage in collective judgment that reinforces nationalist identification while affirming their cultural literacy. Global pop serves less as a threat to national ideology than as a resource through which loyalty and belonging are performed. Importantly, these negotiations do not eliminate pleasure or agency. As Mohamad Zreik (2024) suggests, cultural negotiation in China often involves pragmatic accommodation rather than open opposition (81–90). Young users can enjoy global aesthetics, emotional expression and social connectivity while simultaneously affirming national belonging. The coexistence of enjoyment and ideological regulation thus highlights the value of understanding global pop as an interface rather than a simple import.

5. Gender Ideology, Masculinity and the Politics of Pop

Gender ideology has emerged as one of the most intensely contested arenas through which global popular culture is interpreted and negotiated in contemporary China. Among China's Gen Z, debates surrounding masculinity, femininity and sexuality are deeply entangled with nationalist discourse, anxieties over demographic decline, and concerns about cultural sovereignty. Although global pop culture circulates diverse gender aesthetics and performative possibilities, these representations are not received in politically neutral ways. Rather, gender operates as an ideological filter through which global pop forms are evaluated, regulated and domesticated within China's platformized cultural environment.

As Rosie Peppin Vaughan (2025) observes, official

discourse in recent years has increasingly framed gender as a matter of national concern. Public conversations about declining birth rates, educational performance and broader social uncertainty have frequently centered on anxieties about masculinity and family values (1–12). Campaigns targeting the perceived "feminization" of men in media and entertainment form part of a broader effort to align gender ideals with discipline, productivity and national strength (Iida, 56–75). These initiatives extend beyond regulating behavior; they seek to shape appearance, emotional expression and modes of self-presentation, positioning popular culture as a primary site of ideological intervention.

Global pop culture complicates this project by circulating gender presentations that depart from traditional norms. Androgynous male idols, emotionally expressive masculinities, cosplay aesthetics and fluid stylistic performances—often associated with K-pop, J-pop and anime—have gained significant popularity among Gen Z. Drawing on Judith Butler's (1999) theory of gender performativity, such representations can be understood as iterative social performances rather than expressions of a fixed biological essence (cf. Butler, 1999; Ton, 2018). However, within the Chinese context, these performances rarely constitute sustained challenges to normative gender ideology. Instead, they are selectively sanctioned, reframed, or disciplined according to their perceived ideological compatibility.

Digital platforms play a crucial mediating role in these negotiations. While they enable the circulation of gender-diverse aesthetics, they simultaneously impose constraints through moderation policies, algorithmic visibility and user-driven moral regulation (Zeng et al., 929–933). Male idols, for instance, may be celebrated for their appearance within carefully managed fan spaces yet criticized in broader public discourse as symbols of cultural decline. Such contradictions illustrate how gender nonconformity can coexist with ideological containment. As R. W. Connell (75–78) argues in her discussion of the hierarchical ordering of masculinities, alternative expressions are tolerated only under specific, controlled conditions.

Fandom practices further demonstrate how gender

ideology is reproduced through participation rather than overt coercion. Studies indicate that Chinese fan communities often engage in self-regulation, discouraging content or behaviors that might invite political scrutiny or moral condemnation (Mao et al., 1–25). For Gen Z fans, supporting idols or global pop stars frequently involves affective labour aimed at aligning gender representations with nationalist expectations—such as professionalism, patriotism and moral propriety. In this sense, fandom becomes a site where emotional attachment to global pop culture is reconciled with conservative gender norms.

At the same time, gender ideology among Gen Z cannot be characterized as entirely rigid. As Andreas Grimmel and Julia Gurol (2021) suggest, popular culture in China often functions as a space for pragmatic negotiation rather than straightforward compliance or resistance (327–352). Many young people engage playfully or ironically with global pop aesthetics, adopting stylized performances without fully endorsing their ideological implications. Yet such flexibility does not necessarily destabilize dominant norms. More often, it creates limited room for experimentation within frameworks that ultimately reaffirm heteronormativity and nationalist values.

Importantly, gender discourse among Gen Z is inseparable from nationalist affect. Online debates about masculinity frequently portray gender nonconformity as a threat not only to social stability but also to national competitiveness and cultural integrity (Mardling, 2025). In this context, global pop culture becomes a symbolic battleground in which the defense of "proper" gender norms is equated with safeguarding the nation. This dynamic reflects what Michael Billig (1995) conceptualized as "banal nationalism," wherein everyday cultural judgments subtly reproduce national ideology without overt political mobilization (5–7).

6. Conclusion

Global popular culture in China functions not simply as a cultural import but as a mediated ideological interface through which nationalism and gender norms are reconfigured in the lives of Gen Z. Transnational cultural flows enter a highly platformized

environment where meanings are filtered through domestic power relations, digital governance and participatory practices. Rather than producing automatic liberalization or youthful resistance, global pop is shaped within existing ideological structures and often reinforces them. Revisiting Arjun Appadurai's notion of disjunctive cultural flows in light of digital mediation highlights how global circulation does not dissolve national ideology. Although global pop travels across borders, its meanings are unstable and reconstructed through platform algorithms, nationalist discourse and user engagement. Globalization thus provides symbolic resources that can reproduce, rather than weaken, the nation. Understanding global pop as an interface foregrounds mediation and power, offering a sharper framework for analyzing cultural globalization under authoritarian and platformized conditions.

Nationalism is sustained less through explicit propaganda than through everyday cultural practices. Drawing on Michael Billig's concept of "banal nationalism," national belonging emerges through routine moral judgments, fan discipline and cultural boundary-making. For Gen Z, nationalism often appears as an affective mode of participation embedded in digital habits and aesthetic preferences, blurring distinctions between state discourse and popular culture. Gender ideology, thus, constitutes a central site of this negotiation. While international pop culture offers diverse gender aesthetics and performative possibilities, these are selectively sanctioned and domesticated within nationalist and heteronormative frameworks. In dialogue with Judith Butler's theory of performativity and R. W. Connell's analysis of hierarchical masculinities, gender nonconformity can be seen as coexisting with ideological containment. Masculinity and femininity become politicized categories linked to national strength, social order and moral propriety.

China's Gen Z is not a uniform bloc of conservatives. Ambivalence characterizes much youth engagement. As Sun Wanning suggests, cultural negotiation in China often takes the form of pragmatic accommodation rather than open resistance. Global pop enables pleasure, experimentation and connection, yet simultaneously reinscribes ideological norms. Digital platforms

are, therefore, not neutral conduits but active actors shaping visibility, meaning and affect. Global popular culture becomes a site where nationalism and gender ideology are both negotiated and normalized—simultaneously enabling limited change while consolidating dominant frameworks.

REFERENCES

Appadurai, Arjun. "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy." *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 7 (1990): 295–310.

Appadurai, Arjun. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

Aranha, Celine. "Gender Discrimination." *Journal of Dharma*, 20/1 (1995): 34–46.

Baehr, Peter. "China the Anomaly: Hannah Arendt, Totalitarianism, and the Maoist Regime." *European Journal of Political Theory*, Vol. 9/3 (2010): 267–286.

Billig, Michael. *Banal Nationalism*. Sage Publications Ltd, 1995.

Bloom, Peter. *Capitalism Reloaded: The Rise of the Authoritarian–Financial Complex*. Bristol University Press, 2025.

Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. Routledge, 1999.

Chen, Zhaodi, and Dali L. Yang. "Governing Generation Z in China: Bilibili, Bidirectional Mediation, and Online Community Governance." *The Information Society*, Vol. 39/1 (2022): 1–16,

Chong, Gladys Pak Lei. "Chinese Bodies That Matter: The Search for Masculinity and Femininity." *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol. 30/3 (2013): 299–313.

Connell, Robert. W. *Masculinities*. 2nd ed., University of California Press, 2005.

D'Souza, Gregory. "Gender Discrimination: Reasons and Remedies." *Journal of Dharma*, 20/1 (1995): 63–71.

Fong, Vanessa L. *Paradise Redefined: Transnational Chinese Students and the Quest for Flexible Citizenship in the Developed World*. Stanford University Press, 2011.

Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan, Vintage Books, 1977.

Grimmel, Andreas, and Julia Gurol. "Beyond the Duality of Normativity and Pragmatism." *European Review of International Studies*, Vol. 8/3 (2021): 327–352.

Gui, Qian. *"China's Rising Appeal to Global Gen Z." China Daily*, 19 Nov. 2025: www.chinadailyasia.com/hk/article/623917.

Hu, Jieren, and Xingmei Zhang. "Digital Governance in China: Dispute Settlement and Stability Maintenance in the Digital Age." *Journal of Contemporary China*, 28 Sept. 2023: https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2023.2261877.

Iida, Yumiko. "Beyond the 'Feminization of Masculinity': Transforming Patriarchy with the 'Feminine' in Contemporary Japanese Youth Culture." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, Vol. 6/1 (2005): 56–74.

Iwabuchi, Koichi. *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism*. Duke University Press, 2002.

Jenkins, Henry. *Textual Poachers: Television Fans and Participatory Culture*. Routledge, 2012.

Kochuthara, Shaji George. "Patriarchy and Sexual Roles: Active-Passive Gender Roles versus an Ethics of Mutuality." *Journal of Dharma*, 36/4 (2020): 435–452.

Li, Xinghan, and Jiameng Sun. "Exploring the Impact of China-Chic's Rise on 'Generation Z' National Confidence in the Era of Digital Empowerment." *International Journal of Education and Social Development*, Vol. 2/1 (2025): 95–106.

Lie, John. *K-Pop: Popular Music, Cultural Amnesia, and Economic Innovation in South Korea*. University of California Press, 2015.

Lin, Jian, and Jeroen de Kloet. "TikTok and the Platformisation from China: Geopolitical Anxieties, Repetitive Creativities and Future Imaginaries." *Media, Culture & Society*, Vol. 45/8 (2023): 1525–1533.

Mao et al. "Observations of Chinese Fandom: Organizational Characteristics and the Relationships inside and outside the 'Fan Circle.'" *The Journal of Chinese Sociology*, Vol. 10 (2023): 1–25.

Mardling, Anna. "Explained: Gen Z's Growing Gender-Based Political Divide." *PoliticsUK*, 1 Sept. 2025: https://politicsuk.com/gen-z-growing-gender-based-

political-divide/.

Meng, Mengxiang. "A Comparative Study of Cultural Value Transmission under Media Governance in China and the United States." *Communications in Humanities Research*, Vol. 93/1 (2025): 118–125.

O'Brien, Susie, and Imre Szeman. *Popular Culture: A User's Guide*. Nelson Education, 2018.

Otmazgin, Nissim. *Regionalizing Culture: The Political Economy of Japanese Popular Culture in Asia*. University of Hawai'i Press, 2013.

Peppin Vaughan, Rosie. "Does Women's Education Improve the Sex Ratio at Birth? Gender, Agency and Sex-Selective Abortion in South and East Asia: A Critical Literature Review." *Women's Studies International Forum*, Vol. 109 (2025): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2024.103050.

Raffnsøe, Sverre, Andrea Mennicken, and Peter Miller. "The Foucault Effect in Organization Studies." *Organization Studies*, Vol. 40/2 (2019): 155–182.

Stephen, Cynthia. "A Name of Our Own: Subaltern Women's Perspectives on Gender and Religion." *Journal of Dharma*, 36/4 (2020): 419–434.

Su, Chunmeizi, and Bondy Valdovinos Kaye. "Borderline Practices on Douyin/TikTok: Content Transfer and Algorithmic Manipulation." *Media, Culture & Society*, 2023: 1–16.

Sun, Wanning. *Leaving China: Media, Migration, and Transnational Imagination*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.

Tabib, Mohamed Tawfiq Said. *The Rise of Neo-Fascist Populism and Islamophobia in the West*. 2022. Portland State University, Dissertation. *PDXScholar*: https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.7899.

Tomlinson, John. *Globalization and Culture*. University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Ton, Jaurieke. *Judith Butler's Notion of Gender Performativity: To What Extent Does Gender Performativity Exclude a Stable Gender Identity?* BSc thesis, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Utrecht University, 25 June 2018:

https://studenttheses.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12
932/30880/JTTON_BScThesis_Judith_Butler_Gender_Per
formativity_FINAL.pdf.

Wang, Jing. *Brand New China: Advertising, Media, and Commercial Culture*. Harvard University Press, 2008.

Wang, June, and Xinyue Yu. "Three Currents of Platformization in China." *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 120/4 (2021): 1- 12.

Xu, Lisha. "Feminism and Androgyny: Gender Politics in Contemporary Classical Chinese Opera." *The Journal of Specialised Translation*, 43 (2025): 12–25.

Yang, Guobin. *The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online*. Columbia University Press, 2009.

Zeng, Jing, Mike S. Schäfer, and Thaiane M. Oliveira. "Conspiracy Theories in Digital Environments: Moving the Research Field Forward." *Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies*, Vol. 28/4 (2022): 929–939.

Zhao, Suisheng. *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*. Stanford University Press, 2004.

Zreik, Mohamad. "The Influence of Chinese Cultural Values on Negotiation Tactics and Conflict Resolution Strategies in International Relations: An Ethnographic Study." *Psychology Research on Education and Social Sciences*, Vol. 5/3, (2024): 81–90.