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WORLD-TALK VIS-A-VIS GOD-TALK
Reflections from a Theistic Reading of Kant

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1. Introduction

Most of what people talk pass for world-talk. Most of the talk we engage in is about something in the world. A meaningful talk about a thing requires that any veil of non-clarity be lifted from the status of the thing. Once we put ourselves in a Kantian world, this requirement introduces before us a huge problem as Kant has neatly divided the world into a phenomenal world and a noumenal world. Kant has advocated that we limit our talk to the phenomenal so that our talk bears the stamp of meaningfulness. But the phenomenal as Kant has envisaged is a construction by our mind. It would then mean that unless it has a reference to the real world of the noumenal, what we take to be our talk about the world will amount to nothing more than a talk about ourselves. The situation can be redeemed only by granting a determinate status to the noumenal world which will in turn prop up the phenomenal. There are valid grounds to suggest that Kant does precisely that. The noumenal in his philosophy is the world as seen by God. Hence let me propose that no real world-talk is possible without a God-talk.

2. Metaphysical Status of the World We Talk

Our talk about the world follows our thought about the world. Kant clearly laid down conditions for a meaningful talk about the world when he said "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (A 51/ B 75).[1] It means that meaningful talk should express our

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[1]References to Kant's works are given in the text by volume and page number of the Academy edition of *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, 29 vols., Georg Reimer and W. de Gruyter, eds., Berlin: Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wisserschaften, 1902-. References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the paginations of the first (1781) and second (1787) editions, indicated as "A" and "B," respectively. Other works referred to are indicated with the following abbreviations given in brackets: *Correspondence* (Corr.), *Critique of Practical Reason* (CprR), *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (G), *Lectures on Philosophical Doctrine of Religion* (LPR),

thoughts which are sufficiently enriched by sensible content. That any meaningful talk presupposes a wedding of thought and thing is no new proposition in epistemology. What counts as the new import in philosophy through Kant is the famed Copernican shift. He suggested that metaphysics will run its course with a much faster pace if it replaces the traditional view that our cognition should conform to the objects with the view that the objects should conform to our cognition (B xvi).

Metaphysically speaking, the conformation of the object to the cognition is not an innocuous affair. Once conformed, the object gets an entirely new character. Baptised into the world of known objects, it is given the new twin clothes of the forms of intuition, namely, space and time and with them, a phenomenal character. A prominent anti-realist reading of the Copernican revolution present in Kant scholarship concludes that the phenomenal character is all there is to a thing or to the world. The world is the construction of the knowing self. The self constructs the world after its own fashion. Beyond the spatial and temporal features into which it is received by the self and the categorial features in which it is thought by the self, the world does not own much which it can claim to be originally its own. In short, it is a construction by the self; it is erected on the structures that extend from the self.

Coming to our central issue here, a talk about the world so constructed is nothing more than a talk about the self itself. All world-talk is a mere self-talk. My point is that we are not bound to read Kant in this narrow, anti-realist perspective that any encounter of the self with the world becomes an exercise in shadow boxing by the self.

3. In Search of a World beyond the Phenomenal in Kant

It is grossly unfair to Kant to suggest that he took the phenomenal world to be the whole world. Kant will surely claim that much of what we know about the world is what we have ourselves imposed on the world. That effectively renders the world a world of appearances. But Kant never claims that the appearing is all that there is to the world we know; he never claims that the known is all that is to the world that is. He does not even say that *our* world is *the* world. Nor is there a claim that everything about the world can be acquainted by us. According to Merold Westphal, a survey of the whole of the world of appearances will not justify a claim

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Metaphysics of Morals (MM), *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (Prol.), and *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (R), and *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (OPA).

that we have known *the* world. *The* world, for Kant, is always beyond the phenomenal, namely, the world of things in themselves. "In the first place, by refusing to jettison the thing in itself as later idealists from Fichte and Hegel to Husserl and Rorty have wanted to do, (Kant) makes it clear that the world whose existence is dependent on our apprehension is not *the* world. It is only *our* world, the world of appearances."[2] What is important is the underlying assumption that there is a real world beyond our world of appearances. Kant affirms that the world of appearances has its ground solely in our thoughts.

> Everything intuited in space or in time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself (A 490-1/ B 518-9).

Kant was quite aware, as evident in his admission in a footnote remark he added, that there was a clear possibility of misinterpretation of his transcendental idealism. What he feared was a narrow version of idealism that will altogether deny the existence of the thing outside our mind.

> I have also occasionally called it formal idealism, in order to distinguish it from material idealism, i.e., the common idealism that itself doubts or denies the existence of external things. In many cases it seems more advisable to employ this rather than the expression given above (i.e., transcendental idealism), in order to avoid all misinterpretation (B 519n).

Kant wants us all to resist a two-pronged temptation. On the one side we are tempted to deny the existence of anything to a thing beyond its phenomenal character. On the other side, the temptation is to make determinate affirmations about the noumenal character of the things.

Setting foot on the noumenal world involves heavy risks since it would be like setting sail into an ocean with no light towers. The noumenal world or the world of things in themselves is a world of the totally unknown and unknowable. But leaving it unreflected for fear of making mistakes cannot be an option. For, according to Kant, our world as a world of appearances will make sense only with the world of things in themselves clearly set in the background. Hence the least required and the most Kant allows himself to do, is to "assume" the world of things in themselves. "The sensible world contains only appearances, which are still

[2]Merold Westphal, *Overcoming Onto-Theology: Toward a Postmodern Christian Faith*, New York: Fordham University Press, 2001, 92.

not things in themselves, which latter things (noumena) the understanding must therefore assume for the very reason that it cognizes the objects of experience as mere appearances" (4:360).

The world of things in themselves is not to be assumed as a totally different world independent of and unconnected to the world of appearances. Rather it should be seen that there is just one world and the phenomenal world is the way we represent it to ourselves in knowing it whereas the noumenal world is the world as it is free from any manipulation or interpretation by us.

4. Assuming God as *sine qua non* for the Assumption of a World of Things in Themselves

As Kant himself admits, since our world is a world of appearances, we have to assume an original world which will be a world of things in themselves. Now there is a problem here. Our world is a world of appearances only because the world, to become our world, in other words, to be known by us, has to conform to certain conditioning structures of our subjective consciousness. The world of things in themselves becomes a world of appearances when it is perceived and judged as spatial and temporal and thought in terms of the categories of our understanding. What is left to be assumed is that there is a real and original world beyond the world of appearances. Well, it is not a different world itself if by that is meant a two-world theory. Ultimately there is only one world. What we call the world of appearances is the world as understood and interpreted in a way possible for humans (i.e., as spatial, temporal and categorial). The world of things in themselves is the original world free of our understanding and our interpretation.

Unless a world of things in themselves is assumed, our world of appearances becomes a mere figment of imagination, a mere representation which is not a representation of something original. So the reason is constrained to assume a world of things in themselves. The problem with the world of appearances is that it is a world we have represented to our mind. Then, how is a world of things in themselves going to be free of a similar problem if its assumption is going to be carried out in tune with the measure of our mind itself. If the world of things in themselves assumed by our mind is going to measure up to the standards of our mind, it is not likely to be any more original than the world of things as they appear to us. As Kant himself cautions, "from every conditioned it always arrives merely at another conditioned" (4:360).

If our world is a world of appearances and is limited because it is the world seen from the limiting, human perspective, the corresponding world of things in themselves assumed by reason should be free of this limiting human perspective.

What perspective can assure a seeing of the world as it is in itself, not subjecting it to any limiting framework, if not the divine perspective? Kant does not hide behind euphemisms as far as his strategy of linking the phenomenal and noumenal poles of the world is concerned. He does not leave it to anyone's guess that what he means by the world of things in themselves is the world as seen from the perspective of God. It is surprising that Kant, whom many theistic philosophers view with suspicion,[3] sheds all guard and comes up with the following forthright statement:

> … reason finds itself compelled to look out toward the idea of a supreme being (and also, in relation to the practical, to the idea of an intelligent world) … in order to guide its own use within the sensible world in accordance with principles of the greatest possible unity (theoretical as well as practical), and to make use (for this purpose) of the relation of that world to a freestanding reason as the cause of all these connections…. (4:361).

Without assuming a world of things in themselves, a world of things as they appear becomes groundless; without assuming God, a world of things as they are in themselves becomes groundless too. What is assumed under the world of things in themselves is a world as seen by God. God's seeing is not a subjective seeing as human seeing is imposing as it is the limitations of its cognitive structure on the world. God's seeing is an objective seeing letting the world be seen as it really is.

A philosopher who claims to have shown metaphysics its humble place cannot, however, allow God a free reign in philosophy. The fact is that Kant does not do that either. He does not make any determinate claim about God. Kant is a self-styled "boundary" philosopher. Even to philosophize about this (our) world, he thinks the most vantage position is

[3]John Hare, for example, thinks that the popular judgement of Kant in the Christian circles is overwhelmingly negative. "Christians who know about Kant tend to think of him as the major philosophical source of the rot which has led to the decline of Christianity in the West in the last two hundred years. He is seen as having taken a decisive step, perhaps the decisive step, away from the traditional faith." *The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God's Assistance*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, 35.

the boundary between the sensible world (i.e., the world as it appears to us) and the intelligible world (i.e., the world as it really is). Standing at the boundary gives the advantage that one is not accused of treading into areas where philosophy cannot legitimately go but at the same time can take a clear glimpse of "the relation between that which lies beyond it (i.e., the world of appearances) and that which is contained within it."[4] Standing on the boundary, Kant avails of best of both the worlds. Kant shoves off all possible likely criticisms by denying that the God-proposition in his philosophy is any knowledge-proposition.

5. Denial of Knowledge Is Affirmation of Faith

Knowledge, for Kant, is clearly restricted to the spatio-temporal realm of sensible experience. Only about things of that realm we can make definitive knowledge statements. However, the irony is that the more one reflects on what one knows and can know, the more one is acutely aware of what one cannot know. Hence Kant admits that his reflection on the world takes him to the "boundary" between our world and the world that is not ours. The difference between the world that is ours and that is not ours is nothing other than the world we know and the world we do not know. It cannot be the case that the world we do not know is also a world nobody knows. How can a world nobody knows become a category of reflection in philosophy? Hence Kant would deny that the world we do not know is a world of nothings; it is, rather, a world of things that are, though not to be known, but to be believed. "I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" (B xxx), testifies Kant.

The room made for faith in Kant's philosophy is no concession made to sooth the frayed tempers of the theists. It is made from a necessity within his philosophy. The commitment of his philosophy to a world of things in themselves is an article of faith. It arises out of a necessity because, as already seen, a world of appearances becomes redundant without a world of things in themselves. Similarly there has to be a commitment to God because without him, a world of things in themselves becomes unowned and

[4]Calling "boundary" itself as "something positive" Kant proceeds to explain how the boundary lets us a glimpse of what is across it. "But the setting of a boundary to the field of the understanding by something which is otherwise unknown to it is still a cognition which belongs to reason even at this point, and by which it is neither confined within the sensible nor strays beyond it, but only limits itself, as befits the knowledge of a boundary, to the relation between that which lies beyond it and that which is contained within it" (Prol. 4:360-1).

orphaned because unperceived by anyone it will be left as nobody's case. So, God becomes another article of faith in Kant's philosophy.

Kant was in no doubt that his commitment to the world of our everyday experience necessitates an equally clear commitment to a world of faith and consequently to a God whose perspective alone guarantees that world. Ferreira's observation that "Kant argues for the *necessity* of postulating the *possible* existence of God" should be seen in this light.[5] The *Critique of Pure Reason* which is the work that celebrates the Copernican Revolutionary shift and gives human beings the title of the creators of their world, is itself oriented to show that there is a theoretical necessity for the possibility of God. God provides a substratum, a *Grund* for all beings (A 697/ B 725). If God were not, nothing will be. In his *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion*, Kant comes up with the following statement. "[W]e are justified in assuming and presupposing an *ens originarium*, which is at the same time an *ens realissimum*, as a necessary transcendental hypothesis; for to remove a being which contains the data for everything possible is to remove all possibility" (LPR 28:1035). Kant makes a similar point in "The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God:"

> when I cancel all existence whatever and the ultimate real ground of all that can be thought therewith disappears, all possibility likewise vanishes, and nothing any longer remains to be thought. Accordingly, something may be absolutely necessary … when its non-existence eliminates the material element and all the data of all that can be thought (OPA 2:82).

6. Kant in God-Talk Again: This Time for a Talk on the Moral World

If Kant's world of things cannot stand without the limbs provided by the God-concept, his world of persons, i.e., moral world, is even more dependent on a God-concept. The moral world, for Kant, is the world of human actions determined by the moral law originating from reason. Humans populating the moral world are *homo noumenon*. But the noumenal moral agents are not insulated from the hurdles of the phenomenal, sensible world. Analysing moral agency of the humans, Kant identifies two conceptions of it, namely, *Wille* and *Willkür* – the legislating

[5]M. Jamie Ferreira, "Making Room for Faith: Possibility and Hope" in D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin, eds., *Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000, 76. For more on this, see his "Kant's Postulate: The Possibility or the Existence of God?" *Kant-Studien* 74 (1983), 75-80.

will and the executing will respectively. The insulation from the sensible is true of the legislating will, the *Wille*. The moral agent receives the moral law legislated from the practical reason, the will (*Wille*), unencumbered by any inclination from sensibility. But the agent undergoes real struggle at the *Willkür*. There the agent has to struggle to tide over the hurdles of sensible inclination in order to execute the dictates from the legislating will. The moral agent does find oneself in a struggle between the categorical imperatives from pure reason, namely, the moral law on the one hand and the inclinations from the sensibility. There is no automatic insurance of upper hand of the moral law; there is the real possibility of sensible inclinations tripping up moral agent.

At this Kant turns, in an uninhibited move, to God-talk again. In order to fortify the noumenal prospects of the moral agent, Kant indulges in God-talk, not once, but three times.

6. Threefold God-Talk Aimed at Fortifying the Moral World

Kant feels constrained to turn to a God-concept three times in conceiving the moral trajectory of a person – in conceiving the origin of the moral law, in conceiving the end of the moral law, and finally, in the assessment of one's moral accomplishment.

6.1. God-Talk at the Conception of the Origin of the Moral Law

Humans as moral beings experience a dialectic within themselves. While on the one hand, reason gives the moral law and asks the self for undiluted compliance, there is something in the self itself (i.e., sensibility) that is naturally resistant to it. In view of this resistance, practical reason formulated its law couched in an imperative. But that does not seem to be enough. When it is my own will that puts me under obligation, I do not take the obligation seriously. My will can be like a doting father who can be easily bluffed to ease restrictions and dole out concessions. As Ronald M. Green notes, "moral reason *alone* easily slips away from the requirement and provides opportunities to soften our self-judgment."[6] What is needed is to anchor one's will to another will that is impartial and just. This is precisely what is acknowledged when Kant writes that "we cannot very well make obligation (moral constraint) intuitive for ourselves without thereby thinking of *another's* will" (MM 6:487).

[6]Ronald M. Greene, "Kant and Kierkegaard on the Need for a Historical Faith: An Imaginary Dialogue" in Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist, eds., *Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006, 165.

The "another" that will oblige me to submit to the moral law cannot be an ordinary will. It has to be the will of the supreme being. "[I]f, from the standpoint of moral unity, we assess the cause that can alone provide this with the appropriate effect and thus obliging force for us, as a necessary law of the world, then there must be a single supreme will, which comprehends all these laws in itself" (A 815/B 843). Again, at another place, Kant reiterates the same point. "A law that is so holy (inviolable) that it is already a crime even to call it in doubt in a practical way, and so to suspend its effect for a moment, is thought as if it must have arisen not from men but from some highest, flawless lawgiver" (MM 6:319). In a recognition that a God-talk alone will make his ethics foolproof, Kant admitted that "our morality has need of the idea of God to give it emphasis" which will make us "better, wiser and more upright" (LR 28:996). With God so introduced into our moral world, our reason remains the sovereign lawgiver only in a qualified way; For, reason "in giving universal laws is only the spokesman" of God (MM 6:487).

Without a God-concept, humans are left with a moral command in its most abstract form. With the introduction of God, there is a much needed image. If we use a Kantian terminology, with the introduction of God, there is a 'schematisation' of the imperative of the moral law. Kant scholar Cassirer supports such a reading of God's role in Kant's philosophy.

> Instead of regarding the concept of duty purely as to its meaning and what it commands, we here join the substance of the demand with the idea of a supreme being, which we think as the creator and the moral law. Such a change is humanly inevitable, for every idea even the highest such as that of freedom, can be grasped by man only in an image and by 'schematisation.'[7]

The image of God boosts will's powers and accordingly the will can now promote the end of morality with all its strength. For Kant, the thought of God is a natural fall out of conceiving the moral law as a command. "Granted that the pure moral law inexorably binds every man as a command (not as a rule of prudence), the righteous man may say: I will that there be a God" (CprR 5:143).

Justifying the introduction of God-concept, Kant says besides the schematisation of the moral command made possible by the God-concept, humans can now also look forward to an ennobling experience within them.

[7]Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981, 382.

In *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, he argues that in the consciousness of the moral law and accompanying sense of duty, there is

> something that so uplifts the soul, and so leads it to the very Deity, which is worthy of adoration only in virtue of his holiness and as the legislator of virtue, that the human being, even when still far removed from allowing this concept the power of influencing his maxims, is yet not unwilling to be supported by it. For through this idea he already feels himself to a degree ennobled (R 6:183).

6.2. God-Talk at the Conception of the End of the Moral Law

Kant is categorical in calling a good will as the unconditional good. At the same time, Kant is aware that an emphasis on good will as the unconditional good will be surely followed by the question, 'should man make himself worthy, what may he then hope for?' (A 805/ B 833). In his own admission, this is a question that "cannot possibly be a matter of indifference to reason" (R 6:5). He then comes to the view that a worthy moral agent should be sufficiently rewarded. His philosophy follows the question "whether the principles of pure reason that prescribe the law a priori also necessarily connect this hope with it," i.e., the hope of highest good (A 809/ B 837). He concludes that such a connection between the moral law and the highest good is a *sine qua non*, in the absence of which the moral law itself will be "empty figments of the brain" (A 811/ B 839). Hence he concedes that although love of duty forming the absolute maxim of the will guiding every action is, without contention, the absolute good (*bonum supremum*), it is not the "sole and complete good" (G 4:396) (*bonum consummatum*). Elaborating further on what he means by complete good, he says that moral truths "do not imply that virtue is the entire and perfect good as the object of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings. For this, happiness is also required" (CprR 5:110). He regarded an ethics that has no regard for the sensuous nature of human beings and thought morality and pleasure to be foreign to each other as morose ethics. The goodness of the totality of the moral person demands that a morally perfect will has a corresponding influence in his sensible sphere. Hence although virtue and happiness are "foreign to each as such" (CprR 5:128), they are "thought of as necessarily combined" since "the one cannot be assumed by a practical reason without the other belonging to it" (CprR 5:113).

But who can guarantee the necessary combination of virtue and happiness also in reality? Virtue is an internal state of affairs of a moral

person. Happiness arises when nature approvingly responds to human internal state of moral worthiness. A Newtonian lifeless nature cannot respond to man's moral worthiness unless another existence is presupposed which can both judge one's internal moral worthiness and also control nature. This sets the scene for another entry of God-talk in Kant's philosophy. God is required in order to avoid the antinomy of practical reason *(absurdum practicum*) which is inevitable should there be no "happiness in exact proportion to morality" (CprR 5:110).

6.3. God-Talk at the Final Assessment of the Moral Enterprise

Even though Kant introduced some God-talk into his moral world, both at the point of initiation as well as culmination, he was left wondering if that was enough to keep his moral world standing. He saw the issue of evil chipping away the moral person's integrity. Accordingly he feels constrained a third time to turn to some God-talk; this time, in the final assessment of the whole moral enterprise of a person.

Kant, in his *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion*, toyed with a very lenient view of evil in human beings. Evil was just another name for imperfection or uncultivatedness in a person. It was thought that it will wither away with proper education and moral development. In this he was quite in agreement with Leibniz who saw evil only as a deficient cause. Kant soon discovered that evil was not that harmless. In his *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, he came to regard evil an "active cause" (R 6:57) and "radical" since it "corrupts the ground of all maxims" (R 6:37). Since it corrupts the very ground of all maxims, evil leaves its indelible impact on the very first choice one makes. A person's first deed is itself evil and its repercussions reverberate the entire span of his/her moral history putting his/her progress into moral perfection in peril. Man can only have a wishful dream to begin a wholly new story in his future. Every new story bears the stamp of his history. History pushes its burdens into every new moment in the future. That "he nevertheless started from evil … is a debt which is impossible for him to wipe out" (R 6:72). The Aristotelian wisdom statement that 'the past is more present than the present' is quite true of man in this respect.

Evil is an innate propensity in humans. So its extirpation is near impossible. The only way it can be extirpated by a human means is the adoption of a good maxim (i.e., the moral law adopted as the subjective principle of one's actions). But how can there be a maxim unadulaterated by evil when the supreme ground of all maxims itself stands adulterated?

The adoption of a maxim is also an exercise in freedom. But, as Kant points out, there is guilt in the very first manifestation of the exercise of freedom (R 6:38). As a result every subsequent maxim stands influenced by the guilt of the first maxim. This effectively rules out any possibility of one's extirpating evil through the adoption of a good maxim.

He criticises the stoics that they "exaggerated the moral capacity of man, under the name of 'sage,' beyond all the limits of his nature, making it into something which is contradicted by all our knowledge of men" (CprR 5:127). For Kant, man's moral state is never "*res integra*" (R 6:58n) (i.e., a complete thing) free of contradictions between the moral law and sensible incentives. The Kantian man is not an Aristotelian eudaemoniastic being who enjoys perfect bliss free of all dialectical conflicts.

To wriggle out of this dead-end situation, Kant sees no other way than turn to God-talk again. Given the radical evil in human beings, Kant is acutely aware of the fact that human moral capacity falls terribly short of their celebrated goal of becoming morally perfect. Hence he introduces the concept of supernatural grace which works in a moral agent both backward and forward in time. Grace is "a higher assistance inscrutable to us" that effects a "positive increase of force into our maxim" (R 6:44-45). To have faith in grace means to have "the unconditional trust in divine aid, in achieving all the good that, even with our most sincere efforts, lies beyond our power" (Corr. 10:178). In backward working, grace makes up for all one's actions where one fell short of the ideal because his/her very act was corrupted by evil. Grace starts its empowerment of man from the past by "the lawful undoing … of actions done" (R 6:116). Thus one's past is taken care of. Now, what about the future? What grace can do as regards the future is to lead humans to a conversion whereby the old man would die and a new man would arise in his place – one, whose new life will be conformable to its duty (R 6:116). The concept of grace thus returns optimism to the moral agency of a person, for the concept of grace "represents what cannot be altered as wiped out, and opens up for us the path to a new conduct of life" (R 6:184). Moral perfection, impossible from a human perspective, is made possible by grace of God.

Kant takes effort to show that his concept of grace fits in well with his rationalistic scheme. Reason opts for grace because it "does not [want to] leave us altogether without comfort with respect to the lack of a righteousness of our own" (R 6:171). Therefore, with what Kant calls a "reflective faith" (R 6:52), reason introduces an optimism in the moral agent. The reflective faith leads one to think that "if the goodness of God

has called him as it were … to be a member of the Kingdom of Heaven, he must also have a means of compensating, from the fullness of his own holiness, for the human being's inadequacy with respect to it" (R 6:143).

7. Conclusion

Being a frontline Enlightenment philosopher with the slogan of "reason alone," Kant set out to found a system upon elements wholly immanent to reason. Philosophizing on metaphysical concepts was looked at with suspicion. But that did not take him far enough. It was soon realized that immanence needed a guarantee and assurance from a transcendent world. It is debatable whether it was by choice or force that Kant inserted transcendent references into his immanent world, be it the immanence of the world of things or the moral world of persons. In both the worlds, the references to a transcendent God cannot be glossed over. God is a permanent fixture in his philosophy, sometimes expressed and most of the time assumed. Kant may protest that he does not bother to waste his time and thought on transcendent concepts like God. But the truth is that he has been able to meaningfully talk about the world only because he relented on his Enlightenment pretences and talked about God. Today Kant may be the first to join the chorus, 'no world-talk without a God-talk.'