

NON-ANTHROPOCENTRIC AND DYNAMIC VISION OF HARMONY A New Materialist Perspective

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Abstract: This article deconstructs the static approach to harmony and elucidates its dynamic dimension. First, I provide critical analysis of Plato's functionalist notion of harmony in the *Republic*, where harmony is viewed not as the suspension of the power relationship between the dominant and subjugated, but as the establishment of the relationship of domination that gives rise to the governability of one's own soul and the city, and, further, contributes to the stability of the self and the system. Second, I emphasize the Aristotelian anthropocentric perspective of harmony in the *Politics*, where harmony is considered a fraternity of the political animal that shares the logical capacity of speech and excludes the inhuman. Third, through the lens of Latour's new materialism, I seek to redefine harmony as a dynamic process and as material assemblages between humans and non-humans that foster creative tensions and increase the intensity of agency.

Keywords: Aristotle, Collective of Humans and Non-Humans, Latour, Plato, Rancière.

1. Introduction

When we scrutinize the concept of harmony, the depths of its opacity quickly become apparent. We tend to systematically associate harmony with stability and finality. This 'static' approach, widely adopted in common-sense usage and common parlance as

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well as in ethical and political thought, neglects the dynamic dimension of harmony. *Harmony* comes from the Greek *harmos*, meaning 'joint' and the Latin *harmonia*, meaning 'concord of sounds.' A 'concord of sounds' depends on the discernment of that which is audible and pleasant to hear from that which is inaudible or unpleasant. Meanwhile, a 'joint' is not a self-contained item or substance but a point of connection between different elements of being. From this perspective, harmony is, first, related to the idea of the assemblage of different elements. Second, it is linked to the act of hearing, which implies the act of understanding. Consequently, harmony is not an abstract principle or an invariable scheme.

In this article, I will focus on the functionalist and conservative account of the notion of harmony and its hierarchical dimension, based on the functions and natures outlined in Plato's *Republic*, which involves the establishment of an asymmetric relationship between individuals. Second, I will provide critical analysis of Aristotle's anthropocentric perspective on harmony in the *Politics*, which distinguishes human speech from the voices of animals, and of Jacques Rancière's political philosophy, which implicates the incorporation of voice into speech. Third, after examining the limits of the anthropocentric view of harmony and how it reinforces human exceptionalism, I conduct an analysis that extends the view of harmony from the ontological and axiological field of human communities to elaborate a non-anthropocentric philosophical vision of harmony as a dynamic process. Through this philosophical perspective, I aim to affirm the fluid, non-static dimension of harmony that advocates for creative tension, which promotes a new horizon of thinking and acting.

2. Classic Philosophical View of Harmony in Plato's *Republic*

Throughout the history of philosophy, harmony has often been conceived as an ideal concept that contributes to the unification of the constituent parts of a system in an organic whole. The model of a system, which presumes the value of harmony, aims at the elimination of dissonant elements that disturb the unity of human society. Plato stands within this tradition of the model of harmony. In his *Republic*, Plato notably tends to define *sophrosyne* (*sophrosúnê*), moderation "as a kind of consonance and harmony" (Plato, *Complete Works*, 1062, 430e). *Sophrosyne* is the philosophical word

for "temperance," which is connoted with self-control, wisdom, and moderation in Plato and elsewhere. Harmony is closely connected to "this value [which] is surely a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires" (Plato, *Complete Works*, 1062, 430e). Harmony then relates to order, regulation, and control. This rigid, austere interpretation of harmony is also what establishes the relationship of domination between individuals. Thus, Plato asserts that moderation is determined by an agreement between the rulers and the ruled about the power of making decisions and that this agreement resembles harmony (Plato, *Platon*, 139, 431e).

Additionally, harmony concerns the supreme value, justice, because harmony is a state in which justice—the principle of the division of labour and the specialization of functions—is well-realized among the inhabitants of a city. Justice is achieved by each individual's performance of their function, which is well adapted to their internal nature, and this state resembles harmony. Further, functions that are intrinsic and true are differentiated from those that are extrinsic and false. For Plato, function is a matter of soul and internal nature, not of external force. The strict hierarchical distribution of functions, which reflects the internal nature of each person, thus installs the power relationship from which harmony emerges. In this sense, justice and harmony are intimately linked to each other. Plato provides the best illustration of the affinity between justice and harmony in the *Republic*:

[Justice] was not concerned with the external performance of a man's own function, but with the internal performance of it, with his true self and his own true function, forbidding each of the elements within him to perform others than its own, and not allowing the classes of things within this soul to interfere with one another (139, 443d).

From Plato's perspective, harmony is thus not the suspension of power dynamics but the establishment of this asymmetrical relationship that leads to the governability of one's own soul and the city. This is the way in which harmony contributes to the stability of the self and the system. Plato employs a metaphor involving musical notes to define justice as a harmonious and pleasant state in which one may 'hear' the union of the different elements: "Tuning the three elements just like three fixed points in

the musical scale: top, bottom, and intermediate. If there turn out to be any intervening elements, he must combine them all [into] a perfect unity of diverse elements, self-disciplined and in harmony with himself" (Plato, *Republic*, 141, 443d-443e).

The agreement among the different musical notes symbolizes the effect of a well-distributed function and the perfect hierarchy of elements. The three values of wisdom, courage, and temperance are described by Plato as three different musical tones. In this excerpt, harmony is of the same order as unity and temperance. Unison, which is the combination of different tones for a harmonious sound, eliminates dissonance, thus producing what is pleasant to hear. The distribution of different tones in very distinct positions—high, low, and middle—constitutes a set of power relations that temperance—consider the musical sense of ‘tuning,’ as in, *The Well-Tempered Clavier* (Bach)—attempts to achieve. According to Plato, the miscellaneous should be subsumed in unity, and harmony is a process of unification to achieve the supreme value of justice.

Conversely, for Plato, what is unfair comes from confusion regarding one’s own roles as well as the amalgamation of these roles. Interference in tasks that are foreign to one is the cause of injustice. For Plato, failure to respect the division of labour and refusal to submit to the superior are factors that disrupt harmony and cause dissonance and can even be described as a civil war: “[Injustice] must be a kind of civil war between the three parts, a meddling and doing of another’s work, a rebellion by some part against the whole soul in order to rule it inappropriately” (Plato, *Complete Works*, 1075, 444b).

Injustice resulting from the distribution of roles unsuitable for a person leads to a state of internal war and a destruction of order. For Plato, “the revolt of the lower parts against the legitimate authority of the noblest parts and the insurrection of one part against the whole” (*Platon XXXIII-XXXIV*) bring about the end of peace and harmony. Plato clearly suggests an axiological order between lower and higher, villager and noble, part and all. Harmony is only possible by respecting this axiological dichotomy.

3. Platonic Conservative and Functionalist Aspects of Harmony

Platonic perspective on harmony is functionalist and conservative, in that Plato emphasizes the importance of the stability of the

system and rules out any possibility of questioning or deviating from the assigned order of functions. It is useful to elucidate the basic nature of the functionalist argument:

The activities of the individual contribute to the total functioning of the social system. Man is understood not as a person, but as the bearer of a determined social function, of a role to be assumed within the framework of the system and according to the place that the individual occupies in it. Thus, according to the functionalist model, man (the part) is secondary to the system (the whole) to which he is entirely subordinate (Kuvavic 98).

The functionalist aspect consists of giving a preponderant place to the function of the elements of a system and the functioning of the system as a whole. Harmony is part of the mechanism of social control and self-control. The function becomes an intrinsic principle to govern the self for Plato; he merges the concepts of function and internal nature.

According to functionalist principles, "each of the elements performs a function which contributes to the maintenance of the system" (Lugan 51). Plato castigates any attempt to introduce instability into the system and considers any transgression of roles to be an attack on the integrity of both the individual and the system. In his eyes, system instability is equivalent to illness in the individual: an inadequate and unbalanced state that results in total vice. Plato believes that the three parts of the soul—reason, courage, and the sensual appetite—are also what constitute the social classes of the city. For Plato, then "the human soul is therefore composed of the same parts as the city. We must find there, equally distributed, the same virtues" (*Platon XXXIII*). From this perspective, the function assigned to individuals is an achievement of their internal nature and health, value, and order. This is why Plato adopts a conservative perspective that attaches pre-eminence to the stability of the system. For Plato, harmony is not an annihilation of hierarchy but the establishment of an adequate relationship of submission by the inferior to the superior. Further, in this sense, peace is not an idyllic state but the rigid maintenance of this asymmetric order; harmony is to stay in one's own place and not deviate from one's own function.

4. The Foundation of Harmony in Aristotle's *Politics*

Defining harmony as a concordance of sounds necessitates a distinction between that which is pleasant and that which is unpleasant to hear. This discernment involves both the audible and inaudible because not all sounds are picked up by human ears. The human hearing field is limited, and humans cannot hear ultrasounds or infrasound that exceed human sensitivity at a specific range of frequencies and intensities. Any acoustic vibrations that fall outside the given limits are no longer perceived by human ears as 'sounds.' The experience of harmony in the sense of a pleasant combination of different sounds exists within the human hearing range. Thus, the limits of the threshold of human perception affect the notion of harmony.

Moreover, harmony, in the sense of the agreement of opinions, also necessitates the distinction between opinions, that is to say, audible, intelligible, and understandable sounds that are familiar and common, and noise, that is, an audible sound that is incomprehensible and foreign. Similarly, Aristotle in *Politics* tries to differentiate between voice and speech:

Now, that man is more of a political animal than are bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state (Aristotle, *Politics*, 31, 1253a7-1253a19).

In this excerpt, we can see identified three categories of sound, which may be defined as follows: i) That which is categorized as sound and is intelligible is subsumed under the category of speech, ii) That which is categorized as sound but is unintelligible is subsumed under the category of voice, and iii) That which is not categorized as sound and is unintelligible is subsumed under the category of the inaudible and the unthinkable.

Aristotle thinks of only the first two categories when ascribing an asymmetrical status of hierarchy between humans and non-humans. Audibility, in that account, refers not just to that which remains inside the human auditory field but also to intelligibility and the sharing of that which is common. Harmony in the sense of concord, which connotes, for example, an agreement among opinions, the affinity between people, or alliance between countries, has a purely anthropocentric semantic dimension that concerns only the first category above, that of speech. However, without presupposing a defined threshold of human perception and human understanding, we cannot precisely define the extent of human audibility as a sensory and intellectual capacity.

By refusing to identify the voice (*phone*) per se with logic (*logos*), which is the ability to form arguments, Aristotle privileges the first category above, namely, speech, which consists of sound that is audible and comprehensible. Intelligibility precedes reason, and audibility precedes political engagement. In this sense, Aristotle excludes other animals from the political community of humans because other animals are only endowed with voice, which is audible but incomprehensible to humans. This second category is qualified as that which is unarticulated and not endowed with reason, and therefore lacks *logos*. In other words, Aristotle strictly attributes *logos*, which is charged with meaning and reason, to the speech of humans, not the voices of animals.

In Book I of *Politics*, the voices of animals only indicate pleasure and pain, which are the lowest, most immediate, and instinctive feelings. Hence, the voice of an animal concerns only that animal's own conservation, not the conservation of the family and the city. For Aristotle, "the family is an association of master and slave, of husband and wife" (1637, 1253b), which attests to the relationship of domination between them. Aristotle agrees with Plato: the hierarchical relationship between the dominant and dominated, which is assigned by nature, is key to harmony and the maintenance of the political community of humans. Furthermore, here, notably, Aristotle uses the noun *semainein*, 'indication' (Aristotle, *Politics*, 31, 1253a11), for the voice of animals. This term refers to that which would be expected to have a certain degree of passivity in relation to pre-established order. Conversely, Aristotle uses the verb *deloun*, 'set forth' (31, 1253a15), for the speech of

humans, which can express the useful and the harmful, the just and the unjust. This moral sentiment differentiates the troop of animals from the political community of humans. The verb 'set forth' means the assertion of one's perspective and determination to put forward one's opinion, which involves agency as well as the ability to argue and deliberate.

The Aristotelian perspective on harmony establishes a community of political animal that shares the logical capacity of speech, which is captured by the levels of the human hearing spectrum. The vast horizon of that which is audible and incomprehensible and that which is inaudible and unintelligible is often overlooked in favour of that which is audible and understandable. Restricting the condition of achieving harmony to this limited auditory field, however, is anthropocentric insofar as this approach is based on the denial of multiple accounts of the different cognitive and sensory fields of non-humans, who are also able to hear and think in different ways than humans (Kohn and De Castro).

5. Sensory Order as the Scene of Harmony in Jacques Rancière

To elucidate the philosophical meaning of harmony, in the sense of agreement, we consider the notion of disagreement put forth by the French political philosopher Jacques Rancière. According to him, disagreement is neither a misconstruction that implies ignorance or concealment, nor a misunderstanding based on the imprecise nature of words:

We should take disagreement to mean a determined kind of speech situation: one in which one of the interlocutors at once understands and does not understand what the other is saying. [...] The interlocutors both understand and do not understand the same thing by the same words. [...] While clearly understanding what Y is saying, X cannot see the object that Y is talking about; or else X understands and is bound to understand, see, and attempt to make visible another object using the same name, another reason within the same argument. There is necessarily a structure of disagreement in the concept of speech (*Disagreement*, X-XI).

Speech is that which is categorized by sound, thus audible and intelligible, and is therefore understandable. It is founded upon

logos, but *logos* is not limited to speech. This is why Rancière points out the double specificity of *logos*, which is not only the principle of sharing (speech) but also that of division (the "account" of speech) (*Mésentes*, 71). For speech, the articulated voice, if it does not participate in what is common, falls into the category of noise; the common object of discussion is that which is the subject of litigation. *Logos* is the criterion for the attribution of this privileged capacity to attest to the ontological division between the logical animal and the merely phonic animal. The common is confined not only to what an individual finds pleasant or unpleasant but also to what is just or unjust to the family and the city. However, Rancière points out the unequal distribution of competence for the common:

The sharing/division of the sensible shows who can have a part in common according to the function, time, and space in which this activity is done. Having such or such an "occupation" thus defines competence or incompetence with the common. This defines whether you are visible or not in a common space, endowed with a common speech (*Le Partage*, 13).

For Aristotle, although all humans are speaking beings, not all humans are political animals, in the sense that *logos*, being the principle of division, is a privileged capacity reserved only for those who are endowed with logical intelligence. Those who are not qualified to participate in a common stage fall outside the political community of humans. A common stage is where humans, as equals, discuss that which is common; thus, Rancière believes that those who do not participate in this stage are condemned to silence—a condemnation that reduces their speech to animal noise and their being to animality (*Mésentes*, 44). I define these sorts of humans as *in/human humans*. The *in/human* refers to that which is fundamental to *Homo sapiens* as a species, but which is excluded from the political human community owing to a lack of requisite social and economic capital. The *in/human* has a marginalized position within the human community.

How can the concept of *in/human* be distinguished from that of *non-human*? I try to identify *in/human humans* as those who understand language but do not fully have power over it. Rancière takes an enslaved person as an example of this case: *in/human humans* are subject to the rule of those who fully possess language (*Le Partage*, 13). For Rancière, those who fully possess language are

those who can apply the logical capacity of argumentation and govern the self and the other (*Mésentes*, 78). Only this kind of human is qualified as a political and logical animal who takes part in the common stage of speech. Conversely, in/human humans are those who cannot perform the elocutionary act of establishing correspondence between saying and doing, and are deprived of authority and power. The unequal distribution of functions and places, and of the existence of a common stage of speech, necessarily produces the in/human within humans, thereby establishing what is truly human.

6. The Negative Concept of Harmony for Rancière

In *Disagreement*, Rancière further attempts to define harmony as the effect of the rigid order of the unequal distribution of places and functions. What is the logic of this order? It is “the logic which distributes bodies in the space of visibility or their invisibility and aligns ways of being, ways of doing, ways of speaking appropriate[ly] to each one” (28). Rancière names this system of distribution *the police*, defined as “the sensory order which organizes domination” (24) and “the configuration of the perceptible” (29) and “an order of the visible and the sayable” (29). Harmony is on the side of the police and is that which results from the hierarchical order and discipline of the body, which determines the fields of visibility, audibility, and intelligibility. The field of the perceptible is closely linked to that of socio-political existence, insofar as only those who are within the field of the sensible have the right to define that which is common and that which relates to rational discourse, contributing to social justice.

Rancière's negative concept of harmony is static: he thinks of harmony as the effect of the principle of exclusion through the naturalization of functions, which aims to prevail over conflict and disagreement. In this sense, his notion of harmony contrasts with those given by Plato and Aristotle, who tend to legitimize the hierarchical order of places and functions; Rancière virulently rejects this unequal regime, which is the police, and differentiates it from politics. For him, politics breaks the hegemonic configuration of the perceptible that divides bodies into two categories: that which is worth seeing, hearing, and being considered, and that which is unworthy of being seen, heard, or considered. From this

perspective, politics is what disturbs harmony and challenges the asymmetric distribution of bodies. In other words, for Rancière, politics emerges with the rupture of harmony, in the sense that politics is a sort of reconfiguration of the perceptible which "breaks with the tangible configuration" (*Disagreement*, 29); "political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it" (*Disagreement*, 30). It follows that politics is a bodily modality of being, and a bodily practice, that changes the hegemonic ways of being, of doing, and of speaking.

However, this break with the police is not considerably radical because, for Rancière, politics always presupposes the police—politics is only a repulsive reaction to the police, that is, it only exists as a deviation. Furthermore, I argue, Rancière overlooks harmony's dynamism. Harmony is what unfolds in the fluid and even challenging scene of the auditory spectrum and the sensory field, not in the rigid, static state of an established order. It is placed within the realm of politics because tension between agreement and disagreement is inevitable when the common space is reconfigured. The field of speech that participates in determining what is common and universal as the subject of litigation is a dynamic and fluid field in which the value of harmony should be rethought and explored using different approaches.

It is necessary to evaluate Rancière's analysis, which considers the in/human within the human (whereas Rancière does not consider the role of non-humans in the constitution of politics because he views politics as a process of protesting against the fall into animality). He advocates the inclusion of the invisible, the inaudible, and the unintelligible in the field of the perceptible and the transformation of noise into logical speech. In this sense, the reconfiguration of the sensible is only an extension, which consists of making the imperceptible perceptible.

Thus, Rancière's approach is limited by a humanist interpretation of politics and a view of harmony as a state of concordance with the status quo, just as politics is a rearrangement of the community of speech involving the incorporation of people without a share in the common world. I argue that a non-anthropocentric alternative reconfiguration of the sensible must necessarily involve the limitations of the human sensory field, a

recognition of the existence of non-humans, and limitations of the politics that exclude non-humans.

7. Harmony as the Collective of Humans and Non-Humans

Plato, Aristotle, and Rancière, three great philosophers, tend to focus on the anthropocentric dimension of harmony: for these thinkers, harmony concerns the constitution of the community of humans. To overcome this limited approach, which does not consider non-humans, it is necessary to focus on the non-anthropocentric dimension: harmony is not limited to the axiological and practical field of the human community because “social assemblages are composed of both humans and non-humans, and often just non-humans” (Bryant 206); harmony hence extends beyond anthropocentric parameters. Harmony is an ontological value that affirms a “flat ontology” (Bryant 116) between humans and non-humans, which deconstructs the hierarchy between beings. In addition, it is a practical value that contributes to the renewal of a collaborative bond of co-constitution with non-humans rather than an exploitative relationship that favours humans.

This non-anthropocentric vision of harmony is based on the perspective of new materialism as far as this way of thinking overcomes “the binaries of nature and culture, body and mind, animality and humanness” (Pitts-Taylor 2). “‘New materialism’ or ‘Neo-materialism’ [is] a concept developed by the Mexican author, artist, and philosopher Manuel DeLanda and the Italian-Australian philosopher and feminist theoretician Rosi Braidotti in the second half of the 1990s” (Witzgall 14). It entails a material turn that criticizes and exposes the limits of linguistic turns, which tend to “focus on the discursive at the expense of the material” (Alaimo and Hekman 3) and reduce matter to passive or inert things or natural resources that can be used and manipulated. In contrast to those views, new materialism considers the productivity and agency of material matter and non-human organisms that humans have long overlooked. In our present context, it focuses on the fluid and transformative process of the biological body and the agency of the materiality of non-humans.

Through the lens of Latour’s actor-network theory (1996), the components of harmony are no longer limited to humans but

include both human and non-human actors. Humans and non-humans are co-involved in the experimental stage of everyday bodily and material practices. Actors are what affect and are affected and thus what constitute the density of reality. From this perspective, it would be useful to define harmony as a dynamic process that is an integral part of the network of human and non-human actors—neither an assured finality nor a substantial and essential human value but a dynamic and open process consisting of interaction between these actors. Harmony is thus not an ideal object but rather something in the process of being made.

Harmony is not the annihilation of tensions and conflicts; instead, it advocates creative tension. It is not a process of purification or homogenization but one of hybridization, which implies transformation, change, and flexibility. Harmony based on "the univocity of being" (Deleuze 53) implies the abolition of the hierarchy between humans and non-humans and the sharing of the same voice. The univocity of being does not allow the unequal distribution of voice and speech according to functions and places but refers to an equal and transversal relationship between humans and non-humans that, in fact, realizes a "generalized symmetry" (Callon 176-177) between them. Therefore, the non-anthropocentric vision of harmony affirms the intensity of the material agency of non-humans and the entanglement between human corporeality and non-human materiality. "Agency depends on the collaboration, co-operation, or interactive interference of many bodies and forces" (Bennett 21). This non-anthropocentric vision of harmony is an attempt to challenge the prevailing ontological field, which is bellicose, and to determine who can participate in the common and redefine it.

Harmony is a horizon of transformation of thought and practice that shows us the limits of the human sensory order and the existence of non-humans, as well as the density of multiple realities of non-humans, which are not reduced to simple objects of observation and exploitation by humans. Non-humans have different sensory and cognitive fields that constitute a rich spectrum of multiple realities. To grasp the density of these multiple realities, it is necessary to adopt the approach of "alien phenomenology" coined by Ian Bogost (2012). This is an inventive and critical method to "examine how non-human entities

experience the world around them” and “to suspend our own human ways of operating and encountering the world so as investigate non-human ways of encountering the world” (Bryant 62-63). According to this perspective, the objective of harmony is to form “a collective of humans and non-humans” (Latour, *Pandora’s Hope*, 296) beyond the communities of humans. The formation of this collective is based on the dynamic dimension of harmony and will lead to an ontological, axiological, and political turn.

8. Conclusion

The significance of this article is in its assertion that harmony is not synonymous with peace or tolerance. Rather than idealizing harmony as a sublime, noble, and abstract value that does not apply to anything, I have, in this article, argued that harmony is a dynamic process which advocates for tensions between agreement and disagreement. Conversely, the conservative functionalist perspectives on harmony developed by Plato and Aristotle tend to reduce harmony to the essentialist distribution of positions and functions in favour of the unification of the system and the maintenance of the established order.

However, notably, in the new materialist perspective adopted in this article, harmony is neither a finality to be achieved nor a self-sufficient substance; it is that which implies instability and fluidity per se. Harmony results from the revelation of the anthropocentric aspect of the social consensus and extends to a relational ontology between humans and non-humans. The components of harmony and its purpose in the new materialist perspective are substantially different from those arising from the functionalist approach. The new materialist perspective affirms the entanglement between human and non-human actors and attests to the material agency of non-humans, which profoundly affects humans and non-humans. From this perspective, harmony is no longer a simple indication of human exceptionalism, nor is it a superior quality of communitarianism possessed by humans; instead, it is what decentres the anthropocentric parameters to give rise to the development of a collective of humans and non-humans. The new materialist interpretation of harmony thus leads us to rethink the actual boundaries between humans and non-humans and, further, to acknowledge and recognize the agentic force of non-humans.

Defining harmony as a dynamic process is already a theoretical-political position in the sense that this perspective opens the door to a new rearrangement of the power relationship that deconstructs the dichotomy between nature and culture, that is, between animality and humanity. In this light, the philosophical perspective on harmony developed in this article consists of redefining harmony as a bodily, situated everyday practice that advocates creative tension and as a modality of the deployment of productivity and confrontation between dissensus and consensus. Here, I have aimed to provide a philosophical perspective casting harmony as an endless field of creation of an actor-network of humans and non-humans to form a "politics of nature" (Latour, *Politics of Nature*, 1), that is, to radically rethink the nature of politics beyond the confines of a purely anthropocentric axiological field. Such a philosophical vision of harmony yields an ontological-political turn.

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