

PERMANENT REVOLUTION AND PERPETUAL PEACE

Revisiting Kantian Cosmopolitanism

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1. Introduction

We live in a globalized cosmopolitan world. Solitary conception of one's existence is not only limited in its existential boundaries they set up, but it is dangerous to the humanity as a whole. Kantian theory of cosmopolitan right is considered as one of the most important philosophical origins of modern cosmopolitan thought. He did not, of course, invent either the idea or the name of cosmopolitanism, which he drew from the ancient Stoics and rediscovered in the interstices of modern revolutionary movements.¹ But his great achievement was to transform it into a philosophical principle of the modern age based on the notion that nationalism was a sign of human immaturity and enslavement to the passions and that 'genuine principle of

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¹The term 'cosmopolitanism' has apparently a Cynic origin: To the question where he had come from Diogenes, the Cynic replied, "I am *cosmopolitan*." Diogenes did apparently mean to assert that the local affiliations were of lesser importance than a primary affiliation to humanity. He insisted on defining himself, primarily, in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns, although he was apolitical in his style. The Cynic background was historically very important for Stoics, which influenced later Greco-Roman cosmopolitan thought. The central difference between Kant and the Stoics is that the search for peace requires, according to Kant, a persistent vigilance toward an ineliminable human aggression, while for the Stoics aggression is a consequence of unwise attachments to external things and persons. The Stoics thought that the life of the cosmopolitan, and the cosmopolitan concerns with goals of world cooperation and respect for personhood, may be difficult to sell to citizens who are hooked on to local group loyalties. The life of the world citizen is, in effect, as Diogenes the Cynic said, a kind of exile! There is no evidence to see that Kant has been influenced by Cynics, but his influence of Stoics is almost univocally accepted. This point is discussed in Martha Nussbaum, "Kant and Cosmopolitanism," in *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, eds., Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999, 25- 53; also in "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 1 (1997), 1-25. Here, Nussbaum traces the debt Kant owed to ancient Stoic cosmopolitanism.

right' necessarily points toward a 'universal law of humanity,' which would transcend the nation-state. As Hannah Arendt rightly commented, one becomes a member in the world community by the fact of being human – one's "cosmopolitan existence."² Each human being dwells in two communities: one, the local community by birth and second, the community of human argument and aspiration. While answering the question on nature's 'final design,' Kant, in no means unequivocal, argues that it is nothing but "a cosmopolitan whole."³ However, cosmopolitan right is also seen as a banner or label under which powerful nations conduct wars against their enemies and portray them as enemies of humanity itself. Carl Schmitt, who subscribes to such a view, believed that the *moralization* of war under a cosmopolitan flag has a close affinity to the *totalization* of war, since it turns the enemy into an 'inhuman monster' who 'must be definitely annihilated.'⁴ In the same way, Hegel makes critique on Kant's theory of cosmopolitan right on the ground of its 'fixed conception' as regressive and non-nationalistic, where all the particularities of the nation-states are subsumed and eliminated. It seems however, Hegel's attempt was not abolishing Kant's cosmopolitan theory, but rather advancing Kantian framework beyond the formal natural law. Kant's theory of a cosmopolitan order was not merely an idealistic irrelevance to the realist play of power politics, nor was it a moral trap or an exercise in self-delusion. It was rather a philosophical expression of a determination to resist the pressures of nationalism, overcome the external violence of modern state, and turn the idea of universality into a concrete reality.⁵ Cosmopolitanism as Kant proposed is to be defended against 'spiritless radicalism,' as Arendt aptly called it, albeit on the understanding that Schmitt's destructive criticism is justifiable inasmuch as it captures 'what is' from the standpoint of power politics.⁶ As Kant rightly says, "political moralists" can always produce the contrary by fashioning morality to suit his own advantage as a statesman.⁷

²Hannah Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, Ronald Beiner, ed., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992, 75.

³Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, 53.

⁴Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, 15.

⁵Robert Fine, "Kant's Theory of Cosmopolitanism and Hegel's Critique," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 29, 6 (2003), 609-630.

⁶Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, San Diego: Harvest, 1979, 326-40; cited in Fine, "Kant's Theory of Cosmopolitanism and Hegel's Critique," 611.

⁷Immanuel Kant, "Appendix" in *Political Writings*, Hans Reiss, ed., H. B. Nisbet, trans., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 118.

In this essay, I analyze Kantian Cosmopolitanism under three perspectives: first, *Sensus Communis* as its foundation that Kant developed in his *Critique of Judgement*;⁸ second, republicanism and perseverance for peace as inevitable part of realizing cosmopolitanism; and, third, a critical evaluation on whether his effort is purely a ‘spiritless radicalism’ as some of his opponents, including Hegel, thought.

2. *Sensus Communis*: Foundation for Cosmopolitanism

The centrally uniting principle of *purposiveness without purpose*⁹ that Kant identifies and extols in the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* is located in the capacity of *sensus communis*, which is translated, as Arendt says, “common sense.”¹⁰ Commonsense is not common, but communal. It helps to develop and accept plurality and thus, co-exist with ‘large-mentality,’ which is the outcome of imagination. It is a communicable cultural feeling that humanity is said to share universally, and the source of all that sees the beauties of nature as adapted to our powers of cognition as well as to the free play of our imaginative faculties in harmony leading to purposiveness. This common sense, according to Kant, is essential. Without it the subjective elements of cognition, morality, and imagination

⁸Arendt, *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, 61. For this discussion I depend on Arendt’s reading of Kant’s *Critique of Judgment*. Beiner, however, argues that Arendt was clearly wrong when she states that Kantian political philosophy must be reconstructed from the third *Critique*, because his real political philosophy remained unwritten. Kant’s politics is strongly shaped by his moral vision in contrast to what Arendt suggests. Her version of Kantian politics is obsessed with Platonically defined philosophy, although Kant himself has his own version of Platonic influence. For post-critical Kant, morality is situated firmly in the province of reason, not in that of taste. Ronald Beiner, “Re-reading Hannah Arendt’s Lectures,” *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 23, 1 (1997), 21-32.

⁹According to the *Critique of Judgement*, while “the purpose (*Zweck*) is the object of a concept, insofar as the concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility),” purposiveness (*Zweckmässigkeit*) is “the causality of a concept in respect of its object.” Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, Paul Guyer, ed., Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, transl., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 5: 220; For this discussion see Saju Chackalackal, *Unity of Knowing and Acting in Kant: A Paradigmatic Integration of the Theoretical and the Practical*, Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications, 2002.

¹⁰This functional translation may be contrasted with the stand of Onara O’Neill, *Constructions of Reason: Exploration of Kant’s Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 45, where she rejects “common sense” as well as “community sense” (opted by Arendt in *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, 70), and opts instead “public sense.”

would remain independent. Hence an individual would almost reduce the knower to the status of scepticism. A common platform is necessary in order to facilitate communication, which in turn, is essential for any type of communicable cognitions. For Kant, this platform is provided by a *sensus communis*, based on which the mental states of individuals can be universally communicated. This also includes the communication of feelings that underlie aesthetic judgments.

Common sense, according to Kant, is an understanding of sharable mutuality and intersubjective communication that leads to actual community. Although there is no theoretical or practical necessity with regard to the aesthetic judgment by which everyone *feels* the same liking for the object perceived as beautiful, there is a subjective necessity, “i.e., a necessity of the assent of *all* to a judgment which is regarded as the example of a universal rule that we cannot state.”¹¹ This universal assent of the judgment of taste, though not objectively necessary in itself due to the lack of conceptual employment, demands “the agreement of everyone else, because we have for it a ground that is common to all.”¹² It is this common ground that Kant terms *sensus communis*. Kant says:

“*Sensus communis*,” however, must be understood the idea of a communal sense, i.e., a faculty of judging [*Beurteilungsvermögen*] that in its reflection takes account (*a priori*) of everyone else’s way of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on the judgement.¹³

Thus, identifying *sensus communis* as a reflective faculty of estimation available to humanity, Kant takes it to be our *inner ability* to make judgments of taste. In other words, it is a power to assess the success of the judgment of taste by considering whether a particular actual feeling derived from the aesthetic judgment is shared or not. Establishing and

¹¹Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, §18, 5:237,122.

¹²Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, §18, 5:237, 122. Kant holds that aesthetic judgment is the property of the humanity, exercised in a community, and never in solitude. “In solitude man is very indifferent to the beautiful... Beautiful form seems to exist only for society... When we are alone, we never attend to the beautiful.” This is because “sociability is the cause and motivation of taste.” Cited in Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979, 26-27.

¹³Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, §40, 5:294, 173-74.

cultivating the ability of *sensus communis*, according to Kant, take place by way of three general rules or conditions of thinking. These are conditions of acting as well. “They are (1) to think for oneself [the maxim of enlightenment, as Arendt says]; (2) to put ourselves in thought in the place of everyone else [the maxim of the enlarged mentality]; and (3) always to think consistently [the maxim of consistency – *mit sich selbst Einstimmung denken*].”¹⁴ Apart from their moral significance and the helpful hints they offer for living with one another in a society, they tend to the *sensus communis* and set the ground for a proper response to the judgment of taste. The need for individual autonomy and self-legislation that marks the basis for a responsible rejoinder in evolving and catering to an intersubjective or universal form of community – a cosmopolitan community – is reflected in these ‘maxims of common human understanding.’ Plurality of viewpoints cohabits in a coherent and peaceful manner.

2.1. Plurivocity for Enlarged Mentality

Thinking for oneself is a maxim that calls for an active reason which can defend itself by engaging in unprejudiced thought. Despite the necessity of the common sense, Kant does not allow any chance of reducing the individual participants to a mere passive state of accepting the reasoning of others. Instead, he demands that all those who form part of the community have to be persons, who are able to think for themselves, whose thinking and judging ensue from their own independent reasoning.¹⁵ Indeed the rational independence of these agents implies that there is a plurality of viewpoints (I call it *plurivocal* against univocal). Yet Kant, with his second maxim, posits a dynamic interrelation that is possible within this plurivocity. Here, it is very important to reflect why Kant stands for republicanism. He contends that republicanism must replace despotism, where a state is governed by laws derived from the private will of its ruler, eliminating the plurality of views, in individual states. Genuine independence, in Kant’s vision, does not amount to absolute individualism; nor is it a call for transferring ourselves to the standpoint of others. Assuming the common character of our feeling and thought, Kant

¹⁴Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, §40, 5:294, 174; Arendt, *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, 71. These same principles are laid out elsewhere and there they are given as “general rules and conditions of the avoidance of error,” and are called enlightened, enlarged, and consequent or coherent, respectively. Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Victor Lyle Dowdell, transl., Hans H. Rudnock, ed., London: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978, 95-96.

¹⁵Chackalackal, *Unity of Knowing and Acting*, 476.

calls for adopting the maxim of “enlarged thought” so that a person is able to disregard “the subjective private conditions of his own judgment, by which so many others are confined, and [to] reflect upon it from a *universal standpoint* (which he can only determine by placing himself at the standpoint of others).”¹⁶ This basically facilitates communication among individuals, by which one’s own initial judgments can be approached and debated from the perspective of others, and, thus, possibly a lofty position can be arrived at. This, however, is not a given position but each individual has to arrive at by constantly engaging in the process of thinking (for oneself) and by shifting those grounds to the universal standpoint. So reasoning is not individualistic but includes and permits accessibility to others. This results in the necessity of the final maxim of consistent thought. The constant interface between individual and intersubjective dimensions of thinking involved in gradual developmental process has to be infused with consistency at both levels. It is said to be a disinterested and an unending task – a philosophical task – the attainment of which is possible only “by the combination of both the former, and after the constant observance of them has made them automatic.”¹⁷

The need to transcend the limits of subjectivity and thus to ascribe universal validity to the judgment of taste are grounded in the fact that human beings share in a common responsiveness. Kant held that “this common sense is assumed ... simply as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge;”¹⁸ its intrinsic necessity deriving specifically from the common sense and not from the object involved. Paul Guyer clearly expresses the value of communication with regard to the aesthetic judgment in the following passage:

A beautiful object pleases us because it is an occasion for communication and because we have a natural disposition for communication, the satisfaction of which brings us pleasure. On this account, the absence of society precludes the judgment of taste,

¹⁶Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, §40, 5:295, 175. Arendt argues that to think with an enlarged mentality means one has to train his or her imagination to move beyond the boundaries. It is the same reason why, as Arendt opines, Kant takes the line of the spectator, not the actor as such. Being a “citizen of the world,” a *Weltbetrachter* – a world-spectator – Kant looks to the world beyond territorial limits, which made him even to limit himself to travel less, and satisfied with reading travel reports! See, Arendt, *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, 42-44.

¹⁷Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, §40, 5:295, 175.

¹⁸Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, §21, 5:239, 124.

obviously enough: such a judgment makes a claim on the agreement of others, and can be made only on the basis of experience of others and their preferences. Their absence thus makes the judgment of taste logically incoherent and practically impossible. But the absence of others is also taken to deprive one of one’s own pleasure in a beautiful object. Without anyone to share its experience with, Kant holds, one can have no “proper enjoyment” of the object itself, precisely because its pleasurable nature lies in the fact that it is an occasion for communication. On the theory that it is the communicability of a mental state rather than the harmony of knowledge with its object which causes aesthetic pleasure, the conditions of both aesthetic response and aesthetic judgment are the same – namely, those which ground the possibility of communication.¹⁹

In line with the maxims, then, the judgment of taste requires a constant conciliation between individual and community, thus facilitating a progressive communicability within the community of taste.

2.2. Rationale of Reflective Communication

Kant introduces rational communication as that which relates humans and caters to the social spirit of the mankind. The reflective activity of *sensus communis*, which manoeuvres for a relation between imagination and understanding without the mediation of concepts, can be effective only if formal communicability is possible. “Everyone expects and requires from everyone else this reference to universal communication [of pleasure], as it were from an original compact dictated by humanity itself.”²⁰ This is possible by way of constituting a shared world of action for one another through the exercise of our own freedom, which requires that the maxims of *sensus communis* are fulfilled. As Arendt states, “you must be alone in order to think; you need company to enjoy a meal.”²¹ Facilitating such a communication among responsive individuals is an attempt to treat them as ourselves, but in their own right, where they are not objectified or treated as a means for certain ends, but as individuals sharing the same faculties and abilities as we have, and ultimately as end. It is important to note that rational communication and mediation never compromise Kant’s

¹⁹Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 26; see also Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, §9-10.

²⁰Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, §41, 5:297, 176.

²¹Arendt, *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, 67.

foundational principle on man “as the ultimate end.”²² Yet it promotes common understanding among peoples of pluri-form views and initiates them to work for the future. Such a unity cannot be identified as extreme uniformity, but rather mutual search for a common ground. Kant argues:

The art of reciprocal communication of ideas of the most educated part with the cruder, the coordination of the breadth and refinement of the former with the natural simplicity and originality of the latter, and in this way to discover that mean between higher culture and contented nature which constitutes the correct standard, not to be given by any universal rule, for taste as a universal human sense.²³

The maxims of *sensus communis* shed light on our ability for the aesthetic judgment, which requires that our consistent thinking – individually as well as collectively – forms us into members of a community. Here, in this union, the aesthetic taste becomes a reality and the unifying ground of human cognition and practice. It must be noted that more than something readily given, *sensus communis* is an ability, or an *inner faculty* that we have to acquire and advance by way of our continued effort of rational self-disciplining. Consequently, the unifying principle of *purposiveness without purpose* can be actualised in the realm of aesthetic activity. Such an experience of unity can be realized only in a republican form of government and constitution.

3. Republicanism as Locus of Unity

Kant strongly believed that a republican constitution and government can bring the desired peace in the world. Every republican constitution is based on three fundamental principles: the principle of *freedom* for all members of a society, the principle of the *dependence* of everyone upon a single common legislation, and the principle of legal *equality* for everyone as citizens.²⁴ These three rightful attributes are inseparable from the nature of a citizen. Kant argues that the emergence of republican states – representative democracies – is crucial and unique for realizing peace:

For if by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic (which is by its nature inclined to seek perpetual peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among other

²²Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, §83, 5:430, 297.

²³Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, §60, 5:356, 229-30.

²⁴Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 94; “The Metaphysics of Morals,” in *Political Writings*, 139. This point is elaborated in, Leslie A. Mulholland, “Kant on War and International Justice,” *Kant-Studien* 78, 1 (1987), 25-41.

states. These will join up ... securing the freedom of each state in accordance with the idea of international right, and the whole will gradually spread further and further...²⁵

This can be realized in the context of a federation of states, which is not like a world government however, but a union of republican states. On Kant’s account, republican states can function as focal points of peace. This is because in these states, “the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, [and] it is natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game.”²⁶ Kant continues to argue that despotic states, to the contrary, easily go for war because their rulers need no public consent and usually can avoid the ravages of war. Republican states promote ‘public use of reason’ in order to facilitate the moral and political engagement of their citizens and thus are more likely to seek for lasting peace.²⁷ “Perpetual peace is *guaranteed* by no less an authority than the great artist *Nature* herself (*natura daedala rerum*).”²⁸ Kant’s claim on republic is not something empirically tested but rather something like an “*a priori* necessity.”²⁹ There must, he believed, be an “absolute sovereign agent which can force each of us to obey a universally valid Will under which everyone can be free.”³⁰ Nature can never impose a duty to promote perpetual peace, which is at the heart of his cosmopolitan idea, only practical reason can do that. Kant, however, argues that at the political, international, and cosmopolitan level, Nature guarantees what man ought to do, without prejudice to the ‘free agency of man.’³¹ Kant’s argument is

²⁵Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 104.

²⁶Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 99.

²⁷Kant, “Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” Ninth proposition, in *Political Writings*, 51-53.

²⁸Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 108.

²⁹Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” §45, 138. Kant argues that the legislative power can belong only to the united will of the people. All rights are supposed to emanate from this power; the laws it gives must be absolutely *incapable* of doing anyone an injustice. It is just like the *veil of ignorance* theory of John Rawls, who developed his theory of justice under Kantian transcendental understanding of contractarian approach.

³⁰Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” §46, 139.

³¹Kant addresses this question at three levels: political, international and cosmopolitan levels. In the political area, the mechanism of Nature would result in the creation of the state even by ‘a nation of devils.’ The antagonism of men will make them compel one another to submit to the coercive laws of the state. In the area

obviously conservative as one might expect from a philosopher who denied the right of revolution and affirmed the obligation to obey the law.

There is historical evidence that prolonged human struggles have led to exhaustion and disgust with war, that the longest period of peace in Europe was the result or end served by the Napoleonic Wars. In the twentieth century, World War I resulted in the creation of the League of Nations and World War II in the creation of United Nations. As a moralist, Kant hoped that the results of the mutual antagonism of men would lead to seek an institutional protection of peace in the form of federation of states.³² Here, wealthy nations and their citizens are duty bound to assist developing nations in their endeavour to eliminate poverty, hunger, preventable diseases, premature mortality, and illiteracy. These are hindrances to individual autonomy, and one aspect of the duty to respect other humans as ends in themselves is to promote the conditions of their autonomy. Improved conditions of autonomy facilitate political progress and thus help the cause of peace. Hence, assistance in the struggle against poverty, hunger, and so forth, in developing countries may be seen as a way of satisfying the duty to promote republicanism in foreign nations for

of international right, the separate existence of many independent states is essentially a state of war unless there is a federal union to prevent war. Linguistic and religious differences, as provided by Nature, will prevent the emergence of a single world power; although they will initially provide a pretext for war, eventually the growth of culture will contribute to mutual understanding of peace. In the area of cosmopolitan right, Kant believes the “spirit of commerce,” which eventually takes hold of people, will further the cause of peace. “Perpetual Peace,” 108-114. In the present world, we see just the contrary to what Kant proposes. The contemporary gurus of *The End of History and Last Man* (Fukuyama) and *Clash of Civilizations* (Samuel Huntington) subscribe for the opposite by showing the empirical fragility of the society, where individuals are divided on the basis of different civilizations they belong to and hence, one takes the sword against the other. Despite large scale transactions and trade networks in the present world, the market-driven globalization produces a fragmented society with haves and the have-nots. I believe, however, that we can never subscribe for the teachings of the prophets of doom even if there are difficulties to understand the Kantian cosmopolitan ‘utopia;’ we hope for the better!

³²Teleology, of course, falls into disrepute when thinkers ‘reify’ Providence or Nature and claim to have discovered their real ends or purposes in history. Kant avoids this trap and sees teleology as a regulative principle which serves as a source both of empirical hypotheses and moral aspiration. Kant maintained that the teleology of nature is something internal, not external. See Burleigh Wilkins, “Teleology in Kant’s Philosophy of History,” *History and Theory* 5 (1966), 172-185.

the sake of peace.³³ Kant wrote that the task of establishing a universal and lasting peace “is not just a part of the theory of right within the limits of pure reason, but its entire ultimate purpose.”³⁴ Everybody is obliged to act in accordance with the idea of such an end of perpetual peace: “for this is based upon duty, hence also upon the rights of man and of states, and can indeed be put into execution.”³⁵ Kant’s ultimate hope lay not in the formation of a single world government – as Arendt points out, “Kant knew quite well that a world government would be the worst tyranny imaginable”³⁶ – but in a federation of states, a federation which would be furthered by states committed to what Kant called “republicanism,”³⁷ which corresponds roughly to what we call liberal democracy.

Kant, however, believed both in the ‘rights of man’ and in the ‘rights of states,’ which sets him apart from cosmopolitan liberals on the one hand and political realists on the other. He believed that all states are moral personalities, and I think this is the lynch-pin of his claim that states should not intervene in the affairs of other states. When we think of intervention we often think of military intervention and of wars of conquest, but, as Kant realized, intervention can take a variety of forms, and states may be acquired in a variety of ways. For example, states may be acquired by inheritance, exchange, purchase, gift, or by marriage; and in all of these transactions, Kant believed, the subjects of a state are used or misused as objects to be manipulated at will. A state, according to Kant, is “like a tree, it has its own roots, and to graft it on to another state as if it were a shoot is to terminate its existence as a moral personality and make it into a commodity.”³⁸ He believed that every state is a moral personality,

³³Poverty and inequality can certainly make a person outraged and desperate, and a sense of injustice, related to particularly gross inequality, can be a ground for rebellion – even a bloody revolution. In looking for underlying causes of war, the economics of deprivation and inequity has a very plausible claim to attention. Amartya Sen gives a detailed account and argues that peace cannot be actualized unless adequate attention to the problems of poverty and inequality is given. See, “Violence, Identity and Poverty,” *Journal of Peace Research* 45, 1 (2008), 5-15.

³⁴Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 174.

³⁵Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 170.

³⁶Arendt, *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, 44.

³⁷Ideally, for Kant, all states should be republican in both spirit and form, but some states may be republican in spirit and not yet in form. An example for Kant was the Prussia of Frederick the Great which was republican, that is, representative, in spirit but not in form.

³⁸Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 94.

which is constituted by social contract. It means the autonomy of a state, like that of individual person, should not be suppressed by force or influence. But, in reality what happens is the opposite, if not always. Although the political psychology of certain states is just contrary to what they do on contractual agreements, they just do it fearing of their isolation and possibility of getting lost in the market-place. Kant defines a state as “a union of a multitude of men under principles of justice.”³⁹ If we use the language of modern-day discussions of collective responsibility, for Kant the state is not a mere aggregate of persons, and that the union to which he refers is that of an organised collective. Kant defines moral personality as “nothing but the freedom of a rational being under moral laws,”⁴⁰ while a psychological personality is simply the ability to be conscious of one’s self-identity. But, a state as moral person living with and in opposition to another state is a condition of natural freedom. This freedom is also a condition of continual war. States like individual persons can have rights and duties, and these rights and duties obtain in relation to their own subjects, although Kant thinks the duties states owe to their own subjects are not coercive duties. Thus, the republican federation of states is Kantian transcendental ideal in the political sphere, where states mutually share and help and thereby it ensures global basic structure in economic, political and social realms.⁴¹

4. Cosmopolitan Ideal: Spiritless Radicalism?

The philosophy of history is meant precisely to set in place a political philosophy, however marked by a natural teleology it may be. It is true that this political philosophy is not a philosophy of political judgement. It is limited to articulating the political task assigned to the human species as a natural finality. The very expression “a cosmopolitan point of view” shows the singularity of this hinge point. As Paul Ricoeur says, “the nine theses of the essay [Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View] are meant to establish, degree by degree, the conditions of possibility of the transition from natural teleology to world citizenship – from *cosmos* to *polis*, we might say.”⁴² Kant’s point is looking for a

³⁹Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, John Ladd, trans., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965, 77.

⁴⁰Kant, *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, 24.

⁴¹John Rawls develops this point in his *Law of Peoples*.

⁴²Paul Ricoeur, *The Just*, David Pellauer, ed., Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2000, 101.

‘transition.’ He says, “we are here concerned not with philanthropy, but with *right*. In this context, *hospitality* means the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory.”⁴³ Hence, “the idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity. Only under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual peace.”⁴⁴ It means humanity is by nature capable of constant progress towards peace and improvement without forfeiting its strength. Here, the very movement of nation-states to cosmopolitan ideal is considered to be an important element of progress.

At the same time, cosmopolitanism as ‘fixed position in opposition to the concrete life of the state’ makes history as a “superficial play of contingent and allegedly merely human aspirations and passions.”⁴⁵ Hegel’s critique of cosmopolitanism was directed at Kant’s *abstraction* of cosmopolitan right from the actuality of social and political life. He commented that “perpetual peace is often demanded as an ideal to which mankind should approximate” and that a “league of sovereigns” is proposed to settle disputes between states.⁴⁶ Hegel did not reject the demand for peace or the institutional means Kant designed to achieve this end, but he could not accept Kant’s formulation of the relationship between means and end. He argued that a league of states is as likely to construct its own enemies as an individual state: “...the state is an individual and negation is an essential component of individuality. Thus even if a number of states join together as a family, this league in its individuality must generate opposition and create an enemy.”⁴⁷ Here, the powerful sovereigns can decide a common enemy and ask the humanity to fight against it as it is the enemy of all. The propensity to war shown by

⁴³Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 105-06.

⁴⁴Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 108.

⁴⁵G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Allen W. Wood, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, §209, 240.

⁴⁶Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §324, 361. The hypothetical ‘social contract’ theory follows the line of thinking started with Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century and later developed by John Locke, Rousseau and Kant. The advanced versions of these aspects are seen in the works of John Rawls. However, many thinkers including Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum argue that such a ‘transcendental institutionalism’ can do less for the realization-focused approach to justice. See Amartya Sen, *The Idea of Justice*, New York: Penguin Books, 2009.

⁴⁷Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §324, 362.

states in isolation is changed but not overcome when they combine into a league or federation. Kant stipulates that ‘reason absolutely condemns war’ but such a minimalist conception of cosmopolitan right makes no mention of other, potentially competing aspects of cosmopolitan right – those to do with social justice, poverty, inequality, democracy, etc. If these elements are not seriously considered the absolute notions of cosmopolitan rights, perpetual peace remains an utopia. Kantian “judging spectator” is profound with ‘large mentality’ but sometimes, it neglects the role played by the “engaged actor.”⁴⁸ Kantian cosmopolitan right may tend to bypass the radical responsibilities within the social world although “destination of the human race is perpetual progress.”⁴⁹

Hegel’s popularly viewed criticism against Kant’s abstract cosmopolitan order can be seen in his analysis on nationalism and patriotism. Hegel questions Kant’s association of nationalism with immaturity and blind passion by exploring the rational foundations of patriotism within the modern system of right. Hegel argues that patriotism is “a consequence of institutions within the state,”⁵⁰ i.e., it is a result of the rational structure of the modern state and not an error of thought or blind emotion. Actually, Hegel was not against the cosmopolitan outlook as such, but he emphasised the need of nationalism as a pre-requisite for developing patriotism. Hegel criticised Kant only for turning cosmopolitanism into a ‘fixed position’ in opposition to the ‘concrete life’ of the state. He, on the other hand, argues that the basis of modern patriotism lies in the disposition of citizens to trust that their interests are preserved in the interests of the state and that their freedom is secured in their conformity to state institutions. The source of such a trust has to be found out in the rationale of state institutions that helps the society to keep away from meaningless absolutism and rationally ordered bureaucracy.⁵¹ As to the argument that republicanism is conducive to peace because rulers cannot go to war without consulting the people and the people are more cultured and therefore less prone to violence than in traditional political orders, Hegel observes that in republican states responsibility for the command of the armed forces and for making war and peace still usually lies with the ‘supreme commander.’ In many instances, the rights of the

⁴⁸Arendt, *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, 48.

⁴⁹Arendt, *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, 58; this point is elaborated in pages, 55-59, 75-77.

⁵⁰Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §268, 288.

⁵¹Fine, “Kant’s Theory of Cosmopolitanism and Hegel’s Critique,” 617.

states may not get protected in a universal will with constitutional powers over them, but they are nonetheless actualized in their own particular wills. At the time of war, states continue to recognize one another reciprocally as states, which mean that they are obliged to wage war in such a way as to preserve the possibility of peace.⁵² Here, the sacrifice of the individuals in a society is considered as nothing but merely instrumental military machines, where individuals fall under ‘one among many,’ and thus, the individual liberty and respecting individuality is subsumed in the universal.⁵³ Although republicanism gives space for *sensus communis* and enlarged mentality, when it takes the form of universal federations, the individual differences can be annihilated.

5. Conclusion

Despite the factual evidence and the every-day drama played on the streets of the world history is just contrary to the radical conception of cosmopolitan right, it is in no way make one, I believe, to be a cynical realist or a conservative pessimist. Kant argues that it is not possible to decide through experience whether the human race’s history shows it be improving morally, getting worse, or vacillating endlessly between good and evil. Yet he makes clear that the only way we can look at this question is by looking at *our vocation to better ourselves* – both individually and collectively. Kant believes that the milestone event that constitutes a “historical sign” that humankind is progressing towards Good is nothing else, but “enthusiasm or the passion.”⁵⁴ Kant argues that politics and morality, which have incompatible agreement in the public power politics, can come to an agreement within a federal union, which is therefore

⁵²Fine, “Kant’s Theory of Cosmopolitanism and Hegel’s Critique,” 620.

⁵³Hegel explains this point by reference to wars of coalition waged by England against France, observing that “the entire people has pressed for war on several occasions and has in a sense compelled the ministers to wage it... Only later when emotions had cooled, did people realize that the war was useless and unnecessary and that it had been entered into without calculating the cost.” *Philosophy of Right*, §329, 365-66. It was almost the same when America gone for military invasion of Iraq in 2003 by declaring war against terrorism. Even if considerable favourable arguments can be made from the decision-makers such an act in the history marks an indelible scar. See Sen, *The Idea of Justice*, 2-3.

⁵⁴Kant, *The Contest of the Faculties*, in *Political Writings*, 183. Kant explains enthusiasm as “the attitude on the onlookers as it reveals itself in public while the drama of great political changes is taking place: for they openly express universal yet disinterested sympathy for one set of protagonist against ... present” (182).

necessary and given *a priori* through the principles of right.⁵⁵ However, by transforming utopia (perfect place) into eudemonia (wellbeing), we look for solutions in terms of individual and societal development and progress than through imposition of institutional framework. Realization of cosmopolitan ideals presupposes certain transcendental institutions in order to pursue for justice and peace. But, in reality, this kind of ideal conception may not guarantee or not even functional from a practical point of view. The institutions and the models of institutions mostly take care of the ‘insiders’ alone. Kant rightly says that unconditional hospitality makes the stranger as member of the native household, at least for a certain time. He strongly believed that scattered human race could be brought together under a single umbrella of “cosmopolitan constitution” and that alone can bring perpetual peace on earth. Kant has to go miles in order to reach such a passionate idea of “universal community.”⁵⁶

Peace would not be lasting if it did not take into account the need for economic redistribution and protection for basic human rights, for which the present international laws or institutions with contractarian framework may not be enough. Even the best attempts by the social contract tradition to solve these problems – John Rawls, Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz – prove insufficient guides to the complexities of the issues we face. Our attempts to make global economic institutions like World Trade Organization or World Bank to form a kind of economic global network and thereby make a universal community terribly failed the purpose. Moreover, in commerce and trade relationships certain under-developed states are instrumentally used by developed states, which have greater amount of voice in the market. It is true, however, that a universal community that Kant visualised becomes meaningful and relevant where “moral politician” wins over the “political moralist.” Kantian march toward human progress and perpetual peace includes also a perpetual war, an eternal war for an eternal peace.

⁵⁵Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 129.

⁵⁶Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 106-07. Kant looks for a universal community of love, where “a government ... established of benevolence towards the people, like that of a father towards his children. Under such a *paternal government (imperium paternale)*...” Kant, “Theory and Practice,” in *Political Writings*, 74.