

## DISCUSSION FORUM

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### I

## INTUITION AND REASON IN RELIGION

In all religious experience both in East and West the contrast between the time-bound experience of reason and the trans-temporal perspective of intuition are of crucial importance. In this paper I wish to approach the problem from the standpoint of the Western thinker Charles Hartshorne comparing it with the ideas of an eastern seer, S. Radhakrishnan. For both transition from the world of space and time to that of the divine constitutes the essence of religion. Each would hold that an adequate metaphysics or theism seeks a balance between intuition and reason. Yet the balance is a tenuous one and each man can be caught leaning toward one side or the other. Radhakrishnan leans toward creative intuition in religion whereas Hartshorne leans toward critical reason. A brief statement of the arguments on both sides will help us to focus the issue more sharply.

Radhakrishnan succinctly states the problem from his own perspective as follows: "While the dominant feature of Eastern thought is its insistence on creative intuition, the Western systems are generally characterized by a greater adherence to critical intelligence."<sup>1</sup> His point is that not all knowledge is propositional knowledge, that intuitive knowledge is an important part of human experience in its awareness of reality and it is particularly important in religion. Intuition gives us integral knowledge, a whole-

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1. S., Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1932), p. 139.

ness and completeness that is lacking in scientific knowledge. Integral knowledge requires a vision, an insight, *Darsana*, into reality and intuition is this insight; it is an immediate, direct, non-inferential knowledge of the real. Logic and dialectic reasons are only preparations for direct experience and therefore, each depends on intuition. In short, intuition is the first principle of reason; it is supra-rational, supra-logical but it is not a-logical or a-rational. Intuition is the synthesizing activity of knowledge and thus, provides coherence of thought. The Cartesian "I Think" depends on the self-knowledge of intuition.<sup>2</sup>

Hartshorne points up the problem sharply when he writes: "About the age of seventeen, after reading Emerson's Essays, I made up my mind, doubtless with a somewhat hazy notion of what I was doing, to trust reason to the end."<sup>3</sup> Though not all of our knowledge is rational, what is rational and what we can know by means of reason is worth knowing. Hence, Hartshorne has spent his life seeking to defend what is good in rationalism. Though he never claims that reason is the whole of experience, he does claim that many problems faced by man are rational in nature and therefore, if we are serious about solving the problems then we will take seriously the rational method. Reason is the tracing out of the consequences of our ideas, it is the honest weighing of evidence and the evaluation of both inductive and deductive processes of thought. Reason calls for commitment to the norms of correct intellectual procedure.<sup>4</sup> Rationalism is the search for the pre-suppositions of civilized living; it seeks the ultimate concepts that have a logical structure that are lucid and beautiful. For Hartshorne, metaphysical reason is essentially a question of the logical structure of concepts and hence, the rational way is the logical way. Reason generalizes and abstracts from the concrete experience. Because it (reason) is abstract it can be called "empty though important" in the on-going process of knowledge. Its aim at generalizations has as its purpose the unification of the facts. The most abstract generalizations are *A Priori*, the ultimate notions,

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2. *ibid.*, pp. 147, 128, 141.

Paul Schilpp, (editor), *The Philosophy of S. Radhakrishnan*, (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 790-794.

3. C., Hartshorne, *The Logic of Perfection*, Open Court, LaSalle, IL, 1962, p. 8.

4. C., Hartshorne, *Reality as Social Process*, (Free Press, Glencoe, IL, 1953), pp. 163, 166.

and these can be grasped by reason. The crucial point in which time and timeless, reason and intuition meet together is the experience of God, the Eternal as discernible in time.<sup>5</sup> Here the viewpoints of Hartshorne and Radhakrishnan converge though they differ somewhat in their approaches both regarding the doctrine of God as well as the rational process for proving his existence.

### I. The Doctrine of God

Radhakrishnan finds the union of time and the timeless in the three poses of the Supreme: the transcendent Absolute, Brahman; the creative freedom, Isvara; and the wisdom, power and love manifest in this world.<sup>6</sup> The Absolute is eternally complete, fixed being, and what is fixed cannot change. The Absolute is the logical *prius* of actuality and possibility and hence cannot be identified with either one. Brahman or the Absolute is the principle of the universe, life, existence, mind and evolution. The transcendent Absolute is beyond all descriptive categories and hence can be referred to only symbolically.<sup>7</sup> It is the source of all possibilities.

On the other hand, God or Isvara is organically related to the cosmos and is the logical *prius* of the universe. God is an expression of the Absolute, he is the power, love and wisdom that is reflected in the religious man's life. He is the universal mind who works with a conscious design, who is the principle of order, progress and the sustainer of our moral effort. God is the concrete embodiment of wisdom, love and goodness which satisfies the religious demand. He is the refuge and the friend of all, the companion who cares and will not leave us alone. Hence, God's redemptive function is felt by the spirit in man. Here the I-Thou relation can be discerned but in the transcendent Absolute, the relation no longer holds. That is, the subject-object relation holds in the maya world but there is a blending, an integration within the Absolute in which the distinction does not hold.<sup>8</sup> "It is a type of experience which is not clearly differentiated into a subject-object state, an integral, undivided consciousness in which not merely this or that side of man's nature but his whole being

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5. C., Hartshorne, *L.P.*, pp. 9 and 11.

6. Paul Schilpp, *P.S.R.*, p. 797.

7. S., Radhakrishnan, *I.V.L.*, p. 31.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

seems to find itself."<sup>9</sup> The contrast of becoming blends into the oneness of being, the many blend into the one, etc.

Hartshorne also recognizes the complexity of the nature of God and insists that one of the chief errors of our forefathers was oversimplification.<sup>10</sup> Hartshorne calls his doctrine neo-classical, surrelativism, or dipolar meaning that God is both-and, i.e., both simple and compound, being and becoming, absolute and relative, necessary and contingent, and so on. God then is absolute yet related to all, he is supreme yet indebted to all; God is necessary yet actualized somehow and this description reflects the complexity as well as the simplicity of God. God as absolute is changeless and permanent and represents the stability and structure of the universe. In more traditional language, the essence of God is to be, necessarily to be, but to be is to create, to become. Being without its contrast becoming loses its meaning. What would being mean without becoming or becoming without meaning? According to Hartshorne, nothing: each requires the other for its meaning. God as absolute is cause; He is abstract, object, independent, but in each, God is supreme, unique. God is not simply a cause but the cause with universal or cosmic influence, as well as the universal effect; not merely an object but the object for all subjects and the subject for all objects.<sup>12</sup> The religious man requires God's absoluteness, permanence if he is to have trust and dependence on such a being. Yet God's relativity is no less important. God as relative, as concrete reflects the changing, becoming nature of God. God is on the make and every experience becomes a part of God's nature. God as absolute is unaffected by the changing world but as relative, every change in the world becomes a part of God in the appropriate sense. God as absolute can be literally described: God is permanent, God is good, God is perfect, God is love, makes good sense in reference to God but can only be partial in relation to man. It is literally true to say that God is true, good, absolute, but when we say that God is father then we speak analogically.

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9. R.A., McDermott, *Radhakrishnan Selected Writings*, (New York: E.P. Dutton and (editor) Co., 1970), p. 134.
  10. Hartshorne and Reese, *Philosophers Speak of God*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p.1.
  11. P.S.G., Hartshorne, p. 2.
  12. C., Hartshorne., *Divine Relativity*, (Yale University Press, 1942), p. 70.

Hartshorne prefers analogical language to symbolic language and feels that the ultimate ideas are literally fulfilled by God.<sup>13</sup>

Up to this point there has been considerable agreement between Hartshorne and Radhakrishnan concerning the doctrine of God. However, at this point differences begin to appear and this in terms of the relation of the categories to one another. It is all well and good to claim that the complexity of God requires more than a monopolar description; also to claim that God is both being and becoming, absolute and relative, necessary and contingent, timeless and yet manifest in time. But how are these polar categories related? Here Hartshorne sets forth a logical principle of relation which I find missing in Radhakrishnan's doctrine, namely, that God as concrete or becoming exceeds and includes the abstract or being.<sup>14</sup> Rather than mere monopolar or even dipolar thinking, in relation to the categories, Hartshorne insists that we think in terms of triads.<sup>15</sup> The principle still holds that the categories such as being and becoming go together and that one is meaningful only in relation to the other but another principle, that of inclusive contrast must be added. Here becoming is the whole of the relation whereas being is only a part. Hence, becoming or change is the ultimate category, not because we wish to glorify change but because change can include without loss the meaning of being but the reverse is not the case; being does not include change. This is a rejection of Radhakrishnan's characterization of the supreme as the Absolute or "we limit down the absolute in relation with actual possibilities"<sup>17</sup> which seems to give the Absolute a career of its own. For Hartshorne the absolute is the abstract feature of God and has no meaning except in relation to the whole.

Radhakrishnan suspends logic when he deals with the Absolute and the results are a blending, an integration of the categories. The only way of "knowing" or being aware of the Absolute is by means of intuition. For Hartshorne, the abstract

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13. The language question is too big to be gone into in detail and this would take us away from the main point of the paper. See Hartshorne's discussion in *THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH'S* ed. by Kegley and Bretal. We will have more to say on this below.
  14. *D.R.*, Hartshorne, p. 7.
  15. C., Hartshorne. *Creative synthesis and Philosophic Method*, (LaSalle: Open Court publishers, 1970), p. 100.
  17. S., Radhakrishnan, *I.V.K.*, pp. 344-345.

metaphysical principles, such as those above, literally describes the divine superiority which is a matter of principle not of degree. It may be difficult precisely to say wherein the wisdom of Confucius lies but all we need to say of God is that he is wise and omit all qualifications.<sup>19</sup> Hence, the essential meaning of ultimate categories are fulfilled in God. This does not rule out mystery in God for Hartshorne. Indeed, the mystery of God lies in his concrete actuality, the becoming nature of God which is marked by novelty and is cosmic in dimension.<sup>20</sup> In short, whereas Radhakrishnan holds that symbolic language applies to the Absolute, Hartshorne holds that it is literal language that must be applied to the Absolute aspect of God's nature. And whereas Hartshorne holds that logic is applicable to the abstract nature of the Supreme, Radhakrishnan suspends logic in favour of intuition. This can clearly be seen in each man's evaluation of the arguments for the existence of God.

## II. Arguments for the existence of God

The arguments for the existence of God are the supreme attempt to show the rationality of theism. For our particular purposes, the arguments will support the use of logic in relation to the doctrine of God for Hartshorne, but for Radhakrishnan it shows the limitations of logic in theism.

As we have seen, the supreme is known by direct, intuitive insight for Radhakrishnan and this self-evidence of God within man does not give much worth to the arguments. All proofs for the existence of God are defective if we mean by proof a demonstration that is as compelling as a mathematical proof.<sup>21</sup> The self-revelation of God to prophetic souls is more valuable than the best of logical proofs for the obvious reason that all human arguments are not logical proofs.<sup>22</sup> Yet all arguments for the existence of God are merely a declaration of one's intuitive, immediate experience of ultimate reality. The onto-

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18. C., Hartshorne, *D.R.*, pp. 76, 83, 86. The whole chapter is devoted to the defense of this principle.

19. Hartshorne and Reese, *P.S.C.*, p. 7.

20. C., Hartshorne, *L.P.*, pp. 4-5.

21. Radhakrishnan, *I.V.L.*, p. 39.

22. *Op. Cit.*, p. 219.

logical argument is such a report.<sup>23</sup> If we have the experience of God, then we can formulate the idea of God but without the experience of God, the idea is of little worth. Out of one's spiritual intuitive insight one can develop the idea. The value of all such ideas and the arguments that follow lies in the "fact that our deepest convictions give us a trustworthy knowledge of ultimate reality, perhaps the only knowledge possible and we cannot have such ideas unless we first have the experience."<sup>24</sup> Radhakrishnan states Anselm's argument as follows: the idea of a perfect being necessarily involves the existence of that being. When we think of God, we can only think of God as existing.<sup>25</sup> Radhakrishnan goes on to state, in a very cursory way, the rejection by Aquinas, Descartes, Kant and Hegel and concludes that "the only way to establish the validity of this argument is to trace how the ideas arose."<sup>26</sup> He does deal with Kant's criticism that existence is not a predicate and therefore, cannot be involved in our ideas and hence, we cannot deduce the existence of God from our idea of God.<sup>27</sup> To have an idea of God is different from affirming the existence of God. In conclusion, "discovery becomes proof when what is revealed by intuition is confirmed by the slower processes of consecutive thinking".<sup>28</sup>

Hartshorne would agree with Radhakrishnan that if the arguments for the existence of God must be as compelling as a mathematical proof before they are accepted, then they must be rejected. There will always be premises that are questioned by someone or a formal mistake pointed out by logicians. Complete agreement on such fallible issues or matters seems impossible. Arguments are the attempt to persuade and the strength of the persuasion rests on the strength of the argument. Again, Hartshorne would agree that the notion of a supreme being first reaches consciousness in "an emotional and practical, not in an explicitly logical or analytic form" and that this richness of insight into fundamental experience makes meaningful the idea of God.<sup>29</sup> Then comes the attempt to analyse, to define, to purify and to under-

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23. Op. Cit., p. 220.

24. Op. Cit., p. 220.

25. Op. Cit., p. 220.

26. Op. Cit., p. 221.

27. Op. Cit., p. 39.

28. Op. Cit., p. 221.

29. Hartshorne and Reese, *P.S.G.*, p. 1.

stand the complex experience. Without this religious experience, no idea of God could be derived. Indeed, the idea of God must come from God Himself, that is, "there is nothing at all to think about, under the name of God, unless just God Himself. It is a unique case, in which to think (consistently and more than verbally) about a certain kind of individual.....is a distinction without a difference".<sup>30</sup> Ideas about the supreme being are ultimate ideas and there can be as many arguments for the existence of God as we can distinguish ultimate ideas. All ultimate ideas are summed up in God. Here we shall concentrate on the idea of God itself, from which the ontological argument arises.

The traditional way of formulating the idea of God in philosophical categories was to say that it is the essence of God to exist. Hartshorne feels that this analysis is good as far as it goes but it simply does not go far enough. A third term is needed, namely, actuality: "an essence exists if there is some concrete reality exemplifying it; existence is only *that* an essence is concretized, actuality is *how* or in what particular form it is concretized".<sup>31</sup> Here Hartshorne's doctrine of God emerges: since God is both necessary and contingent one can argue that God is necessarily somehow actualized. The actualization is what is contingent not the existence of God. To put it another way, it is the essence of God to exist, which is God's necessary existence, but God's existence is to be always somehow actualized in some concrete experience which is contingent. When Radhakrishnan restates Anselm's argument, he does so in the language of Kant: the idea of a perfect being necessarily involves the existence of that being. The term "perfection" is not in Anselm. Anselm's term is "none greater" and this can be interpreted so as to avoid the Platonic meaning of complete, infinite, absolute which has surrounded "perfect". Hartshorne interprets "none greater" as the "self-surpassing, unsurpassable greatest (that is, unsurpassable by another) which makes sense out of the assertion, 'somehow actualized' ". Here, it seems to me, Radhakrishnan does not use his own idea of the supreme as both being and becoming but merely accepts the Kantian idea of perfection, in an uncritical way, and therefore does not find the ontological argument convincing as a logical inference. However, I do not feel that the same

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30. Hartshorne, *A.D.*, p. 107.

31. Hartshorne, *A.D.*, p. 10.



reasoning holds if one redefines perfection as necessarily somehow actualized. And this certainly would fit Radhakrishnan's doctrine of the supreme. But we have seen also that Radhakrishnan ultimately rejects logic or reason for intuition in relation to the supreme and we shall deal with that point later. I wish now to deal with the "predicate" criticism.

As noted before, Radhakrishnan repeats the Kantian criticism that existence is not a predicate. But who insisted that it was? Certainly not Anselm, particularly in the third chapter of the *Proslogium*, and emphatically not Hartshorne. Hartshorne argues that the problem does not revolve around existence or non-existence but rather the argument is concerned with the *kind* of existence that can only be applied to God, that is, contingent or non-contingent are the predicates and the argument establishes that only non-contingent existence applies to Deity. "We make contingency and its negation, not existence or non-existence, the predicates with which the argument is concerned, (in connection with the predicate perfection)".<sup>32</sup> It may be that Radhakrishnan is thinking that existence always implies contingent existence and hence does not apply to the supreme. At any rate, the criticism is beside the point. The ontological argument holds that to conceive God and not islands (Gaunilo), or thalers (Kant), or circles (Radhakrishnan) is to conceive of necessary existence. But is the necessary existence of God a logical inference from the unsurpassable Greatest one? We must now examine this in relation to Radhakrishnan's denial and Hartshorne's affirmation that it is.

Though Hartshorne would be the first to admit that formal logic is in an unfinished state, still he would insist that we should use the logic we have to help us in our thinking about God. Logic enables us to make distinctions, to test validity and to explore possibilities in the most formal and least controversial manner. Logic has relevance to philosophical problems in at least three different ways: (1) since thought turns upon relations, logic enables us to distinguish between internal-external relations in reference to the subject and object; (2) model logic enables us to distinguish between the contingent and the necessary, and it enables us to formulate the relation between the two; (3) finally, it helps us to exhaust possible solutions to problems, to set forth

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32. Hartshorne, *L.P.*, pp. 51, 52.

the alternatives so that we might select the most adequate.<sup>33</sup> Though formal modal logic is helpful in dealing with the abstract, the most general aspects of experience, the necessary aspects of reality, yet modal logic must be called the logic of temporality. This is because becoming includes being and the contingent includes the necessary, that is, being and the necessary are only abstract aspects of temporality.<sup>34</sup> If this be the case, then God must fulfil rather than violate the rules of logic; i.e., a logic that takes adequate account of his nature. Logic deals with the abstract features of experience and necessary existence is the abstract feature of the creative becoming of God. For God's concrete becoming is all-inclusive of the actual as actual and the possible as possible, and God's abstract nature is the object for all subjects, for God's necessary existence is the most abstract principle of existence. Hartshorne expresses this formally as  $q-Nq$ , perfection or the unsurpassable greatest strictly implies necessary existence.<sup>35</sup> The rigorous statement of the ontological argument in terms of modal logic is Hartshorne's effort to express formally the "empty though important truth" about the necessary existence of God. God's necessary existence means complete tolerance of all creativity and is the same as absolute adaptability or unlimited power to preserve self-identity in response to any world or situation whatever. Whereas contingency is specific, exclusive or restrictive, necessary existence is compatible with any conceivable state of affairs. This is an argument for the Universal existential tolerance of God.<sup>36</sup> Hence, God's existence neither excludes existence (this is His universal tolerance), nor is neutral to existence but rather requires existence or exists no matter what possibility is actualized.<sup>37</sup> In short, the existence of God is the measure of existence in general and this includes contingent existence.

But also Hartshorne's assertion is that God is necessarily somehow actualized and this actualization is not logically expressible. Creation or actualization is not a logical step but a free act; it represents a self-created actuality. The concrete nature of God is not expressible in terms of modal logic. Hence, Hart-

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33. Hartshorne, *C.S.P.S.*, pp. 82-86.

34. *Op. Cit.*, p. 84. Note his reference to *prius*.

35. Hartshorne, *L.P.*, p. 52.

36. Hartshorne, *L.P.*, pp. 68-70.

37. Hartshorne, *A.D.*, p. 60.

shorne makes the distinction that logic can help us deal with "necessary existence" and we can logically infer necessary existence from the unsurpassable greatest but such logical inference is suspended in relation to creative actualization, the necessarily somehow actualized. Radhakrishnan does not clearly make such a distinction and as we have seen, he blurs this distinction in relation to the Absolute. He suspends reason and logic in relation to the Absolute and leans toward intuition. Hartshorne does not feel that the use of formal logic will enable us to dispense with intuition, but it will help us to clarify the task that intuition is asked to perform.<sup>38</sup> What we need are better intuitions and better logic with which to deal with intuition, but what we do not need is dispensing with one or the other. Hartshorne is critical of Radhakrishnan when he speaks of "limiting down the Absolute in its relation with the actual" which suggests that the Absolute is *more* than the supreme in its relation to the world. Hartshorne feels it is objectionable to use *the Absolute* as an expression for the totality of the Supreme's aspects or to speak of the Absolute selecting among possibilities for actualization. If the absolute selects then it is relative.<sup>39</sup> What Hartshorne would like to see is the use of the term abstract in relation to the Absolute which would indicate that the Absolute is the most abstract feature of the concrete. It is the blurring of such distinctions that troubles Hartshorne. But for Radhakrishnan it is the point at which logic and reason shade off into the Absolute which can be known only by intuition.

### III. Some Concluding Observations

Whereas our western thinker stresses reason, logic in our knowledge of reality, our eastern seer has emphasized immediate, intuitive contact with reality. Both of them agree that we must begin with intuition, with our immediate experiences but they differ as to how far reason and logic can carry us. For Hartshorne, the abstract features of reality can be known by reason and logic can be of assistance here. For Radhakrishnan, we can use categories by which God can be known by reason and logic can be of some assistance but the Absolute transcends our categories, and also our reason and logic and intuition is our best

38. Hartshorne, *C.S.P.M.*, p. 84.

39. Hartshorne and Reese, *P.S.G.*, p. 310.

guide here. Thus, both agree that aspects of the supreme can be known but they differ as to what aspect it is. Here is the parting of the ways: Hartshorne wishes to interpret the Absolute as the abstract and therefore knowable but Radhakrishnan does not; there is a blending of Sankara and Ramanuja but in terms of the absolute, Sankara wins out. Is this merely a verbal problem or is it a substantive issue? I think it is both: Radhakrishnan is not always careful in his use of the Absolute and this raises substantive issues such as the relation of being and becoming. I feel that it boils down to the problem of relation and balance. I wish to suggest two principles that might help us to resolve the differences. The first is Hartshorne's principle of inclusive contrast: intuition exceeds and includes reason. Here intuition has the meaning of the whole of experience whereas reason is a part of intuition. If intuition exceeds and includes reason then the sharper, more adequate our reason, the more meaningful our intuitions. Though this is Hartshorne's principle, it is not enunciated by Radhakrishnan and yet it preserves everything that our eastern seer wants. He wants that which is permanent and complete and this is certainly preserved in the abstract. But he would have to prune off those aspects of the absolute which suggest concrete becoming such as mentioned above. But perhaps this is the offer that each man must make to the other: to correct and amplify our intuitions by means of reason and logic and to support and improve our reason by means of intuition. I have tried to show, in terms of the arguments for the existence of God, how this might be done. If Radhakrishnan would revise his notion of the Absolute and reconceive existence as both necessary and contingent and if Hartshorne would revise his understanding of creative intuition and the importance of the non-cognitive aspects of experience then there would be more compatibility between the two. Hence, there needs to be not only the principle of inclusive contrast but also the principle of creative interdependence. And this means that intuition must not make claims to completeness or finality just as reason must not: each is a source of novelty for the other and each is a prod to greater adventure.

We raised the question at the beginning of the paper as to which position had the better case against atheism. Certainly to argue cogently for theism is to show the falsity of some of the plausible competitors. I feel that Hartshorne is much stronger at this point; whereas Radhakrishnan is brilliant in description, Hartshorne is brilliant in argument. He argues that if the doctrine

of God is meaningful and consistent then God necessarily exists. And if the existence of God is a logical or conceptual problem then empirical atheism and empirical theism are ruled out. For both of our thinkers, theism is a matter of the intellect not of the emotions; i.e. the existence of God is not a matter that can be settled by the heart or emotions although we may feel the absence of God. But the feeling of the absence of God is not to be equated with the non-existence of God.

I must conclude this paper with a few assertions that will not be further developed. Assuming that theism has been supported by sufficient reason in the above, what important practical application can we make of it? My first point is that clarity in the theistic issue provides clarity in one's basic aims and aspirations. Put otherwise, the implicit assumption of this paper is that theism is the only adequate organizing principle of our life and thought and if there is confusion here, then that confusion will show up in our attempts to deal with our practical problems. We face the problems of how we can have freedom with peace or at least the avoidance of totally destructive warfare? How can we bring the birth rate into reasonable relation with the low death rate? And finally,<sup>40</sup> how can we correct the ecological destructiveness with a reasonable good standard of living? I believe that we can develop our reasoning and sharpen our intuitions whereby we can deal wisely rather than foolishly with these problems; where immediate comforts will not lessen our interests in long range comforts—consider the energy crises in relation to the continual production of cars with 400 hp engines; and where value (I have focused that value through religion in this paper) will dominate our existential judgments. I believe that the adequate relating of reason and intuition in religion will help to bring about the political and social reform we need and that both Radhakrishnan and Hartshorne can be of assistance here. But this is a theme for another paper.

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40. The first two problems are stated by Hartshorne in *L.P.*, page 5. Radhakrishnan deals with these problems throughout his writings, but in particular, see his chapter on "Our World Community," in *Religion in a Changing World*, Humanities Press, 1967, pp. 155-182, particularly, pp. 155-156.