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'SRUTI AND SMRTI' — THE UN-VEDIC DEMARCATION

With the growing popularity of the *Vedānta* system, few will deny that there is need for an even greater indepth study of *Vedānta*, particularly *Vedānta* as associated with the versions of the three great giants of *Vedānta*: *Sankarācārya*, *Ramanujācārya* and *Mādhavācārya*, based on their respective interpretation of *Bādarāyana's Brahma-sūtra*, and ultimately of the Upanisads—but why stop there?

Now, the *Vedāntins*, mentioned above, could be said to have agreed that the world is the "manifestation" of *Brahman*, that knowledge of *Brahman* (or *Brahmajñāna*) is the *mārga* "path) which leads to liberation (*moksa*) of the otherwise bounded 'soul' (*jiva*), and further, that *Brahman* can be known only through the sacrosanct teachings of the scriptures. They differed, however, in what each considered to be the precise nature of *Brahman*, the manner in which *Brahman* is said to have caused the world, the status of the individual 'soul' and its relation to *Brahman* in the ultimate sense. These, however, are not the problems I wish to address here, I only wish to draw attention to the respective attitude of the masters towards what they regarded the "scriptures" to be.

In his predilection towards 'sruti' (that which was "heard")

śankara can be said to have disregarded the *smṛti* tradition (that which was 'recollected') altogether, despite the fact that much of the "essence" of *Vedic Dharma* and a re-assertion of *Vedic* truths and injunctions more appropriate to the era the *Vedānta* schools grew up in, is to be found distilled in the *smṛti* tradition. Scriptures such as *Purānas*, *Bhāgavatas*, *Mahābhārata Rāmāyana*, contain some very profound insights and elucidations on certain practices and truths which cannot—or ought not to be—ignored by any school which purports to represent the central thrust of *Vedic Dharma*. If scriptural authority, *śahda pramāna*, is to be a means of knowledge, it should not be confined merely to the selected exegesis of the *Upanisads* alone.

Upanisads express one perspective of the 'revealed' truths and they cannot be said to have succeeded in depicting the truths in any more understandable and tangible form than have the smrtis. The Upanisads may represent a higher level of abstraction and may furnish the requisite arguments for a rational comprehension, where the smrti may provide only a mythological "like-so" story which may have a better appeal to one's intuition than to one's intellect; still, however, that is not to say that smrti works like the Pāūcharātra literature, have missed the truth of Vedic teachings. Even if the smrti tradition were to be regarded as a second-order perspective, the interpretation and appreciation they offer of Vedic wisdom and insight cannot be underestimated.

Why some of the learned minds have taken the *Upanisads* to be the concluding portion—*Veda-anta*—in the sense not only

^{1.} In Brahma-sūtra bhāsya, I. iii. 28 Sankara explains that smrti is called anumāna—inference—because it depends on other sources for its validity, while śruti does not: śrutih prāmānyam-pratyana-peksatvāt; anumānām smrtih, prāmānyam prati sapeksatvāt. In II. i. Sañkara argues that smrti can be denied to have any scope—unless its purport appears originally in śruti (meaning Vedās). Sankarācārya does, however, regard the Bhagavad Gijā to be "an epitome of the essentials of the whole Vedic teaching" (P. 4 Introduction by Sañkara to his commentary on B. G. tr. by Mahadeva Sastri; Ramaswamy Sastrulu & Sons; Madras 1972.) It is

intriguing that Sañkara cared to write a commentary on the *Bhagavad Gītā*, and one also on $Brahma-s\bar{u}tra$, both of which since have attained the ranks *almost* of *fruti* amongst advantins. But this attribution, especially in the case of the latter, seems somewhat arbitrary—for, if Bādarānya could be said to have composed the $s\bar{u}tras$ then there are good chances that the $s\bar{u}tras$ were not "heard" ('revealed'); and in the case of the former, if Sri Kṛṣṇa could be said to have sung 'the $G\bar{t}t\bar{u}$ to Arjuna which Sanjaya later "heard", then it could equally be the case that Rāma spoke is Bhārata and others what Vālmīkī 'recalled' in the $R\bar{u}m\bar{u}yana$.

cf: The Philosophy of Pāncharātra—an Advaitic Approach by Dr. S. R. Bhatt; (Ganesh & Co., Madras, 1968). Also: Vishnu-purānam (tr. ed.) by M.N. Dutt (Chowkhamba Publ., Varanasi; 1972). Laksmi Tāntra: (tr. ed.) Sanjukta Gupta: (ORT XV Leiden, E. G. Brill; 1972).

as the 'end-portion', but also as the 'essence-portion' is neither clear nor convincing. For instance, regarding the status of the classic Yogavāśistha Rāmāyana, S.N. Dasgupta argues that though the work may be included among the puranas "...it is throughout occupied with discussions of Vedantic problems of a radically monistic type, resembling the vedantic doctrines as interpreted by Sankara."3 The Vedic Spirit, truly, never died, it still has not; its purveyors have taken many a guise and it still persists in practices and forms, in ethical-codes and unwritten "sabda" besides the one popularly offered as representative of Vedic Dharma in its more doctrinal garb. Of course, the Upanisads, help to highlight the movement of thought after the Vedic era, but thought, as such, need not be taken to encapsule the whole truth of Vedic Dharma. The Upanisads represent a portion of it-in so far as Dharma is related to thought and 'thoughts' function in the fundamental inquiry for truth,and for that reason it would be more appropriate to regard the Upanisads as foreshadowing the 'darśanic perspectives' or the 'thought-schools' that flourished in the classical period as various 'views' on the teachings of the *Upanisads*.

And what of the mythologies, cosmogonies and folklores enunciated in the Itihasa-Puranas-Tantras? Do they not embrace much of the insights and intuitions of the Vedic "seers"? Or is their emergence to be regarded as part of an independent and distinct body of injunctions and practics evolved in a heterodox tradition betokening elements of worship and devotion which are not (except in the rare one or two instances*) to be found in the Upanisads? What is the significance of the shift in emphasis and almost total neglect of certain practices and rites, along with deity-veneration in the selected body of (sometimes regarded as the "Principal") Upanisads? Does it mean that in an increasingly degenerating era (kali-yuga) man could be said to attain liberation through a path steeper than the one (s) Vedic 'seers' themselves espoused? May it not be the case that a 'stage' in the hazardous path to enlightenment has been lifted out and given undue emphasis sufficient to give the stage an appearance of the path? The Upanisadic stage may be a necessary development to one treading the path, but that does not mean that

the development proceeds by the exclusion of other, equally important stages. Perhaps one would wish to argue that with the *Upanisads* a point of refinement had been reached which culminated in the doctrine of *Brahmasūtra*, *kārikas* of *Gaudapada*, *sūtras* and their multitude of commentaries that followed the major treatises in each school. Of what avail then are the *smrti* works?

Precisely this seems to be the line of reasoning behind the advaita Vedantin's neglect of the crucial development of literature of the smrti tradition. While, on the other hand, one finds Rāmānuja making more references to the smrti tradition and deducing much in the way of practice from this rich heritage than does Sankara. But the development that Sankara and his followers vouch for, if only implicitly, cannot be regarded as the definitive statement of Vedic Dharma, for the reasons pointed out earlier. It may be added that those who look out for the more intellectual portion within the Vedic (orthodox) tradition, are more generally inclined towards embracing Advaita Vedānta, or alternatively, Nyāya (or more recently neo-Nyāya) systems as the apex of Indian "wisdom". There is little doubt that Sankara and Gautama were perhaps two of the greatest thinkers in the Indian tradition but to rest content with structures ("schools of thought") built after their reflections, is to overlook the complexity of the religiophilosophical development through which the Vedic tradition has come to us.

Of great significance, I believe, would be an equally rigorous analysis of the works of the *smṛti* tradition, and in particular the use of *Smṛti* in works of Rāmānuja⁴ and Mādhava.⁵ The richness, from a philosophical point of view, of their work has not been fully grasped by modernity. This is the price modern thinkers have had

^{3.} S.N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume II, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975) p. 228f.

^{*} such as Svetāśvatara Upanisad. 1. 14 & 8-17 and Iśa, Upanisad, 1, 18.

^{4.} Rāmānuja regards Pāncharātra Āgama to have been 'divinely-inspired' which bring to light the "essence" of the Vedās: vedān...suranardura-vagāhāmscāvadhārya tadarthayathatmyavabōdhi pancharatr fastram svayameva nirmimiteti niravadhyam; vedāntesu yathā sāram sangrahya bhagavan harib. bhaktānukampayā vidvān sanchipekşa yathāsukham. Srībhasya II. ii. 42.

^{5.} Likewise, Madhavacharya in his bhāsya on Brahma-sūtra I. i. 3, consider the Pāncharātra (presumably also other fāstras as Mahābharata, Ramayana) to be on par with the Vedās; vedapāncharātrayorekyābhiprayena pancharatrasyeva prāmānyamuktam.

to pay because of their failure to appreciate the smrti literature. It is, therefore, necessary that literature other than the Upanisads be well exploited and investigated for their philosophic worth. There is no justification for dealing with a portion of the Vedās and calling it sruti par excellence. The battle of Vedic Dharma-truth against ignorance—continues to be waged in the apparent folklores, legends, 'myths' and mythologies of smrti literature and succeed as much in conveying much of the "essence" of the vehicles of Sanātana Dharma—as the Vedās.6 It is apt to conclude with an example that brings out the case I have argued for: In the Rāmāyana, Hanuman is asked to explain his relationship to Rāma. Hanuman replies that when he sees himself in terms of his bodya limited physical organism in space, moving in time—he feels very distinct from Rama, i.e. he feels there is an ocean of difference between him and Rama; the latter's elegant pose, command and beautiful body cannot be matched by Hanuman's. But, Hanuman continues that when he thinks of his soul,-his 'psyche', the inner-impulse of life,—then he feels part of Rāma, for Rāma, is the source of life, Rāma is the whole of life-impulse of Life, the Consciousness of which Hanuman is a reflection, so to speak. And yet he, Hanuman, is different from Rāma, as he is not the whole of the life-impulse, Life, Consciousness or the 'Oversoul' which Rāma is. Finally, Hanumān reflects, that when he sees himself beyond the life-impulse, beyond his 'psyche', when he beholds his "essence", the Spirit of his being, the real 'Self', atman, he finds that he is no other than Rāma Himself! He absolutely identifies himself with Rāma; the identification is so absolute that there is no Hanuman identifying—only Rama, the identified. This is the truth of his being as Hanuman sees it—there is the Being of Rāma and no other. Saying this Hanumān breaks into tears and falls at the feet of Rāma. Somewhat legendary, but this clearly enlightens the truth of ananda, cit, sat: the triune manifestation of Brahman as citta, Iśvara and 'atman'.7

I am indebted to Ian Kesarcodi-Waston and Arvind Sharma for their comments.

^{6.} The Sermons of Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa in letter read like the smrti fables, but in spirit are uniquely Vedic, though he tended to disparage the Vedās themselves, only to recast the teachings in his own way; for instance, Ramakrishna reflects: "So many religions, so many paths to reach one and the same goal", which is identical to the Rg-Vedic Dictum: "Truth is one, sages call it by various names". Similarly the more recent "vāhinīs", and poems—especially Bhāgavata Vāhinī and Rāmakatha-Rasa Vāhinī—of Sri Satya Sai Baba, (illustriously) bring out very well the Vedism of Smrti tradition:

^{7.} Strictly speaking, however, there is no implication in Hanumān's account that 'ālman' as such is a manifestation of Brahman; rather it would be more adequate to read here the advaita dictum: 'Ālman is Brahman', for the Being of Brahman is relationless.

Note also how Hanumān's characterization of his 'relationship' to Rāma foreshadows the three 'school-perpectives' of classical *Vedānta*—viz, *Dvaita*, *Viŝisṭādvaita* and *Advaita*.