

a critical study of Collingwood's philosophy of history in the book 'R. G. Collingwood's Philosophy of history'. The positivist-analytical British philosophy makes wearisome, dry reading, not to speak of the inconsistencies and philosophical inaccuracies that would result from any philosophical enquiry identifying the object of history and philosophy. Still, Kanichai has, in this book (dissertation for doctorate, written a decade ago) made a scholarly study of the British philosopher and has given a clear and systematic presentation of his ideas.

The first four chapters present the thought of Collingwood and the last chapter is devoted to the criticism of his philosophy. The first chapter is about the unity of philosophy and history. The universal object of history can be realised only when the historian transcends to the universal object of philosophy. The second chapter deals with history as the perception of fact, a perception which is the immediate awareness of fact mediated through the presence of thought or judgement. The data of the historian is what he is able to perceive. The third chapter considers philosophy as history. The different branches of knowledge are various forms of mind among which philosophy appears pre-eminent. Metaphysics, the science of absolute presuppositions of any science, is historical since the history of every age presuppose it. In chapter four Kanichai explains Collingwood's philosophic theory of history. The object of history is thought as revived and re-enacted based on the remnant evidence of the past in the present. The past thought and its re-enactment in the mind of the historian can be the very same.

The last chapter is devoted to the criticism of the philosophy of Collingwood. The author makes an extensive, thorough and rigorous criticism selecting the three cardinal ideas of the philosophy of Collingwood: historical object, historical method and historical activity. Though the negative criticisms are fully justified, the positive contributions of Collingwood could have been and should have been shown more clearly and in more detail. If a little more attention had been given for clarity, it could have avoided the boredom one feels while reading the book. The spelling mistakes which are not so rare may be a cause of irritation for some. In conclusion, I have no doubt, this work would be of great help for anyone desiring to have an objective and correct understanding of Collingwood's philosophy of history and philosophy of history in general.

*G. Aranjanil*