

THE STATE'S BELLIGERENT REASON FOR EXISTENCE: A RECURRING CHALLENGE TO *PACEM IN TERRIS*'S THEOPOLITICAL ETHICAL VISION

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Abstract

This theological ethical article reflects on the state's belligerent reason for existence as a recurring challenge to *Pacem in Terris*'s vision. Rooted in natural law, Pope John XXIII's social encyclical was groundbreaking for its universal appeal for world peace among states. Political theorists, however, see that the state is organized through wars and the monopolization of legitimate violence to enforce laws, secure order, and achieve peace. In this regard, *Pacem in Terris* responds to the state's violent tendencies through the ethical principles of subsidiarity and universal human family. The practical limitations of smaller social bodies or the United Nations Organization as world authority nonetheless necessitate the continuing reliance on the state, despite its coercive practices, to realize the universal common good. Given this paradox, the article argues that Pope Francis's ecclesial images of the

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Church as 'mother to all', 'field hospital', and 'polyhedron' offer insights to re-imagine the state as a social body based on the commons by unearthing its theopolitical ethical foundations in pursuance of peace.

Keywords: State, Subsidiarity, Universal Human Family, War and Violence, Field Hospital, Polyhedron

Introduction

Written sixty years ago, Pope John XXIII's *Pacem in Terris* (*PT*) remains a relevant reminder of the horrors brought by the Cold War. Initially drafted by Msgr. Pietro Pavan, it was published on 11 April 1963, some months after the Cuban Missile Crisis (16-29 October 1962) that almost led the whole world to the brink of nuclear destruction. While *PT* exhorts the need for states to promote peace through the universal common good by recognizing individual human rights and freedoms, the Cold War period also revealed the belligerent nature of states recurring throughout history. The state, as a social body, continues to be organized through its capacity to employ violence against its populace and wage war on foreign states. Protecting its sovereignty as its goal, the state utilizes force to attain this purpose.

The question on the relationship between war and peace is contingent on the state's violent nature. Since the Cold War ended when the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, the countless major and minor ongoing conflicts around the world have put the state's role in promoting peace into question. Although the Catholic Church exhorts that conflicts should be resolved through dialogue and negotiations, it was only recently that Pope Francis called for the full abolition of its just war doctrine in *Fratelli Tutti* (*FT*, 256-262). This development in Catholic Social Ethics provides an opportune moment to rethink the possibilities of whether a state as a political body that is incapable of war, could practically secure peace.

By rethinking its foundations, this theological ethical article reflects on the state's paradoxical nature as an agent of peace and the common good while being an instrument of war and violence. The article first discusses *PT's* theopolitical ethical vision by focusing on its presuppositions that the state, through its public authorities, must promote peace by achieving the common good through participation in God's moral order. The second part discusses *PT's* positive vision by contrasting it with the state's belligerent nature. In response to this issue, the third section analyzes how *PT* attempts to go beyond the

state's limitations to promote peace through the ethical principles of subsidiarity and universal human family. We argue at this point that despite *PT*'s proposals, these principles are not practically sustainable outside the state's political structure. The last section discusses how Pope Francis's ecclesial images of 'mother to all', 'field hospital', and polyhedron' offer insights on how to rethink the state as a social organization and realize peace and the universal common good.

***Pacem in Terris*'s Theopolitical Ethical Vision: Quest for Peaceful Coexistence among Nations**

PT's theological method is traditionally expressed in the language of natural law as its general structure.¹ Its reliance on natural law makes the social encyclical universally accessible to "all Men of Good Will." Its universal appeal is demonstrated in the God-given "order in the universe" (*PT*, 2-3) and "order in human beings" (*PT*, 4-7). Founded on the principles of "truth, justice, charity, and liberty," *PT* presupposes that peace is not merely the absence of war but based on *tranquillitas ordinis* (tranquility of order), an idea that traces back to Augustine of Hippo.² As Roland Minnerath comments, "Peace is envisioned within a positive dynamic that fosters it and that presupposes the search for an order that is inscribed in human nature itself."³ Thomas Aquinas's later developed *tranquillitas ordinis* as the universal moral order manifested in laws, whose authority ultimately comes from God as its creator (*PT*, 46-47).⁴ This moral order is actualized in the varying degrees of relationships: 1) among human beings (*PT*, 8-45), 2) between individuals and public authorities (*PT*, 46-79), 3) among states (*PT*, 80-129), and 4) men and political communities with the world community (*PT*, 130-145). Peace, however, is not a product of the rigidity of laws. Peace, as Joaquín Ruiz – Giménez Cortez comments, is not a "mechanical order, externally imposed, but an order of liberty in line with the supreme human destiny."⁵

¹ Charles E. Curran, "The Teaching and Methodology of *Pacem in Terris*," *Journal of Catholic Social Thought* 1, 1 (2004) 17-34.

² Augustine of Hippo, *The City of God against the Pagans*, trans. R.W. Dyson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, xiii - xix.

³ Roland Minnerath, "*Pacem in Terris*, Fifty Years Later", *Logos* 18, 1 (2015) 37.

⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1947, II-II, q. 29.

⁵ Joaquín Ruiz – Giménez Cortez, "Con el corazón en alto: *Pacem in Terris*," *Revista de Fomento Social* 68, 2013, 515-527.

Pastorally, Catholics are called to integrate their faith with action to promote peace as participation in God's moral order (*PT*, 151-152). Constant education is recommended to dialogue with non-Catholics about moral integrity concerning social affairs. Such collaboration may even be "the occasion or even the incentive for their conversion to the truth" (*PT*, 158). As A.D. Lee suggests, *PT's* universalist language opened the dialogue of Catholics even with the vehemently atheistic Soviet Union since the issue at hand is world peace.⁶ Despite this openness, *PT* stresses that the Church has the duty to safeguard its faith and morals based on truth in Christ, the "Prince of Peace," who, through his "heavenly assistance," makes societies achieve the "closest possible resemblance to the kingdom of God" (*PT*, 166-172).

Politically, *PT* emphasizes the necessity of dialogue to resolve conflicts through mutual respect for human rights and state sovereignty. This approach contrasts with Pope Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum's* traditional appeal to duty toward persons. This emphasis reflects John XXIII's openness to the changes in the modern world brought by the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights as an expression of human dignity: 1) cultural and moral rights, 2) religious rights, 3) right to one's state of life, 4) economic rights, and 5) right to association, 6) right to migrate and reside, and 7) political rights. *PT* calls the state to guarantee the individual's "freedom of action," while the state structure is guided by just laws by governing through consent instead of force. At the international level, states are called to be guided by freedom to avoid oppression or domination by another country.

Among *PT's* novel contribution is its recognition of the United Nations Organization as a world authority to promote peace.⁷ Although *PT* sees that the UN cannot compel states to submit their sovereignty, it exhorts higher organizations to "respect the principle of subsidiarity" by recognizing the free capacity of lower organizations to contribute to the universal common good.⁸ For *PT*, peace is founded on three motives: 1) truth, justice and vigorous cooperation, 2) removing the threat of war, and 3) peace affects the whole human family (*PT*, 114-116). *PT* condemns the "arms race" through deterrence as the basis of security because it does not foster trust among nations, calling instead for "nuclear disarmament" (*PT*, 128). As Christopher

⁶ A.D. Lee, "After 'Pacem in Terris' - What?" *New Blackfriars*, 46, 540 (1965) 505-510.

⁷ John Murray, "The Peace that comes of Order: Reflections upon the Encyclical 'Pacem in Terris'," *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* 52, 207 (1963) 308.

⁸ Murray, "The Peace that comes of Order," 309.

Hrynkow argues, it was mainly because of nuclear weapons that the Catholic Church started to veer from its 'just war' teaching.⁹ Thus, beyond the generalities provided by natural law, *PT* also has inductive elements as seen in the section 'sign of the times', which are God's revelation of the epochal social challenges that humanity is facing (*PT*, 126-129). Despite its hopeful, if not utopian vision, Charles Curran observes that *PT's* idealism falls short in acknowledging the world's sinful realities that must be redeemed.¹⁰

State Security: War as its Main Reason for Existence to Attain 'Peace'

Political philosophers offer varying reasons regarding the state's use of violence over its populace to achieve security. The modern social contract theorist Thomas Hobbes theorizes the state's necessity to prevent the belligerent "state of nature" among individuals.¹¹ As social contract, individuals surrender their freedom to the state's sovereignty in exchange for their security of life, liberty, and property. In contrast, Karl Marx criticizes the liberal tradition, which is the basis of social contract theories, by arguing that the state only protects bourgeois interests while exploiting workers, leading to class conflict.¹² At the turn of the 20th century, Max Weber writes that the modern state's authority stems from its rational-legal institutions, whose essential powers involve policing people, levying taxes, and expropriating property. Its authority is actualized through legitimate violence to compel individuals to follow the law and thus enforce social order.

A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a 'state' [if and] insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.¹³

Although violence may come from criminals, rebels, or foreign invaders, the state's survival depends on its monopolization of

⁹ Christopher Hrynkow, "Nothing but a False Sense of Security': Mapping and Critically Assessing Papal Support for a World Free from Nuclear Weapons," *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 2, 1 (2019) 51-81.

¹⁰ Charles E. Curran, "The Teaching and Methodology of *Pacem in Terris*," 17-34.

¹¹ Cf. Thomas Hobbes, *Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society*, ed. William Molesworth, London: John Bohn, 1851, I. xii., 12.

¹² Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Collected Works, Vol. 11 Marx and Engels 1848, 1851-1853*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1979, 103.

¹³ Max Weber, *Politik als Beruf*," in *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, Band 17*, eds. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Wolfgang Schluchte, Birgitt Morgenbrod, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992, 156-252.

violence to repress its non-authorized sources. State control is, however, not limited to institutional violence. While referring to the military and police as “ideological repressive apparatuses” as institutions that use ‘hard power’ to control the populace, Louis Althusser sees that civic institutions such as schools, Church, media, and the market are also instrumental in perpetuating the state’s ‘soft power’ as “ideological state apparatuses.”¹⁴

Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari further argue that the state’s main reason for existence is war. For Foucault, the state is in perpetual war because it inherently creates a social and racial divide among its populace. He sees that a state’s dominant group inherently wages war through various disciplinary practices against its minorities and foreign bodies to keep its purity, integrity, and superiority.¹⁵ Deleuze and Guattari theorize that state violence began when the first primitive state adopted the militaristic ethos of nomadic societies, which they call “war machines”, for its defense. By conquering these nomadic societies under the state’s centralized control, the state became a ‘war machine’ itself whose existence depends on waging wars against outsiders to avoid directing its violent tendencies within.¹⁶ Their observations thus invert Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum, “War is the continuation of politics through other means” by stating “Politics is the continuation of war through other means.”¹⁷

Interestingly, Charles Tilly analogizes the state’s core activities of war making, state making, protection of clients, and extraction of resources to organized crime. While the former is legitimate and the latter is illegitimate, both groups operate on the principle of violence to secure these goals. In his reading of European history, Tilly argues that the state’s monopolization of legitimate violence took many centuries to develop in early modernity, when state power slowly dissolved alternative sources of protection such as the nobility, bandits, and pirates. It also centralized the economy through capital

¹⁴ Louis Althusser, “Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d’état,” *Positions*, Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1976, 67-125.

¹⁵ Michel Foucault, *Il faut défendre la société : Cours au Collège de France, 1975-1976*, Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 1997, 70-71.

¹⁶ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Mille plateaux : Capitalisme et Schizophrénie*, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1980.

¹⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Bonn: Ferd. Dümmlers, 1973, 179; Michel Foucault, *Il faut défendre la société : Cours au Collège de France, 16*; Deleuze et Guattari, *Mille plateaux*, 525.

accumulation in exchange for the protection of merchants to strengthen its violent capacity. Eventually, the fear of war in non-centralized societies with more centralized and efficient nation-states forced them to imitate greater powers for their defense. Although modern state-building started in Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations were later instrumental in recognizing the nation-state as an internationally recognized form of sovereign body. By Tilly's logic, the state is thus another term for legitimately 'accepted' racketeers that protect citizens as its clients.¹⁸

Depending on the state as the main political agent of peace and the common good paradoxically relies on its capacity for war and violence. War reveals the latent side of the state, despite it manifestly attempts to achieve peace when dealing with other nations. Despite the state's practical limitation to promote peace and the common good due to its belligerent nature, *PT* nonetheless attempts to respond to the problem of how to achieve peace and the universal common good through the principles of subsidiarity and the universal human family.

The State as an Undesirable but Practical Necessity: The Limits of Subsidiarity and Universal Human Family

PT acknowledges the state's limitations in attaining peace and the universal common good. Recognizing that the modern world has made sociopolitical and economic life interconnected, the state cannot be isolated from the global community since its sovereign interests affect other nations too.

From this, it is clear that no State can fittingly pursue its own interests in isolation from the rest, nor, under such circumstances, can it develop itself as it should. The prosperity and progress of any State are in part a consequence, and in part a cause, of the prosperity and progress of all other States (*PT*, 131).

Despite the increasing socialization of relationships that have been subsumed under the modern state, as earlier mentioned in *Mater et Magistra* 45-46, John XXIII observes that states do not have authority over other states. Since all their governments, in principle, stand on equal footing, they ought to respect each other's sovereignty (*PT*, 134). He also sees that, in practice, public authorities in all states have unequal capacities and influence to pursue the universal common

¹⁸ Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 169-191.

good, making the pursuit of global security and peace a challenging task (*PT*, 135). Although, *PT*'s teachings on subsidiarity and the universal human family provide a way to prevent a deadlock in achieving peace and the universal common good, these ethical principles have their practical limitations, resulting in the continued reliance on the state.

4.1. Limits of Subsidiarity: Individuals, Families, and Intermediate Societies

Developed earlier in Pope Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno* as the principle of "subsidiary function" (QA, 80), *Pacem in Terris* calls on state and global authorities to recognize smaller social bodies' capacities to contribute to the universal common good. Subsidiarity teaches that policies should not be implemented by force but with the consent of smaller organizations. Individuals, families, and intermediate societies in the state have the immediate proximity to address problems according to their specific situation's needs. Instead of relying on higher authorities to meet the needs of its members, it trusts the initiatives of smaller social bodies to resolve their own issues. In this way, they acquire confidence, self-sufficiency, autonomy, and thus freedom, to direct their path on how to attain the common good. For this reason, despite the overarching dominance of universal authorities in deciding the development of societies around the world, *PT* calls them not "to limit the sphere of action of the public authority of individual States, or to arrogate any of their functions to itself" (*PT*, 141). In other words, subsidiarity provides an alternative ethical practice to the management of state's power by decentralizing its authority, decision-making processes, and policy implementation in the hands of smaller competent organizations.

Local organizations, however, have limited capability and resources to resolve the bigger issues that befall them. National security, immigration, mass infrastructure development, and inter-regional environmental calamities are some issues that go beyond the competence of local politics. It necessitates the state's mechanized efficiency, that is hierarchical enough to evaluate, coordinate, and influence local situations. Moreover, the state provided infrastructure and services with greater efficiency than the organized voluntary initiatives of local communities. As Robert Bates and his colleagues argue, it was the state's violent capacity to compel citizens to work and

provide security that developed the potential of stateless societies.¹⁹ Thus, even if subsidiarity recognizes the capacity of smaller social organizations, the modern demand for efficiency and security would necessitate them to form a state as a centralized organization to confront external challenges.

Limits of the Universal Human Family: The United Nations Organization and the Global Community

The principle of universal human family implies that any particular common good should be directed to the whole of humanity's benefit. It subscribes to the idea that all human beings share equal dignity despite their life status and identity (i.e., class, gender, race, age, etc.). It gives reason for the practice of active solidarity with national minorities and refugees who lack privileges in the states where they live. As recognized by *PT*, the UN concretizes the principle of the universal human family because of its institutional role of "maintaining and strengthening peace between nations" by safeguarding human rights (*PT*, 142).

The UN as an institutional realization of the universal human family, however, can only appeal to the state authorities' conscience. It does not have the power to compel states to enforce its resolutions. A key example is the United Nations Security Council, which has fifteen member states, five of which are permanent members (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China). While a resolution needs 9 out of 15 votes for approval, each permanent member state has the veto power to dismiss the proposal in case it is against their sovereign interest despite its necessity for the universal common good. A war conducted by any of the permanent members cannot be practically stopped except by themselves. As Juvenal asks, "Who will guard the guards themselves?"²⁰ Ironically, the UN Security Council's permanent member states are mostly involved in, if not initiating, wars around the globe since it was organized after World War II. Even though the universal human family is a guiding principle that would put a halt to wars, its practice depends on the states' decisions for its full realization.

¹⁹ Robert Bates, Avner Greif, and Smita Singh. "Organizing Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, 5 (2002) 599-628.

²⁰ Juvenal, "Satire VI," in *Juvenal and Perseus*, trans. G.G. Ramsay, The Loeb Classical Library, London: William Heinemann, 1928, 347-348.

The Theopolitical Ethical Necessity of Reimagining the ‘State’

The theopolitical ethical limitations of subsidiarity and the universal human family consequently expose the practical limitations of smaller organizations or world organizations. These practical concerns make the state a continuing necessity, despite its undesirable belligerent nature, to achieve peace and the universal common good. The dilemma of dealing with an undesirable yet necessary social body leads to this question: whether we should just recognize and accept that the state as the best social organization we can have or an alternative efficient, sustainable, and non-violent social organization beyond the state form is possible.

Since *PT*, Catholic Social Ethics have repeatedly exhorted that states should avoid war and violence to resolve conflicts. The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* teaches that war is only justified “as long as the danger of war persists and there is no international authority with the necessary competence and power, governments cannot be denied the right of lawful self-defense, once all peace efforts have failed” (CCC, 2308). Seeing the possibility that atomic, biological, or chemical weaponry could obliterate the whole of human existence, the lack of global authority to secure peace, and the broad interpretations of international laws to justify war, Pope Francis’s *Fratelli Tutti*, however, calls for revising the Church’s catechism by abolishing the ‘just war’ doctrine (*FT*, 258). The abolition of ‘just war doctrine’ thus removes the theopolitical ethical legitimacy of wars to achieve peace. This abolitionist position on ‘just war’, however, necessitates the rethinking of the theopolitical ethical ground that supports the state as a social body.

Questioning the Theopolitical Ethical Legitimacy of State War and Violence

Political security is often grounded on the state’s capacity to inflict violence toward individuals, social groups, or foreign states. Internationally, just war doctrine’s abolition would only be effective if states would subscribe to the idea that wars are no longer a practical option to resolve conflicts. Locally, a state incapable of compelling citizens to obey its laws is incompetent. Local and international crimes are meted out with punishment to restore justice. However, the interpretation of whether particular violent acts or international wars are justifiable pose a perennial contentious issue in any political and juridical administration. Enforcement of justice requires some violent capacity to restore social order whether on a local or international

scale. Linking justice to the state's capacity to enforce it through laws ultimately rests on the political body's legitimacy to employ violent means of control.

Unfortunately, the state's belligerent nature is also legitimated by reactionary political theologies. José Comblin traces its roots to the Hobbesian interpretation of social contract theory, that prioritizes national security over individual rights. The Hobbesian state is the Leviathan that crushes all potential sources of rebellion in the name of liberty.²¹ Similarly, Carl Schmitt argues that medieval Christendom saw the state as Paul the Apostle's *katechon*, the lesser evil that restrains the cosmic evil of lawlessness from manifesting in the world at the critical time (cf. 2 Thes 2:6-7). For Schmitt, Christendom's legitimation of state violence is based on the Roman Empire's political ideology, which was later adopted by the Church Fathers.²² An example of this is Augustine of Hippo, who emphasized justice in state governance or else it would become "great robberies." In the absence of justice, Augustine would rather have a corrupt government than no government (i.e., "abandoned men") at all because at least robbers have their own laws on how to share their loot, thus preventing impunity.²³ Like Weber and Tilly later argued, the thin line between the state and organized crime's use of war and violence to enforce justice and law is the former's legitimacy provided by the populace. The state's theopolitical ethical legitimation of its belligerent nature thus further complicates the problem of achieving peace and the universal common good.

The Commons beyond Divisions: Complementing Subsidiarity and the Universal Human Family

To actualize authentic peace requires rejecting the state's theopolitical legitimation of wars and violence that divides society to 'us' and 'them', thus reconstructing its 'nature' based on the 'common'. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt criticize the negative political anthropologies of Augustine, Hobbes, and Schmitt. Negri and Hardt demystify the claim that the state is the transcendental representation of sovereign interest. They argue that the state does not necessarily represent the multitude's desire that brings joy and freedom. Global

²¹ José Comblin, *The Church and the National Security State*, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1979, 64.

²² Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum*, trans. G.L. Ulmen, New York: Telos Press, 2003, 59-62.

²³ Augustine, *The City of God*, IV. iv.

anti-war protest movements exemplify how states are detached from their citizens. The multitude of people around the world, especially those in affected belligerent states, have challenged state-initiated wars that were conducted in the name of ‘freedom’ and ‘security’. In this regard, a response to the state’s belligerent nature is to re-organize its institutions so that they could go beyond private or public interest by emphasizing the multitude’s desires to develop the commons (e.g., peace, environment, knowledge, health, etc.) since these aspects of human life affect the whole world.²⁴

Working toward the commons challenges the various social divisions created by the state’s belligerent nature. Early in his pontificate, Francis wrote in *Evangelii Gaudium* about the problem of “globalization of indifference” brought on by the dominance of private interests on global concerns (EG, 54). He also warns about the dangers of “ideological colonization”, which is oftentimes state promoted, that threatens the traditional family as a social unit due to liberal-oriented public policies.²⁵ In both positions, the state’s belligerent nature operates through the domination of private interests by instrumentalizing public institutions. In effect, it divides societies between those who have power and the marginalized who lack access to state institutions. As a response to this dichotomy, the commons provide a more inclusive grounding for the formulation of political policies. The commons provide the long-term reason and resources for pursuing subsidiarity and universal human family that could overcome the narrow rationality and practical limits of individuals, smaller organizations, the state, or global authorities. Peace is thus achieved through the multitude’s free concerted and institutionalized actions as various social organizations that are directed to build the commons as concrete manifestation of the universal common good.

‘Mother to All,’ ‘Field Hospital,’ ‘Polyhedron’: Re-Imagining the State’s Reason for Existence

Imagining alternative ways to be a social body beyond the state form is an imperative to actualize *Pacem in Terris*’s vision via positive means. Francis’s view of the Church as “mother to all,” “field

²⁴ Cf. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth*, London and Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.

²⁵ Charles Pope, “‘Ideological Colonization’: An Apt Description of Modern Imperialism,” *National Catholic Register*, 28 September 20, <https://www.ncregister.com/blog/ideological-colonization-an-apt-description-of-modern-imperialism> [accessed 28 September 2023].

hospital," and "polyhedron" offers a promising theopolitical ethical grounding for social organizations to address the common issue of peace (EG, 210, 236).²⁶ A social body that is 'mother to all' shows how institutions should be nourishing not only to its citizens but to non-citizens as well. The 'polyhedron' is an image that recognizes the variety of perspectives in contrast to a 'sphere' that abolishes differences. A 'field hospital' provides humanitarian assistance to everyone regardless of which side they belong to in war. Francis's metaphors are in contrast to the state's belligerent nature that treats the 'other' as a threat. Achieving authentic peace thus requires the state or any social organization to recognize differences while finding ways to dialogue about common concerns.

Francis's ecclesial images provide a theopolitical ethical principle that nobody should be excluded when it concerns common issues. The applicability of a theopolitical ethics based on inclusion in state-building, however, remains a practical challenge since it is designed to give special privileges to its productive citizens over minorities while violently castigating socially deviant members. Traditional political practice tends to transform social reality by neglecting people (e.g., poor, handicapped, dissidents, criminals, rebels, sexual and racial minorities, foreigners, sinners) who do not conform to the ideals of political authorities in state-building. In this regard, political authorities should be practically cognizant that inherent differences exist in their societies, which consequently means responding to the various interests affecting the common. They should aim to resort to non-violent solutions to non-state violence by addressing the key causes of criminality or rebellion (e.g., poverty, lack of representation). They must also accept that peace and the universal common good are grounded in policies that result in the harmonious integration of internal and external differences instead of forcing identities based on narrow ideals. Thus, peace as tranquility of order is actualized through inclusive relationships among social bodies' different members, whose aim is to promote the universal common good instead of merely invoking individual rights or state sovereignty.

²⁶ Antonio Spadaro, *Interview with Pope Francis*, 21 September 2013, http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2013/september/documents/papa-francesco_20130921_intervista-spadaro.html [28 August 2020].

Conclusion

PT offers a theopolitical ethical vision for peace as *tranquillitas ordinis*, the harmonious moral order of relationships that participates under God's universal authority. To realize this, *PT* advocated that states should respect human rights, govern through consent, and resolve conflicts through dialogue. These endeavors are guaranteed through the UN's creation as the world authority that could foster the universal common good. For *PT*, subsidiarity and universal human family actualize peace by urging the state to recognize smaller organizations' free capacity to promote the common good while directing its policies beyond the confines of its sovereignty. *PT*'s optimistic view of global political affairs, however, falls short of acknowledging the state's belligerent reason for existence.

As political thinkers argue, the state's purpose is war. It is a social body aimed at creating racial and social divide. It monopolizes legitimate violence to coerce its inhabitants to obey laws while securing its populace from outside threats. The state's capacity to inflict violence on individuals and communities is a paradoxical indicator that it can guarantee peace, security, and order.

Recognizing the state's limitations, *PT* teaches the ethical principles of subsidiarity and universal human family to provide a way to go beyond the state as the agent of peace. Their actualization through smaller organizations or world authorities, however, has practical limitations brought by the former's lack of resources and efficiency and the latter's respect for the states' sovereign interests. Unless an alternative social organization beyond the state-form is realized, *PT*'s endeavors for peace would still depend on the state's coercive tendencies.

The state's belligerent purpose thus poses a recurring challenge to *PT*'s vision. Francis's images of 'mother to all', polyhedron, and 'field hospital' could offer a theopolitical ethical grounding to reimagine a viable social organization that does not require the state's violent capacities. Although the task of rejecting the state's belligerent nature can be accomplished at the level of theopolitical ethical imagination, its concrete actualization, however, remains a practical challenge for social thinkers to ponder.