RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN SECULAR SOCIETY: REFLECTIONS ON THE RATIONALE AND (FUTURE) FORM OF RELIGIOUS TEACHING IN GERMANY

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Abstract

This essay addresses the current state and the future of religious education in Germany. In accordance with the German constitution (Grundgesetz), religious education is part of the regular curriculum of the public education system of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is faith-oriented and denominational. The question of the future of religious education as a faith-oriented and denominational school subject arises in light of massive changes in the religious landscape in Western Europe and, especially, in the face of an increasing plurality of religions and worldviews. This essay argues that, in light of religion regaining importance in the public sphere in Western Europe, being educated about religion becomes a necessary tool for acting in society. In the German education system, currently, there is no provision for religious education for non-religious people because of the denominational orientation of religious education. To reflect on this subject, first, this essay will give reasons for and a legitimation of religious education in the German public education system. After that, it will present ideas for an appropriate form of religious education in

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the public education system. These ideas refer to the organisational form, contents and didactical approaches.

Introduction

In modern, secular societies, with their constant and accelerating processes of change and transformation, the question of religious education is raised again and again. While the question of whether religious education should exist at all in the state education system is a question that does not always have to be answered in the European context (even if the question is repeatedly posed by certain quarters), the question "*why* should it exist?" (i.e. the reasons why religious education should have a meaningful role in the state education system of European states) is a question that needs to be repeatedly addressed. Closely tied to the rationale for religious education is then the question of "how" such a religious education should be organized. The question of forms of organization then immediately involves questions of implementation, of didactics. A lot is currently happening in the German-speaking countries in this respect. It is a time when, faced with social changes, we need to think again about whether there is a place in the state education system for religious education; and, if so, how this can be justified or legitimized. This raises questions as to how such a religious education would be organized and taught.

These questions will be discussed with regard to religious education as a statutory subject in the state school system of the Federal Republic of Germany. To this end, an educational rationale for religious education in the public sphere will first be provided. Issues of how to organize and model religious education in the current circumstances will then be discussed and located in a European context. To begin with, though, the current challenges facing religious education in the Western European context are briefly outlined.

1. Current Challenges Facing Religious Education

What a look at the genesis of the concept of denominational religious education in Germany illustrates most clearly are the processes of change that religious education has had to face anew. The model of denominational religious education still in force in Germany today, a model based on Article 7.3 of the Basic Law, was perfectly appropriate for the conditions of the popular church when

the Federal Republic of Germany was founded. The high proportion of the German population who belonged to one of the two Christian denominations made it seem perfectly plausible for the denominationally neutral state — which, according to Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde, cannot provide itself with its own (normative) principles — to deem the formation of personal (religious) beliefs to be a fundamental good and to transfer the responsibility for this formation to the two large denominations. This made sense given the social homogeneity that prevailed in matters of religion. In line with this model, state religious education was for decades and with few exceptions identical to Christian religious education, and was a self-evident and unquestioned component of state education.

This situation of great religious homogeneity has changed drastically in the past few decades, though, with religious and ideological pluralization, driven by the globalization processes undergone by religion, representing the central challenge to religious education today, and that in several respects. On the one hand, the question is raised with regard to organizational form whether the model of denominational religious education and religious education predominantly restricted to the Christian denominations is actually still appropriate. The introduction of various other religious lessons, such as Alevi or Jewish, but above all the establishment of a denominational Islamic religious education, are already taking into account the processes of change brought about by religious pluralisation. On the other, the growing number of pupils without a denomination has also become a challenge to religious education. The reaction to this has been to create subjects that replace religious education such as ethics, philosophy, values and norms. But, given the social significance that religion currently has in society — contrary to the secularization thesis — the question arises with great urgency as to whether pupils without a denomination should receive no religious education at all within the state education system. This raises the question of religious education beyond or outside a denominational religious education. Our European neighbours have responded to this question in recent years by introducing a religious education that is neutral in terms of denomination, but nonetheless obligatory for all pupils. When denominational and non-denominational models are brought face to face with each other, however, the fundamental question arises as to the aims, interests, purposes and responsibilities of religious education, i.e. the question of what religious education should accomplish, and who decides

what religious education should look like and what it should comprise. This also needs to be thought about anew in religiously and ideologically plural and heterogeneous societies, which leads directly to the question of how to justify and legitimize religious education in the state education system.

2. Rationale for Religious Education from an Educational and School-oriented Perspective

The rationale for religious education will be presented below from two perspectives: from an educational and from a school-oriented perspective.

A first, almost disarming, explanation for the legitimacy of religious education comes today from evolutionary biology. The line of reasoning used by Pascal Boyer[1] is that, since religion exists in virtually every known culture, it seems to be a variant that proves to be advantageous in the process of mutation and selection, or at least has proven to be so in the past, and that is the reason that it spread and that it is now as such simply and tangibly *there*. These considerations thus also draw attention to the human being's capacity for, and thereby openness to, religiosity. To go from the simple presence of religion to the legitimation of a religious education would not be difficult to imagine. But such a pragmatic line of reasoning should not suffice here, and especially so since Boyer also uses it in his attempt to explain the process by which religion becomes obsolescent under modern conditions.

An ideologically plural society is no longer automatically inscribed with a religious dimension of education, and, with the turn from pedagogy to educational theory, religion was ultimately removed by educational theorists from education or the understanding of education. And, rightly, as Peter Biehl explains, "the development of a general theory of education" is "the task of secular pedagogy, which under modern conditions works without theological premises and strictly rejects any theological paternalism."[2] Also, no line can be drawn to the present from the historical argument that, according to Meister Eckart, the concept of education was in its origins, and in its meaning as "inbilden" and "einbilden" (image of God in myself), initially linked to the idea of "*imago dei*." However, it is necessary to

[1]See Pascal Boyer, *Und Mensch schuf Gott. Religion explained*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2009².

[2] Peter Biehl, *Einführung in die Ethik. Ein religionspädagogisches Arbeitsbuch*, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2003, 211.

distinguish between genesis and validity, for what happened in the past need not be valid in the future.

Understood not only as pure educational materialism, however, education certainly is linked to questions of being human, to the question of ultimate reasons, to claims of unconditionality — we could also say to metaphysics, if that did not immediately involve transforming it into theology. Education seeks to enable the subject to open up and interpret his or her self, the world and reality. While religion is not the only means of access to the world, it is an important means; it deals with the existential questions facing every human being and as such plays a decisive role in human existence.[3] Thus, the modern human being does not have to — but can — draw on religious interpretations when it comes to considering the reason and origin of his or her own existence and of the world as a whole, when it comes to coping with contingency, the question of meaning or determining the goal of life, and also when it comes to relating to the other and the mode of this relation, i.e. especially when social relationships and practices of acceptance are foregrounded. Religion is thus an essential (though not always used) interpretative category of life at the individual level of being human, a category to which every human being is entitled. Insofar as education has the task not only of imparting material knowledge to people, but also of enabling them to develop their understanding of self, world and reality, this also constitutes an educational rationale for religious education in the public sphere of society and of the education system for which the state is responsible. The context outlined here means from the perspective of the subject that, because people can seize the possibility of interpreting self and world by means of the system of interpretation that religion provides, such a religious interpretation is a dimension of education — without thereby completely reforming the understanding of education along religious lines, or interpreting the claims to unconditionality formulated above in an exclusively theological manner. This can also provide a rationale for religious education in the public sphere of education.[4]

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[3] On this, see also Jürgen Baumert, "Deutschland im internationalen Bildungsvergleich," in Killius, Nelson et al. ed., *Die Zukunft der Bildung*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2002, 113; Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF, ed., Expertis, *Zur Entwicklung nationaler Bildungsstandards ("Klieme-Gutachten")*, Bonn: BMBF, 2003, 113.

[4] On this, see in detail Judith Könemann, "Religion als Differenzkompetenz eigenen Lebens. Zur Bedeutung religiöser Bildung in pluraler Gesellschaft," in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 133, 1 (2011) 69-82.

But what does interpreting self and world mean today, and what does education have to do with it? Peter Biehl sees the lasting significance of the classical, neo-humanistic educational concepts that are more than two hundred years old in the fact that they recognized the "basic situation of the modern age"[5] in "all its sharpness,"[6] which ultimately means the fracturing of cosmological unity, the prevailing of modernity with all its differentiation and all its distortions, and indeed the inner turmoil of the world. Education is now about enabling people to deal with this "modern situation." This is also the reason why the theologian Dietrich Korsch describes education or religious education as being about developing what he calls *competence in difference*. It aims not at restoring a perspective of unity, a holistic view of the world, and nor at resolving given contradictions, but rather at developing the ability to deal with these contradictions. It is not concerned with the creation of security, but rather with enabling people to tolerate insecurity — that is, with competence in difference.[7] For Korsch, religion is capable of bestowing order on the varied, the opposing, and indeed the different in human life, of relating them to each other, and of bringing the self, the subject, into contact with this diversity. Korsch illustrates this by pointing to the ultimate contingent experience of death, where it becomes most obvious that for successful living a structure is necessary that interprets the variety of human life and establishes a connection (or coherence) between the differences in human life, without dissolving these differences.[8] Thus, if it is neither about restoring worldviews, and nor about compensating for what has been lost, then religion or religious education is about what Ernst Troeltsch has described with the beautiful concept of the "capacity of action to exist together."[9] In other words, it is about the ability to "lead a life."[10]

A different approach is taken by the educationist Henning Schluss,[11] who formulates two criteria for justifying religious

[5]Peter Biehl, *Symbole geben zu lernen. Einführung in die Symboldidaktik anhand der Symbole Hand, Haus und Weg*, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1988, 41.

[6]Biehl, *Symbole geben zu lernen*, 41.

[7] See Dietrich Korsch, "Religion – Identität – Differenz. Ein Beitrag zur Bildungskompetenz des Religionunterrichts," in *Evangelische Theologie* 63, 4 (2003) 271-279, 278.

[8]See Könemann, "Religion als Differenzkompetenz eigenen Lebens, 69-82.

[9]Ernst Troeltsch, "Die christliche Weltanschauung und ihre Gegenströmungen," in Ernst Troeltsch, ed., *Gesammelte Schriften* 2, Tübingen: C.B. Mohr, 1894, 227-327.

[10] See Dietrich Henrich, *Bewußtes Leben. Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Subjektivität und Metaphysik*, Stuttgart: Reclam, 1999.

[11] See Henning Schluss, "Religiöse Bildung im Unterricht – Hoffnungen, Einsprüche, Legitimationsgrundlagen und Modelle," in Thorsten Knauth/Eva-Maria

education in the public domain: namely, equal opportunities and link to scholarship. Drawing on Kant's dictum of education for maturity, Schluss argues that the school can be justified as a compulsory institution if it enables those being taught to achieve freedom and maturity, so that they can act independently and self-responsibly in the world.[12] The second criterion is the link to scholarship as a criterion of rationality, which is also related to the legitimation of the school as a compulsory institution. School can only be legitimized as a compulsory institution if a person can learn there what he or she cannot learn or acquire elsewhere. The skills acquired and learnt in school must therefore go beyond what has already been learnt, and be extended to enable pupils to participate in society. The criterion for this is that individual subjects have a link to scholarship.[13] The criterion of scholarship thus functions as a criterion of rationality, in that it prevents "opinions, attitudes, truths of faith, arbitrariness and tastes from gaining a hold in teaching at school."[14]

Religion as a legitimate school subject is now attributed to Schleiermacher and his dictum that everything that is not evil can become the object of pedagogical endeavour.[15] In other words, the object does not necessarily have to be good; it only has to avoid being identified as evil. This means that, even if it has not yet been socially determined how potentially violent or peaceful religions are to each other, it is legitimate to make religion the object of pedagogical endeavour, since it has not been determined that religion is "evil"; however, the diversity of academic perspectives must always be taken into account, and teaching has to contribute decisively to maturity and in this sense to equal opportunities.

Schluss now sees in the processes of secularization on the one hand and of religious pluralisation on the other decisive reasons for religious education at school.[16] Religious plurality demands a link to scholarship, which emphasizes different perspectives on the respective object. This is because, in contrast to the parish context, which is concerned with a lived religiosity, religious education in the state education system focuses precisely on religion from a scholarly perspective.

Kenngott/Rudolf Englert, ed., *Konfessionell – religionskundlich – interreligiös? Unterrichtsmodelle in der Diskussion*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2015, 149-161, 151.

[12] See Schluss, "Religiöse Bildung im Unterricht – Hoffnungen, Einsprüche, Legitimationsgrundlagen und Modelle," 149-161, 151.

[13] See Schluss, "Religiöse Bildung im Unterricht...," 149-161, 152.

[14] Schluss, "Religiöse Bildung im Unterricht...," 149-161, 152.

[15] D.F.E. Schleiermacher, "Theorien der Erziehung," in *Ders. Ausgewählte pädagogische Schriften*, Paderborn: Schöningh, 37-99.

[16] Schluss, "Religiöse Bildung im Unterricht...," 2015, 156

Even more interesting than this criterion is the second reason for religious education, which lies in secularization. If adolescents no longer have access to religion today due to processes of secularization, and if religion, as explained in detail above, is "an object that belongs to the endowments of the world,"[17] then it is a requirement of equal opportunities to enable pupils who do not have access to religion to have access. This takes up again the question raised at the beginning about the necessity of religious education for pupils without a denomination, and also relates to the classical argument that our society can only be understood if something is known about the inseparable connection between religion and culture independently of any individual religiosity. It is also obvious, however, that such a religious education cannot then be restricted to the faith of only one religious community.

What significance does the rationale for and legitimation of religious education given here have for how religious education is organized under the present social conditions? The focus here is on the question of a religious education that can also be geared towards people who are tone deaf to religion or who have no denomination. Some observations will now follow on forms of organization, content and didactics.

3. Religious Education in the 21st Century: Reflections on Organizational Form, Content and Didactics

If we look at other European countries with regard to the organizational forms of religious education, it becomes clear that religious education in whatever form exists with few exceptions in all European countries, albeit in very different forms depending on regional and national circumstances. There are three main models of cooperation: teaching under the sole responsibility of the state, under the sole responsibility of religious communities, or as a model of cooperation between state and religious communities.

Corresponding to this are four models or objectives of religious education: the model "learning (in) religion," which is a denominational approach or introduction to the religious tradition; the model "learning about religion," which as a rule is a purely informative and knowledge-based approach to religion; the model "learning from religion," which is more strongly related to religion as life practice, to identity formation, orientation and dialogue; and, finally, a fourth and more recent model, "learning through religion,"

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[17]Schluss, "Religiöse Bildung im Unterricht...," 149-161, 156.

which sees itself as a combination of the latter two models ("learning about" and "learning from"). [18] There is an increasing trend throughout Europe towards religious education that is both non-denominational and at the same time compulsory, with Switzerland and the recently introduced "Curriculum 21"[19] being one of the most recent examples.

A look at the landscape of concepts of religious education shows that one model now crosses over the different forms of organization and predominates: namely, the model of "learning from." The contours become less clear on the "fringes" of traditional "learning in," often understood as denominational teaching or teaching that assumes a particular position, and in knowledge-based "learning about." Thus, there is now hardly any pure "learning in" in the school context; in Germany, the Würzburg Synod has already drawn with its clear distinction between religious education and catechesis a dividing line here, even if the denominational approach is still most likely to support this aspiration. But knowledge-based approaches to religion[20] are also opening up more and more to a "learning from" model. It is being increasingly recognized that religion and religions are not simply systems of material content and religious beliefs, but also and above all life practice, which is not accessible through neutral information. Thus, if religions wish to be "understood," it is not sufficient to deal exclusively with the beliefs, but rather to understand also the forms of practice connected to the beliefs and the dimension of religion that is existentially relevant to life. Knowledge-based approaches to religion are therefore increasingly discovering what has always been at the heart of denominational religious education; and, conversely, denominational teaching has opened up more and more in recent decades to models of denominational cooperation and to multireligious perspectives. Both models, "learning from" and "learning about," are thus converging, with the once rigid boundaries between the two increasingly dissolving. Englert and Knauth therefore provide the following summary: "Denominational religious education has become much more knowledge-based, and LER [Lebensgestaltung-Ethik-Religionskunde,

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[18]See Peter Schreiner, "Entwicklungen des Religionsunterrichts in Europa. Eine Übersicht," in Thorsten Knauth/Eva-Maria Kenngott/Rudolf Englert, ed., *Konfessionell – religionskundlich – interreligiös? Unterrichtsmodelle in der Diskussion*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2015, 149-162, 123.

[19]https://www.lehrplan21.ch/ (06.06.2019)

[20]See Lebensgestaltung – Ethik – Religionskunde (LER); Religion and Culture, or Curriculum 21, both in Switzerland, or religious education in Great Britain.

or way of living-ethics-religious studies] much more sensitive to religion."[21]

Given the current challenges facing society, two questions are becoming increasingly urgent. First, there is the question already mentioned of religious education for non-religious people or pupils. This question is important with regard to understanding society, which is inseparably bound to religion; with regard, above all, to fundamentalist tendencies and the need to deal with these and with religion as a whole in an enlightening manner; and, thirdly, with regard to the subjects of learning, the pupils, and the extent to which it is not a requirement of equal opportunities to give secularized people the opportunity to learn something about religion. It could also be claimed that the situation of religious plurality creates the need to acquire religious competence independently of religious affiliation as a basic competence necessary to be able to function in this world.

Thus, when the sharp borders between the different models of religious education dissolve, and a religious education for those tone deaf to religion becomes more and more urgent without a religiosity being imposed on them, attention is directed to the question of what a religious education can look like that also addresses pupils without a denomination and a-religious pupils without the intention of missionizing or taking them over. The concern here is with providing not a detailed draft, but a few initial outlines.

In his well-known speech, "Faith and Knowledge," which Jürgen Habermas gave in 2001 when presented with the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade,[22] he pointed out the necessity of "translation," and thus formulated the requirement that religious ideas be translated as far as possible into secular language. Now it is an essential characteristic of religion that it also contains ideas that elude translation, with Habermas speaking of the so-called *opaque residue*. It is already the task of religious education today to make the material contents of Christian religion comprehensible, to be able to justify theological ideas, and in general to lead to a critical discussion with the aim of forming religious judgments. In other words, religious education wants to make pupils able to speak in relation to the

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[21]Rudolf Englert/Thorsten Knauth, "Es bleibt spannend! Bilanz und Rückblick auf die Diskussion," in Thorsten Knauth/Eva-Maria Kenngott/Rudolf Englert, ed., *Konfessionell – religionskundlich – interreligiös? Unterrichtsmodelle in der Diskussion*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2015, 220-234, 223.

[22]See Jürgen Habermas, *Glauben und Wissen. Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels 2001*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2001.

Christian religion, and beyond the borders of their own religious community. Under the present conditions, it is probably even more important than before to illuminate the opaque ideas to such an extent that they can also be understood by non-religious people without their having to be shared by them. The aim is therefore for people to tolerate — but not necessarily accept — these ideas. Insofar as religious education is always already religious discourse, but at the same time also indispensable reflection on religious discourse, religious education demands from the believing person a change of perspective, one that "puts one's own belief at a reflexive distance, but does not negate it,"[23] as Bernhard Dressler has formulated it. At the same time, however, this aspiration is also to be formulated as being reciprocal, and is to be addressed to all those who do not claim a religious attitude for themselves.

A second consideration picks up on the necessity already mentioned for the individual to interpret self and world, as well as on Dietrich Korsch's understanding of religious education as competence in difference,[24] which consists precisely of dealing with contradictions, learning to be tolerant of uncertainty, and having the ability to "lead a life." Being able to lead a life also always means being able to interpret one's own life in its respective context. However, this competence is first of all something purely formal, i.e. the process of interpretation takes place in and with ideas, but is as process something purely formal. Although this formal structure of interpreting self and world now belongs to the human process of life as a fundamental potential, concrete interpretation must be learned as a real process. This also happens in processes of religious education: insofar as religion is a system of interpretation, people can develop the ability to interpret self and world in relation to this system. For this, they do not already have to be religious themselves or incorporate ideas of religious interpretation in their own interpretation of self and world. This means that religious education provides a double learning opportunity here: firstly, by using the example of religion to develop a person's own interpretive competence; and, secondly, by conveying the need to deal with religious ideas and the specific interpretive system of religion as part of the life world of society.

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[23] Bernhard Dressler, "Überlegungen zu einem evangelischen Bildungsverständnis," in Thorsten Knauth/Eva-Maria Kenngott/Rudolf Englert, ed., *Konfessionell – religionskundlich – interreligiös? Unterrichtsmodelle in der Diskussion*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2015, 137-148, 143.

[24] Korsch, "Religion – Identität – Differenz. Ein Beitrag zur Bildungskompetenz des Religionunterrichts."

Joachim Willems has put forward a proposal for a subject-specific didactic approach that meets the need to develop in religious education not only religious ideas and beliefs, but also the practical dimension of religion. Taking a knowledge-based perspective on religion, this proposal does not stop at a pure transfer of knowledge, but also seeks to enable a "learning from" religion. Following the model of Clifford Geertz's "thick description,"[25] Willems proposes dealing closely with religious traditions so as to understand the deep structures of religion. The main aim here is to reconstruct religious phenomena, perspectives and traditions in their canonical and life-world contexts, and to understand them in their deeper structures of meaning. Phenomena, traditions, etc. are thus interpreted "with the aid of those interpretations with which the persons involved in the phenomena themselves, to our knowledge, interpret this situation."[26] It is therefore about the reconstruction of other symbol systems and the development of interpretive competence. Ultimately, according to Willems, it is a matter of training the ability to describe thickly.

In addition to thick description, the methodological approach of changing perspective also represents a rapprochement with the understanding of religious phenomena. For, the core of changing perspective consists in becoming involved with another perspective cognitively and emotionally, and understanding it in this way. This is about understanding and not about taking the other position, and could also open up phenomena of religious practices.

4. Concluding Remarks

Although denominational religious education is deeply embedded in Germany due to the Basic Law, religious education has to deal with and react to the challenges of a changed religious and non-religious landscape. Religious education encounters four demands that encompass the various organizational models.[27] First, religious education has the task of reflecting on anthropological borderline experiences, such as the experience of finiteness and unconditionality, and the tension that lies between them. It should be added that, in line with the Würzburg Synod,[28] religious education

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[25] See Clifford Geertz, *Dichte Beschreibung. Beiträge zum Verstehen kultureller Systeme*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1983.

[26] Joachim Willems, "Annäherungen an eine religionskundliche Didaktik," in Thorsten Knauth/Eva-Maria Kenngott/Rudolf Englert, ed., *Konfessionell – religionskundlich – interreligiös? Unterrichtsmodelle in der Diskussion*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2015, 163-178, 173.

[27] Englert/Knauth, "Es bleibt spannend!" 233.

[28] The Würzburg Synod was an initiative by the Bishops conference of Germany to implement the decisions by the Second Vatikan Council in the particular context of

should reflect not only on borderline, but also on basic, experiences. Second, it has to keep certain elementary normative foundations of culture in mind, such as the dignity of the person as unconditionally given and not only as a demand of positive law. Third, religious education should enable people to make religion and religions a factual and critical object, with the main focus here being on the ability already described to switch between using a religious discourse and reflecting on it. And, fourth, religious education has a guardian function. Here, it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of a function that is critical of ideology, a function that is directed not only to the outside and to possible claims to totality such as naturalism or transhumanism or the consequences of certain economic forms, but also and above all to religion and religions themselves, and not least towards itself as religious education. In this sense, religious education is also genuinely inscribed with a political dimension.

A look at neighbouring European countries shows that the greatest threat to religious education is not when it is no longer denominational, but when it is no longer an independent school subject and is integrated as a component into another subject, as is the case, for example, with the subject of general knowledge in the new Curriculum 21 of Switzerland or also in the subject "way of living-ethics-religious studies" (LER: Lebensgestaltung-Ethik-Religionskunde) in the federal state of Brandenburg in Germany. Religion is then discussed above all as a cultural and social manifestation, and it is a legitimate question to ask whether something of the specific approach to the world that religion offers then becomes clear.[29] But, even if religion is no longer taught in a denominational manner, the empirical view shows that it is threatened with marginalization, and this is often enough the case even when religion is taught denominationally. For this reason, the most important consideration under the current conditions is in my opinion the question of how to develop denominational teaching in such a way that it provides both religious and non-religious pupils with an educational potential that does not seek to win over and transform some, and provides others with sufficient potential to develop their own religion.

Germany. One of the best known document from the Synod is that about Religious Education in school.

[29]Englert/Knauth, "Es bleibt spannend!" 220-234, 231-233.