FROM KARMA TO MOKSHA*

Introduction

The relation between action (karma) and liberation (moksha) from the bondage of unsatisfactoriness is often so unclear that some have even criticized, either the possibility or the point of the latter, on the ground that it precludes the former. I want in this paper to clarify this relation by showing, firstly, how Karma-yoga can be practised as a means to achieving moksha, and secondly, how that, once achieved, purposive action among us in this world remains not only possible for the then Perfected One (siddha), but also in a certain form wholly to be expected.

These two simple aims I will approach in the simplest of ways: by exercising reason merely to analyse, step by step, the move from doing things to achieving the liberation in question. That what I say is simply said, should be no demerit. Complexity is simple to achieve; simplicity is far more complex.

Karma and its Traces

It is sometimes said that all actions leave traces inside, or in what I will call “the psyche”, to avoid the scholarly point whether manas or (as I believe) buddhi is correctly the “repository” spoken of here. And whilst it is not clear that all actions do this, nor clear that the “inside” spoken of here is a repository in fact, rather than the sum total of these traces and other states...

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of consciousness (as Buddhism normally would tend to say), without doubt at least many, and probably most things we do, leave such traces.

These traces—call them “memory traces” if you wish—or such of them as are associated with likes or dislikes, give rise to inclinations or dispositions to behave in a certain way when we find ourselves in future situations similar in appropriate ways to those which led to these traces. How they do this is no doubt a matter for psychology, or some other appropriate science describing what we are, inside. But it is easy enough to see why “memory traces” of deeds we liked or did not like should be used by us to formulate standing policies of warming-to or fleeing-from such deeds, or the situations which evoked them, in the future. Nothing is more natural than avoiding what we do not like and seeking what we do. These inclinations or dispositions are called vásanās or samskāras by Hinduism, and, normally, samskāras only by Buddhism. They are “karma”, where this means “what we accumulate inside, on doing deeds”, rather than merely “deeds”. “Karma” is a very ambiguous word with several clear meanings, of which these are two. Here the meanings are so distinct that they have different referents—something outwardly observable, or normally so, in the one case, and something inwardly lodged, or “rooted” in the psyche, as a result of this outward observable thing, in the other.

Now, those traces which incline us towards things bind us to those things by being of the essence of our attachment to them, where this attachment is a mental rather than a physical thing. We can be bound to something physically, by a chain or a rope, or mentally—perhaps “emotionally” would be a better word—when the bond would be nothing so tangible, but rather more often in terms of inclinations to possess, or be in the constant presence of, what we are thereby bound to. To be bound to my wife, or my job, or my Ishta-Devatā, is constantly to want to possess, or be in the presence of, what these things are, or stand for, or to be in fact, perhaps reluctantly, possessed by these things, in the sense that one’s perhaps reluctantly imposed—drive to be in their constant presence determines one’s policies of action.

Accordingly, the kind of vásanās I have, will in part depend on the kind of situation I find, or put, myself in. In which case, because it is overwhelmingly true that most situations I am in are worldly, finite, limited ones, and because it is “only human” to like at least very much what is worldly, it would be vásanās entailing attachment to things worldly, finite and limited I will overwhelmingly incline to cultivate. Let me call these “attachment”.

I will, then, be bound overwhelmingly by my own deeds and their consequences to this world of limits, a world which, on the whole, and in the eyes of most, is riddled with unsatisfactoriness. That it is so is not something I will try to argue in this paper, even if it did not seem to me to be obvious. Certainly our world is imperfect, and to most, this differs but little from finding it unsatisfactory. Strictly speaking of course, “being imperfect” is a property of the world, whereas “being unsatisfactory” would seem to be rather more a property of how we find it. But the difference is marginal, for finding imperfection satisfactory—and I do not mean “satisfying”—when perfection is possible in scarcely rational. Still, dukkha is the term I have in mind in speaking of “unsatisfactoriness”, and though this relates to how the world effects us, it also refers to how it is that it should affect us this way—that it should cause us suffering, pain, disquiet, anxiety, imbalance, and a sense of incompleteness or “wrong-centredness” (the lit. translation of dukkha). It is no mere accident that we suffer dukkha in this world. We suffer it in part because it is this world, and not another.

To most, then, the quest for what is satisfactory will involve a reaching beyond or in some way out of this world, and hence an effort to shatter our bonds of attachment to it. In Hindu terms, it will involve an effort to be rid of binding—karma, that is, of all those vásanās which chain us to this world, and hence to unsatisfactoriness.

How do we achieve this shattering of bondage to attachment? Well, one obvious thing we can do at least to stop the uprising of vásanās is to stop their source, that is, action. But this is, firstly, only a way of stopping the rise of new ones, and does nothing to rid us of the ones we have. And, secondly, whilst embedded in this world, action of some kind is unavoidable. In the words of Gita:

\[
\text{na hi kascit kshanam api jatu tishtati akarmakrt} \\
\text{karyate hi avasah karma sarvah prakrtijair gunaib (III: 5)}
\]
No one, even for an instant ever abides (in this world) without doing deeds (akarma-krt), for one is forced to do deeds, regardless, indeed, all (beings) are, through (the influence of) the gunas born of prakrti (that is, because of what it is to be enmeshed in matter, to have a body in a world of bounded bodies.) Accordingly, “a body-bearing being simply cannot abandon (tyaga) action altogether”.¹

And thirdly, if karma is one’s chosen or appropriate yoga, or path to “union” through moksha, action is doubly unavoid-able. So, on both counts, we must find some way of acting which (i) does not make new vâsanâs, and (ii) gets rid of old ones.

**Karma and Dharma**

On (ii)—acting to get rid of existing “attachment”—a few brief remarks must suffice for now, as it is by way of approaching (i) that our aim in this paper—of relating moksha to karma—will best be satisfied. Broadly speaking, existing vâsanâs are to be eradicated, or “burnt-out” (dagdha) to use the Gita’s term-by doing dharma, where this means, “action designed to establish right-centredness (sukha), integration or proper-order”. Dharma, of course, comes from “dhr”, “to uphold”, “sustain”, “support”, “nourish”; hence, “to bring together”, “to integrate”. In Professor Nikam’s words, “Dharma is like the centripetal force in nature which keeps things to the centre; dharma is the centripetal force in man, society, and the universe.”² This very much echoes St. Paul’s words about all creation “groaning in bondage, awaiting “salvation”.

Professor Nikam is of course using the word dharma to refer to the underlying drive all things have towards right-centredness, or, in the words of modern science, the tendency a system has to maintain balance, or equilibrium. In passing, I note the apparent puzzle—since seeming exception—presented by the doctrine of “entropy”; the suggestion, now widely made by modern science, that the Cosmos is running down, and coming to a halt. This is of course exactly what Hinduism teaches in saying we are now in the Kali-Yuga. For this is that “dark”—age when all things are decadent, on the brink of dissolution (Pralâyag), when, in the words of the masterful Irish poet much influenced by Indian thought, W.B. Yeats:

> “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world”. (The Second Coming)

But this is no real puzzle, being properly understood in terms of a higher order, and a deeper centre. It is centring things in the Ultimate that truly matters; And That in the end stands outside of time and space, or the samsara-cakra, wherein alone things can fall apart and fail to hold.

Now, this “centring”, or “balancing”, or “integrating” in the case of mankind naturally means, “living in terms of what he really is (âtman), a knowledge of which he will not achieve until moksha gives rise to Enlightenment or, in the wonderfully succinct phrase or the Gitâ, Brahman-Nirvâna (B.G. II: 72; V: 24-26). This latter, it is important to stress in passing, is no tendentious claim, wanting in justification, but a simple one, based on one scarcely disputable premiss—that what I presently think I am is not an accurate picture of what I really am. It is clear to most of us that we do not understand ourselves very well, to most, indeed, that we understand ourselves very ill. So that what we are has yet to be found out. “Enlightenment” is simply a word referring at least to what we will find out in knowing ourselves properly.

Dharma, denoting the cosmic order, when applied to man implies a threefold meaning:

(i) deeds needed to integrate, or establish proper order, within himself;

(ii) deeds needed to integrate, or establish proper order, within or of society;

(iii) deeds needed to integrate, or establish proper order, within or of the Cosmos.

And these, I believe—thought at least the first raises questions I cannot deal with here—could be summarized as: (i) authentic art; (ii) authentic morality; (iii) authentic religion. And because, what I mean by “art” is, “an effort truly directed to expressing and promoting what one is”, and by “morality” and “religion”, a similar effort to express or promote, in the first

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case, what others are, and in the second, what the Cosmos ultimately is, all such behaviour must, *eo ipso*, be directed away from any stress upon, and hence attachment to, what these things are not, and so away from unsatisfactoriness. In which case, *dhārmic* behaviour, which is what this now clearly is, must lead away from, circumvent, or, if you wish, "burn out", all presently existing *vāsanās*, since it is explicitly behaviour which in no way flows from them. They may continue to exist as psychic (or whatever) realities, but the person, whose ones they were, has disowned and detached himself from them.

What now, though, of how to be sure that no new *vāsanās* arise, especially given that at least many, perhaps most of our deeds do not appear to be any of (i) to (iii), in the sense in which these terms are understood to mark off forms of behaviour from other forms? Normally, artistic, moral and religious behaviour fall into quite specific categories which mark them off from probably most of ordinary daily, deeds we do. So that, whilst *dhārmic* behaviour which truly directs itself to what these things (one's person, that of another, or the Cosmos) really are—and we must remember that our *dhārmic* efforts can be more or less successful, or, if we do not want to call behaviour which tries to direct itself properly, but fails, "*dhārmic*", then, our efforts to be *dhārmic* can be more or less successful—whilst truly *dhārmic* behaviour will not accumulate new attachments, being behaviour which breaks attachment by leading away from what we are bound to, or by, the problem nonetheless remains. Therefore, much and likely most of our behaviour seems not to be *dhārmic* in this quite specific sense.

The answer here is a simple one. Part of the genius of most wisdom profound in its "life-style"—altering effect is its simplicity. It's what one should expect, of course, given that the life's wisdom is directed at changing are not merely those of deep-thinkers, but predominantly those of simple people. The simple secret, then, is that of adopting a certain attitude—the attitude of simply not wanting the "fruit" (*phala*) which might come from this bounded world of unsatisfactoriness, as a result of acting in it. Any worldly products which might come are neither here nor there, a matter of total indifference. (See, for instance, *B.G.* II:47-51). Whether, in other words, one's deeds succeed or fail of their worldly aim is not a concern which in any way troubles their doer, whose attitude is one of *utter detachment* from any worldly product deeds may bring. His attitude to them is "stabilized" or "samed" (*samo bhūtvā; *B.G.* II:48). This is the attitude, or orientation of person, the *Gītā* advances as *nirbhāma karma*, or "desireless deeds".

The actual term "*nirbhāma karma*" occurs nowhere in the *Gītā* but terms very close to it do, and the doctrine unmistakably does. Perhaps the most cogent expression of this doctrine is centrally located in the very final chapter, showing its importance to the author. In the words of the second *slokas* of this chapter:

\[
\begin{align*}
kāmyānaṃ karanānāṃ nyāsaṃ \\
saṃnyāsaṃ kavayo vidūḥ \\
sarva-karmaphaletyāgam \\
prābus tyāgam vicakshanāb
\end{align*}
\]  

(*B.G.* XVIII: 2).

This I would render as follows:

The renouncing of desireful-deeds the Sages regard as true *saṃnyāsa* (i.e. authentic renunciation of unsatisfactoriness); 'all action-fruit' abandonment the Wise declare to be true *tyāga* (i.e. authentic abandonment of unsatisfactoriness).

Or again: "a body-bearing being simply cannot abandon action altogether; but he who abandons *karma-phala* is truly called a *tyāgi* (authentic abandoner of attachment to unsatisfactoriness)."

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ni bi dehabhrā sakyaṃ} \\
\text{tyaktum karmāni asebatah} \\
yas tu karmaphaletyāgi \\
\text{sa tyāgi iti abhidhiyate}
\end{align*}
\]  

(*B.G.* XVII: 11).

The doctrine is clear; and is made clearer still in the context of the rest of this chapter, especially *slokas* 1 to 17. (See also, *II*: 47-48; *III*: 4; *V*: 18-28).

In brief, then, acting with no desire (*kāma*) for the worldly, and hence unsatisfactory "fruits" of one's deeds, is the simple key to action which produces no further attachment. It is in the end also the key to being rid of the ones we have, or at least being rid of their influence, to not being a prey to attachment. For if one acts with *nirbhāma*, one thereby acts in a detached way, so not in an attached way, so not in a way motivated by attachment.

And when one's deeds *also* are *dhārmic*, then, not only do they lead away from the domain of *vāsanā*, by creating no new ones and abrogating the influence (at least) of old ones, but they
also lead one towards moksha by, of their very nature, promoting that right-order which is proper self-understanding.

Kāma, Nishkāma, and Mumukshutva:

One word is perhaps needed here. In teaching that deeds must be “desireless”, or not motivated by any “inclining traces” (vāsānas), the Gītā is not abrogating all “desires”, where by this let us now more explicitly mean, “drives to get or achieve or possess something for oneself”. For, in the Gītā as elsewhere, one desire is explicitly advocated—namely, and simply, desire for release from the bondage of unsatisfactoriness, that is, for moksha, and hence for release from the bondage of all other desires. It is this “desire” which Saṅkara in his Vivekacudāmanī, and Sadānanda, in his Vedāntasūtra, specify as one of the important preconditions an authentic sisiba must satisfy to be worthy of teaching—namely, mumukṣutva, which the latter work quite explicitly defines as “mokṣa-desiring” (“mumukṣutvā-mokṣecca”, Vedāntasūtra, sect. 25).

In brief, then, all attachment-promoting, possession-acquiring kāma is here spoken against, which in effect means, overwhelmingly most kāma. All, indeed, but that single desire (mumukṣutva) in the name of which all other desires are deplored. And it is as well to note that since the single exception has the Spiritual goal as its end, it is not a desire for something one even could get attached to or jealously possess. It is a desire for full realization, through full knowledge, or what you really are; hence not for something you might have which would, eo ipso differ from you. And whilst you can, in a sense, be attached to your vision of this goal before you get there, when you get there, what you then “get” is no possession, but simply what you are, now properly understood. What you are is not a thing you can have like other things, for having things involves a certain twosome: the haver, and thing had, (which differs from him). But there is clearly no sense in which what you are, the making consciously real of which is the goal of the Spiritual quest, can differ from what you are, as haver or otherwise.

What is more, it is claimed—though I will not argue this case here, which is anyway only provable in and through the realization in question—that what is then attained to proves to be unbounded, indeed, of the nature of freedom, per se. If so, it cannot be “possessed” for yet another reason—that you cannot “possess” something with no boundaries.

Now everything I have said of course means that when you do achieve the Spiritual goal of moksha, then there assuredly is absolutely no kāma, in the sense of “drive to get or achieve or possess something for oneself”, because then, not even the only kind of laudable desire—mumukṣutva—is any longer either relevant or possible. One could have no reason for desiring something one knowingly has; and unless one were in some strange way divided against oneself, as the realization in question would of its nature ensure one was not, nor could one even possibly desire something one knowingly has. And it is this, the absolutely desireless nature of the jivanmukta (living-released one), or siddha (perfected-one), which sometimes leads to puzzles about the possibility of such a one acting in our world.

The American philosopher, W.T. Stace, well presents these puzzles in the following dialogue between himself and a Buddhist monk:

Stace: Nīvāna is said to be the cessation of all craving. But a man cannot act, cannot even breathe, without desire, so how can Buddha walk, eat and sleep without desire?

Buddhist: He will have the usual desires, but he is detached from them. His desires will not be egoistic.

Stace: Is egoistic the same as selfish, detached the same as unselfish?

Buddhist: No. In detachment the desire is ‘rootless’. It is not rooted in the self. Action takes place and is motivated by desires, but the inner personality remains withdrawn and not involved in the desires. If the desires of the man who is detached are not fulfilled he remains serene and unaffected because his personality is not involved; but those who are still attached may become neurotic, as so often happens, especially in the West.

Stace: It is difficult to understand how a man can have a desire and not be involved in it. It sounds like having a desire and yet not having it.

Buddhist: Yes. I think this kind of impersonality has to be
experienced before it can be understood. It is part of the ‘enlightenment’ experience. 3

And whilst I would prefer to speak of “attainment” or “realization” and not “experience”, for the latter in its usual usage involves a twosome—experiencer and his object—whereas the former two need not, the message here is clear namely, that people we have every reason to believe are Enlightened act in the bounded world is beyond doubt, even should they do prove baffling, indeed.

But these are issues I will return to later, and for now it is relevant only to note that, though there may be no desire present to a siddha, in the sense of, nothing he wants or could want, to get or achieve for himself, he still may well have some purpose in acting—namely, what he would like others to get. Briefly, though action by a siddha cannot in any way relate to promoting moksha for this being—because this being has it—it can relate to promoting it for others. Some of this is a little premature, however, and I want to expose it gradually by now addressing another seeming puzzle about moksha so far left untouched, and also by relating what I now want to say back to our earlier discussion of dharma.

Moksha, Nirvāṇa and Ātma-Vidya

At first it may seem not to follow that moksha necessarily ensures ātma-vidyā, and so at least the necessary pre-condition for wisdom about right (dārmic)—behaviour in its regard—for except by extraordinary chance, doing what is best for a person involves knowing what will “fulfil” him, and this must involve a knowledge of the “him” to be fulfilled. Merely being rid of what binds me to ignorance (avidyā) about my true nature—i.e., merely achieving moksha—may not of itself ensure or bring with it full knowledge of this nature. Certainly, though, at least the portals to Enlightenment would now have been opened, for nothing now could influence me other than in the direction of proper self-knowledge. And something which removes all hindrance to

Enlightenment—it will prove important now to note—cannot be other than “right-order” (ṛta)—promoting, since, by definition, it does none other than remove obstacles to truth—the truth about one’s person. And it is acting in terms of “truth”, in the sense of the true nature (tattva) of things, which establishes right-order, ex hypothesi.

But despite this cautionary note, there is no real reason to doubt that moksha will do other than always result in what the Gītā aptly calls “Brabman-Nirvāṇa”, that is, the Enlightenment of full ātma-vidyā. For if all obstacles to my self-knowledge have been removed, so nothing could influence me but to satisfy the Delphic Oracle’s injunction, only one other premise is needed to conclude that I will, because must, know myself—namely, that what “I” am at ātman always shows itself when nothing stops it doing so. And I believe we can offer a simple argument to vouchsafe this premise. Briefly, if nothing stops it, if all the obstacles to its knowledge and expression have been removed, then what is there, wakefully present to me (or to my awareness), must simply be what it is. For I always am what ātman, whether this is hidden by these obstacles from me (my wakeful awareness), or not. And, simply, if it is not hidden, if nothing keeps me from it, it just is there, as “object” (as well as “subject”) of any self-awareness I could have. Nothing could be simpler. And if what it is just is there—since nothing now clouds or fosters delusion about its nature—it not only now is true that nothing hinders my clear view of it, but also true that only what it is, and nothing else, can be present to me as what I am. If so, my self-knowledge must now be truly of what I am, must, that is, be ātma-vidyā performe.

Moksha and the Purpose of Action:

Returning now to the issue of action and its purpose, we note that what is not being said in advocating nisbhāma karma is that one should not be concerned about results of action. Indeed, it is being affirmed that, in nisbhāma karma, one is, or should be, wholly concerned that results of one’s and of others deeds be of one quite specific kind—moksha—promoting. And this, we have noted, comes down to saying that one’s concern here must extend to:

(a) seeing that one’s deeds are of a kind that are dārmic;


2
and (b) seeing that one does this kind of deed—roughly what we would call “good” as distinct from “bad”—so that, in detail, they are dharmic.

This is why the common translation “being indifferent to success or failure” for the Gita’s “siddhyasiddhyah samo bhūtvā” (II:48), is likely to be misleading, and why “stabilized” or the more literal “samed” are better. It is not that one should be wholly indifferent to outcome, no matter what, for one’s concern should always be that moksha, its possibility for oneself or another, either be enhanced or not hindered by one’s every deed. It is rather that, in the first place, one remain steadfast (stana), tranquil, unmoved, or “the same”, whatever be the outcome, success or failure, of one’s deeds, and, in the second, that worldly fruits, or their lack, be a matter of no concern.

Accordingly, justifiable purpose in acting can be twofold:

(i) moksha-promoting for oneself; and
(ii) moksha-promoting for others.

Which leads to one very important, though very simple corrective to the very common misunderstanding that achieving moksha can leave no room for justifiable action, no room, that is, for acting with justifiable purpose or intent. Professor Ingalls, for instance, could be guilty of this blunder when he remarks, “Moksha is a state where there can be no change, where there can be no plurality. Accordingly, moksha excludes action... One must get rid not only of immorality (adharma), but of morality (dharma) also.”

Two obvious things bear comment here. Firstly, the initial fact that moksha is not a “state”, being rather the more abstract pre-condition for the “state” of Enlightenment or Nirvāṇa presumably in question—and it is obviously doubtful that “state” is the right word, in any case, even for these. Moksha is “the being liberated from obstacles to this ‘state’”, and not the then resultant “state” itself. Secondly, it is anyway obvious that only one of the purposes one might justifiably have for acting has been rendered redundant in achieving moksha. And whilst Ingall’s objection is in part the unexciting metaphysical one that, in

a boundless, changeless “state” action is not possible, there is all the difference in the world between acting in that “state” (which is metaphysically impossible), and acting from it, in another.

His objection is clearly more than this, though, he goes on to say that “one must get rid not only of immorality (adharma) but of morality (dharma) also”, making it clear that, in achieving moksha, one goes beyond he believes dharma altogether. But this is not true, or at least need not be, for there is clearly a form of dharmic action not only open to, but also to be expected of the siddha, or Perfected One—namely, moksha-promoting for others. Given that others cannot break themselves into Enlightenment without aid, it is clearly incumbent, metaphysically more than morally, on the siddha to assist them in doing so. It is ever true that God cannot leave us comfortless. In part, confusion here is due to the fact that the notion of a being acting from the siddha—“state”, in another, has two aspects not clearly disengaged by careless statements like “moksha excludes action”—namely, how such one might act in this way, and why he should.

How a being who achieves moksha, and so really dwells in Nirvāṇa, can behave so that he also at least appears to dwell and act among us, may prove most difficult to fathom. But it is not a problem peculiar to Hinduism, but the general puzzle of how the Ultimate, being Infinite, can ever be incarnate. This Kierkegaard described as Christianity’s central paradox, and its greatest scandal; and St. Paul as, “foolishness to the Greeks (whose logic could admit no such possibility), and a stumbling block to the Hebrews (whose tradition could not admit an incarnate servant—(Messiah)).” And though mystery in the quite literal sense of mystery (“hidden”) it may well be to the less-than-Enlightened, the fact is that it nonetheless is claimed, and quite clearly evidenced to be. For there is about the truly Enlightened One, the buddha, the jivan-mukta, or siddha, that which can only be adequately accounted for on the hypothesis of him being as claimed. Any jivan-mukta or siddha is simply too wondrous and marvellous in all his ways for any less mysterious, more mundane explanation to hold good about his person.

The seeming “hiddenness to mind” (mysterion) of how it is that a siddha operates in this world is well brought out by the dialogue I quoted earlier between Stace and the Buddhist monk. For the latter’s final reply to Stace’s disingenuous suggestion that desireless action seems inconceivable is, “Yes”. I think this kind

of personality has to be experienced before it can be understood. It is part of the "Enlightenment experience." In other words, how a being who is detached from those things which once bound him to this world can nonetheless continue to act in this world, may prove hard to grasp for those still attached, perhaps even impossible for all but the wholly detached, or fully Enlightened Ones. And yet, on one simple level, part of the puzzle would seem to be a certain obtuseness on the part of Stace; for there seems no obvious reason why a person must be attached to, in the sense of "possess", something to act in its regard. And if there is not, no puzzle whatever remains about how a person might act towards something he is wholly detached from. For at this simple level, detachment is merely a matter of disowning, of counting as no part of one's essential person (atman). And this I think goes much of the way towards dispelling puzzles about how detached persons may act in this world, by showing the fact of detachment need present no problem.

What of course must remain obscure is how a being whose now understood essence transcends our bounded world can nonetheless be found in it. But this obscurity is not, as often thought, a logical, oddity, but an ontological one, even if we accept Kierkegaard's term of "paradox" for it. It is not a matter of any suggestion confounding or contradicting logic, but of being beyond the reach of any understandings we presently have, since beyond the scope of any experienced being our world has opened to us. Despite what is often said, there is nothing logically strange about the possibility of levels of "being" beyond the limits of any we presently know. Nor is there any logical reason why these levels should not embrace our own as well as transcend them. This phenomenon is common enough, not only in science, but even in the commonest experience a mature person has of life. Maturation is very much a matter of achieving levels of understanding which reach beyond the one we once had, by explaining everything the latter could, but much else besides.

And that there should be levels of being whose understanding gives us more solutions to how things are other than such levels, and so are more ultimate in that way, is not at all odd. Whether there are such, remains, a matter of realising them; and in that degree, how the being of a siddha in fact relates to our bounded world must remain "hidden" to all but another siddha, as the nature of colour is "hidden" to the blind. The latter is more logically odd than the former. Both are matter quite simply of realized ontology, practical problems, not logical ones.

On the other hand, why such a one should so behave, should act in our bounded world, though being not of it (in the way we are), is no mystery at all. He does so because the second justifiable purpose clearly applies in his case. He does so, in other words, to lead others to moksha. There is, in other words, a very simple way in which his action could be dhārmic—the way it which his every deed could, and, by the nature of the case, would be moksha-promoting for others. This is of course entirely the Buddha's philosophy of "compassion", and the reason certain Mahayana Buddhist monks and nuns take the bodhisattva vow namely, the vow not to dwell eternally absorbed in nirvāṇa, but to rather dwell "in" (though not of) this, our bounded world until all creatures have achieved moksha.

But of course, though he may be spoken of as "doing dharma" the siddha can no longer be said to be "doing karma-yoga", since having achieved the goal, he is no longer on the way, so no longer in need of a method (yoga) to take him, or keep him, there.

And yet, he is also that being the Gītā describes as "the true Yogi", the One, and the only One, who is "truly Unioned".